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Security audit

Bulk Email Address Validation Neverbounce

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill appears to do the advertised email validation, but it needs review because it can send contact lists to external services and relies on mutable setup instructions.

Install only if you intend to use AgentPMT/NeverBounce for bulk email validation. Confirm you have permission to submit the email list to external services, expect credit usage per address, avoid generic prompts that could trigger this unintentionally, and prefer pinned or reviewed setup skills before connecting credentials.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:188
Finding

Unpinned External Skill Installation Creates a Supply-Chain Execution Risk

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md, lines 188-198
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned third-party dependencies and mutable external Skill installation
Risk Level: Medium

Vulnerable Code

markdown
- What AgentPMT is: ../what-is-agentpmt
  - ClawHub page: https://clawhub.ai/agentpmt/what-is-agentpmt
  - OpenClaw install: `openclaw skills install what-is-agentpmt`
  - skills.sh install: `npx skills add AgentPMT/agent-skills --skill what-is-agentpmt`
- AgentPMT account MCP/REST setup: ../agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup
  - ClawHub page: https://clawhub.ai/agentpmt/agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup
  - OpenClaw install: `openclaw skills install agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup`
  - skills.sh install: `npx skills add AgentPMT/agent-skills --skill agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup`

skills.sh install script:

```bash
npx skills add AgentPMT/agent-skills --skill what-is-agentpmt
npx skills add AgentPMT/agent-skills --skill agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup
text

### Technical Analysis

The Skill recommends executing `npx skills add` against externally maintained content without pinning the `skills` CLI, repository revision, package version, or artifact checksum. Consequently, the content executed or installed at setup time can differ from the content reviewed during this audit.

This is particularly sensitive because the installed Skills concern AgentPMT account, MCP, REST API, and credential setup. If the npm package, source repository, publishing account, or a transitive dependency is compromised, an attacker could distribute modified setup logic or malicious Skill instructions through an otherwise legitimate-looking command.

The use of `npx` may download and run a package that is not already installed locally. Without an explicit version and integrity validation, package resolution depends on mutable registry state. The project also provides no mandatory review or trust verifi
...[truncated 1962 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  1. Pin the skills CLI to a reviewed, explicit version instead of invoking an unspecified release:

    bash
    npx skills@REVIEWED_VERSION add AgentPMT/agent-skills --skill what-is-agentpmt
    
  2. Pin the AgentPMT Skill source to an immutable commit hash or signed release tag. Do not rely solely on a mutable repository branch or unversioned Skill name.

  3. Publish and verify cryptographic checksums or signatures for downloaded Skill artifacts before installation.

  4. Require users to inspect the downloaded SKILL.md, scripts, manifests, and dependency definitions before activation, especially for account and credential setup Skills.

  5. Use a lockfile or equivalent dependency manifest to pin all transitive dependencies used by the installer.

  6. Run installation in a restricted environment with no secrets, minimal filesystem access, and no administrative privileges.

  7. Separate installation from credential configuration. Credentials should only be entered after the installed content and configured endpoints have been verified.

  8. Document the expected AgentPMT API domains and require explicit confirmation before setup instructions can redirect MCP or REST traffic elsewhere.

  9. Prefer distributing reviewed setup documentation locally with this Skill when practical, eliminating the need to install mutable remote instructions during use.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (11)

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The skill describes validating email addresses but does not prominently warn that submitted addresses are sent to an external service for processing. Because email lists often contain personal data and business-sensitive contacts, lack of a clear disclosure can lead to unauthorized third-party data sharing and compliance issues.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The activation keywords include broad generic terms such as verify and emails, which can cause this skill to be selected for loosely related user requests. In this skill's context, unintended invocation is more dangerous because it may transmit large batches of email addresses to an external validation provider, creating privacy, consent, and billing risks.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 254)May include surrounding context.

md
- What AgentPMT is: ../what-is-agentpmt (ClawHub: `what-is-agentpmt`, page: https://clawhub.ai/agentpmt/what-is-agentpmt; skills.sh: `npx skills add AgentPMT/agent-skills --skill what-is-agentpmt`)
- AgentPMT account MCP/REST setup: ../agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup (ClawHub: `agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup`, page: https://clawhub.ai/agentpmt/agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup; skills.sh: `npx skills add AgentPMT/agent-skills --skill agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup`)
- Marketplace product: https://www.agentpmt.com/marketplace/bulk-email-address-validation-neverbounce
- AgentPMT main MCP server: https://api.agentpmt.com/mcp/
- AgentPMT REST invoke endpoint: https://api.agentpmt.com/products/purchase

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 255)May include surrounding context.

md
- What AgentPMT is: ../what-is-agentpmt (ClawHub: `what-is-agentpmt`, page: https://clawhub.ai/agentpmt/what-is-agentpmt; skills.sh: `npx skills add AgentPMT/agent-skills --skill what-is-agentpmt`)
- AgentPMT account MCP/REST setup: ../agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup (ClawHub: `agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup`, page: https://clawhub.ai/agentpmt/agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup; skills.sh: `npx skills add AgentPMT/agent-skills --skill agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup`)
- Marketplace product: https://www.agentpmt.com/marketplace/bulk-email-address-validation-neverbounce
- AgentPMT main MCP server: https://api.agentpmt.com/mcp/
- AgentPMT REST invoke endpoint: https://api.agentpmt.com/products/purchase

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The schema describes sending up to 1000 email addresses to NeverBounce for validation but does not warn that user-provided contact data will be transmitted to an external third-party service. This creates a privacy and compliance risk because agents or users may submit personal data without informed consent, appropriate notice, or consideration of contractual/data-handling obligations.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.