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Security audit

AgentMailer Inbox

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill coherently manages AgentMailer inbox identities through the documented AgentMailer MCP service, with disclosed external API use and safeguards for creation and deletion.

Install this only if you intend to let your agent interact with AgentMailer using your authorized organization/account. Review create, update, and delete requests carefully, especially because inbox identities persist outside the local environment and delete deactivates a mailbox while reserving its handle.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (4)

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 19)May include surrounding context.

md
value: "agentmailer"
      description: "Create and manage AgentMailer identities and inboxes"
      transport: "streamable_http"
      url: "https://api.agentmailer.ai/mcp"
policy:
  allow_implicit_invocation: true

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · agents/openai.yaml (reported line 11)May include surrounding context.

yaml
value: "agentmailer"
      description: "Create and manage AgentMailer identities and inboxes"
      transport: "streamable_http"
      url: "https://api.agentmailer.ai/mcp"
policy:
  allow_implicit_invocation: true

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/inbox-tools.md (reported line 14)May include surrounding context.

md
value: "agentmailer"
      description: "Create and manage AgentMailer identities and inboxes"
      transport: "streamable_http"
      url: "https://api.agentmailer.ai/mcp"
policy:
  allow_implicit_invocation: true

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The skill enables implicit invocation for a capability that can create, inspect, update, or deactivate external identities and inboxes. Without narrowly defined trigger conditions or exclusions, the agent may invoke this tool in broader contexts than intended, increasing the chance of unintended account actions or external data handling without clear user intent.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.