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Security audit

4R System Modeling Framework

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill provides architecture-diagram guidance without requesting sensitive access, persistent changes, or executable actions.

Invoke this skill when you want 4R architecture diagrams and review the results for accuracy. The inspected bundle requires no credentials or system changes.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Memory PoisoningPersistent Context Injection, Context Window Stuffing, Memory Manipulation
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (1)

Memory Manipulation

High
Category
Memory Poisoning
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

Skill manipulates agent memory, state, or stored context. Memory corruption can alter personality, override safety rules, or cause unpredictable behavior.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 43)May include surrounding context.

md
## Avoiding mistakes

- Perspectives and levels are distinct. The four architecture views do not correspond to fixed L1 through L4 levels.
- Relations do not replace rules. Successful paths do not replace conditions, constraints, or failure rules.
- Technology names and folder structures do not establish responsibility boundaries. Distinguish runtime calls from source dependencies.
- Assign state changes and failure handling to explicit roles.
- Separate current state, target design, and inference. Leave unsupported structures and rules unconfirmed.