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Security audit

Custom Telegram Bot

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a coherent Telegram bot integration that discloses its AgentPMT and Telegram messaging role, with some privacy and supply-chain cautions but no evidence of hidden or malicious behavior.

Install only if you are comfortable routing Telegram bot messages, media, update metadata, and optional ingested files through Telegram and AgentPMT. Avoid sending secrets or regulated data unless your policy allows it, and prefer pinned or official install commands over unpinned npx examples for related setup skills.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:182
Finding

Unpinned Package Execution in Setup Instructions

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md, lines 182-183; equivalent unpinned commands are also referenced at lines 173, 177, 248, and 249
Vulnerability Type: Supply-chain risk caused by unpinned dependency retrieval and execution
Risk Level: Medium

bash
npx skills add AgentPMT/agent-skills --skill what-is-agentpmt
npx skills add AgentPMT/agent-skills --skill agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup

Technical Analysis

The setup instructions invoke npx without pinning an exact version or integrity digest for the skills package. The referenced AgentPMT/agent-skills source is also not pinned to a reviewed commit or immutable release in these commands.

npx may retrieve and execute package code from the configured npm registry. Consequently, the code executed when a user follows these instructions can differ from the code available when this Skill was audited. The reviewed project contains no lockfile, checksum, vendored setup utility, or other mechanism that establishes an immutable dependency set.

This is a supply-chain weakness rather than evidence that the current dependency is malicious. Exploitation requires compromise or malicious modification of a package, publisher account, registry resolution path, or referenced upstream source.

Attack Path

  1. An attacker compromises the publisher account, npm package, registry resolution path, or referenced upstream Skill repository.
  2. The attacker publishes or serves a modified version containing malicious installation or runtime behavior.
  3. A user follows the documented setup instructions and runs the unpinned npx skills add ... command.
  4. npx resolves and executes the attacker-controlled package version.
  5. The malicious package operates with the permissions of the user running the command and may alter files, access user-readable data, invoke network services, or install additional components.

Impact Assessment

Successful e ...[truncated 682 chars]

Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  1. Pin the executable npm package to an exact reviewed version, for example by using an explicit version rather than allowing npx to resolve the latest release.
  2. Pin AgentPMT/agent-skills to an immutable commit hash or cryptographically verified release instead of a mutable branch or repository reference.
  3. Publish and verify integrity hashes or signed provenance for all downloaded setup artifacts.
  4. Use a lockfile or a vetted, vendored installer so the dependency graph remains reproducible.
  5. Instruct users to verify the package publisher, version, signature, and expected checksum before execution.
  6. Avoid running installation commands with administrator or root privileges; use an isolated, least-privileged environment.
  7. Add dependency monitoring and periodically review pinned versions before intentionally updating them.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (11)

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The skill enables sending and receiving Telegram messages, documents, and photos via AgentPMT-hosted services, but it does not prominently warn users that message content and media are transmitted to external third-party systems. This can lead to unintentional disclosure of sensitive personal, business, or regulated data because users may not realize the privacy boundary before using the tool.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 251)May include surrounding context.

md
- What AgentPMT is: ../what-is-agentpmt (ClawHub: `what-is-agentpmt`, page: https://clawhub.ai/agentpmt/what-is-agentpmt; skills.sh: `npx skills add AgentPMT/agent-skills --skill what-is-agentpmt`)
- AgentPMT account MCP/REST setup: ../agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup (ClawHub: `agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup`, page: https://clawhub.ai/agentpmt/agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup; skills.sh: `npx skills add AgentPMT/agent-skills --skill agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup`)
- Marketplace product: https://www.agentpmt.com/marketplace/custom-telegram-bot
- AgentPMT main MCP server: https://api.agentpmt.com/mcp/
- AgentPMT REST invoke endpoint: https://api.agentpmt.com/products/purchase

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 252)May include surrounding context.

md
- What AgentPMT is: ../what-is-agentpmt (ClawHub: `what-is-agentpmt`, page: https://clawhub.ai/agentpmt/what-is-agentpmt; skills.sh: `npx skills add AgentPMT/agent-skills --skill what-is-agentpmt`)
- AgentPMT account MCP/REST setup: ../agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup (ClawHub: `agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup`, page: https://clawhub.ai/agentpmt/agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup; skills.sh: `npx skills add AgentPMT/agent-skills --skill agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup`)
- Marketplace product: https://www.agentpmt.com/marketplace/custom-telegram-bot
- AgentPMT main MCP server: https://api.agentpmt.com/mcp/
- AgentPMT REST invoke endpoint: https://api.agentpmt.com/products/purchase

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The schema exposes an option to ingest Telegram photo/document files into File Manager, which can cause third-party user content to be downloaded and retained outside Telegram. Without an explicit user-facing warning in the skill description, an agent operator may enable ingestion without understanding the privacy, retention, and consent implications, increasing the risk of unintended collection and storage of sensitive files.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.