T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
- Location
scripts/data/generate_hexagrams.py:113- Finding
Unconditional Import-Time File Overwrite
- Content
View full analysis
Vulnerability Details
File Location:
scripts/data/generate_hexagrams.py, lines 113–115
Vulnerability Type: Uncontrolled file overwrite caused by import-time side effects
Risk Level: LowVulnerable Code
python # Write to file with open('d:/cyber_iching_mastar/scripts/data/hexagrams.json', 'w', encoding='utf-8') as f: json.dump(data, f, ensure_ascii=False, indent=2) print(f'Generated {len(data)} hexagrams')Technical Analysis
The data-generation module performs a truncating file write at module scope. Consequently, importing or directly executing
scripts.data.generate_hexagramsimmediately opens the hardcoded destination inwmode, truncating any existing file before writing generated data.The operation has no
if __name__ == "__main__":guard, destination validation, overwrite confirmation, backup, or atomic replacement. The generated database also contains simplified placeholder line entries, so overwriting an existing complete database can cause data-integrity loss.The hardcoded Windows-style path limits exploitability on typical non-Windows environments. However, where that path resolves and is writable, loading the module is sufficient to trigger the overwrite.
Attack Path
- An actor causes a user, plugin loader, test harness, or recursive module-discovery tool to import or execute
scripts.data.generate_hexagrams. - Python evaluates the module's top-level statements.
- Execution reaches
open(..., 'w'). - If the hardcoded destination exists and is writable under the process identity, its existing contents are immediately truncated.
- The script replaces the destination with generated JSON containing simplified placeholder data.
No command execution, privilege escalation, or network access is required. Exploitation is limited to files writable by the current process.
Impact Assessment
The issue can overwrite and corrupt the hexagram database at the hardcoded destination. An attacker gains n ...[truncated 401 chars]
- An actor causes a user, plugin loader, test harness, or recursive module-discovery tool to import or execute
- Remediation
View remediation
Remediation Suggestions
- Move generation and file writing into explicit functions rather than executing them at import time.
- Add an entry-point guard:
python def generate_database(output_path): # Build and validate data here. # Write using an atomic replacement strategy. if __name__ == "__main__": generate_database(requested_output_path)- Accept the output path through a deliberate CLI argument instead of using a hardcoded absolute path.
- Resolve and validate the destination against an approved project directory.
- Refuse to overwrite an existing file unless the user supplies an explicit
--forceoption. - Write to a temporary file in the same directory, flush and synchronize it, and atomically replace the destination only after successful serialization.
- Create a backup before replacing valuable existing data.
- Add tests confirming that importing the module does not create, truncate, or modify files.