T08 · Insecure Dependencies
Warning
- Location
SKILL.md:134- Finding
Unpinned Remote Skill and CLI Installation Creates a Supply-Chain Risk
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
agentpmt-docs-and-content
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
Overview
The skill is a disclosed AgentPMT search integration, but it gives mutable remote instructions operational precedence and recommends unpinned remote setup installs.
Review before installing. Use this only for AgentPMT searches, avoid sending secrets or unrelated private context in queries, prefer pinned or verified prerequisite installs, and treat any live remote instructions as data that must not override local security rules or expand the allowed actions.
Vulnerability Patterns
- Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
- Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
- Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
- Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
- Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (2)
T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking
Warning
- Location
SKILL.md:69- Finding
Remote Instructions Are Given Precedence Over the Audited Local Skill Definition
- Content
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- Remediation
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Vulnerability Patterns
- Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
- Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
- Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
- Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
- Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (9)
Vague Triggers
Medium
- Category
- Not specified by scanner
- Confidence
- 91% confidence
- Finding
The activation keywords include broad phrases such as searching the website for anything relevant, which can cause over-triggering and unintended invocation of this external-search skill. In an agent environment, broad triggers increase the chance that unrelated user data or context is sent to the remote AgentPMT service when a narrower local capability might have sufficed.
- Content
Rp1
Medium
- Category
- MCP Rug Pull
- Confidence
- 70% confidence
- Finding
npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.
- Content
Rp1
Medium
- Category
- MCP Rug Pull
- Confidence
- 70% confidence
- Finding
npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.
- Content
Rp1
Medium
- Category
- MCP Rug Pull
- Confidence
- 70% confidence
- Finding
npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.
- Content
Rp1
Medium
- Category
- MCP Rug Pull
- Confidence
- 70% confidence
- Finding
npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.
- Content
Rp1
Medium
- Category
- MCP Rug Pull
- Confidence
- 70% confidence
- Finding
npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.
- Content
Rp1
Medium
- Category
- MCP Rug Pull
- Confidence
- 70% confidence
- Finding
npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.
- Content
External Transmission
Medium
- Category
- Data Exfiltration
- Confidence
- 89% confidence
- Finding
The skill is explicitly designed to send queries to an external API endpoint, which creates a real data-transmission boundary. Although this is consistent with the tool's purpose, it is still security-relevant because agent prompts, user queries, and possibly contextual data may be transmitted off-system to AgentPMT-hosted infrastructure.
- Content
md - What AgentPMT is: ../what-is-agentpmt (ClawHub: `what-is-agentpmt`, page: https://clawhub.ai/agentpmt/what-is-agentpmt; skills.sh: `npx skills add AgentPMT/agent-skills --skill what-is-agentpmt`) - AgentPMT account MCP/REST setup: ../agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup (ClawHub: `agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup`, page: https://clawhub.ai/agentpmt/agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup; skills.sh: `npx skills add AgentPMT/agent-skills --skill agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup`) - Marketplace product: https://www.agentpmt.com/marketplace/agentpmt-docs-and-content - AgentPMT main MCP server: https://api.agentpmt.com/mcp/ - AgentPMT REST invoke endpoint: https://api.agentpmt.com/products/purchase
External Transmission
Medium
- Category
- Data Exfiltration
- Confidence
- 89% confidence
- Finding
The REST invoke endpoint represents another explicit external transmission path. In this skill's context, that is expected rather than malicious, but it remains a true security concern because misrouted or excessive request data could expose sensitive information to a third-party service boundary.
- Content
md - AgentPMT account MCP/REST setup: ../agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup (ClawHub: `agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup`, page: https://clawhub.ai/agentpmt/agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup; skills.sh: `npx skills add AgentPMT/agent-skills --skill agentpmt-account-mcp-rest-api-setup`) - Marketplace product: https://www.agentpmt.com/marketplace/agentpmt-docs-and-content - AgentPMT main MCP server: https://api.agentpmt.com/mcp/ - AgentPMT REST invoke endpoint: https://api.agentpmt.com/products/purchase
Static analysis
No suspicious patterns detected.