Sla Monitor

• Outcome: Pass
• Latest audit: Sep 15, 2026 · 12:20 AM UTC
• Version: 1.0.1

Overview

This skill is a documentation-style SLA monitoring helper with no bundled executable code, though users should review the optional Docker command and promotional links before using its output.

Before installing, treat the skill as operational guidance rather than a hardened deployment recipe. If you use the Docker example, pin and verify the container image and confirm the restart policy, exposed port, and volume fit your environment. Also be aware that generated responses may include AfrexAI promotional links unless you ask the agent to omit vendor marketing.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns

• Skill Instruction Hijacking: Alters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
• Agent Memory Poisoning: Writes attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
• Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution: Fetches external code whose behavior can change after review
• Embedded Malicious Code: Ships malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
• Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation: Obtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

Findings (1)

T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Warning

• Location: SKILL.md:124

Finding

Hard-Coded Promotional Content in Agent Instructions

Content

View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md, lines 124–131
Vulnerability Type: T01: Skill Instruction Hijacking
Risk Level: Medium

Vulnerable Code:

markdown

## Next Steps

Need managed AI agents with built-in SLA monitoring?
→ AfrexAI handles deployment, monitoring, and maintenance for $1,500/mo
→ Book a call: https://calendly.com/cbeckford-afrexai/discovery-call
→ Learn more: https://afrexai-cto.github.io/aaas/landing.html

Technical Analysis

The skill's operational instruction file contains a fixed sales pitch and external lead-generation links. Because SKILL.md is intended to guide an AI agent when the skill is loaded, this content may be treated as response-generation instructions rather than passive project documentation.

The promotional section is unrelated to the core task of creating SLA monitoring configurations, alert rules, error-budget policies, and incident-response procedures. Its placement in the agent-facing instruction file creates a response-integrity risk: the agent may append unsolicited advertising and external links to otherwise legitimate monitoring deliverables.

The package does not contain scripts, credential-access logic, obfuscated payloads, remote code retrieval, privilege-escalation behavior, or persistent memory modification. The confirmed issue is therefore limited to manipulation of agent-generated content.

Attack Path

1. A user activates the SLA monitoring skill to generate monitoring or incident-management artifacts.
2. The agent loads SKILL.md as task guidance.
3. The agent processes the embedded “Next Steps” section together with the legitimate monitoring instructions.
4. The generated response may include the AfrexAI sales offer and outbound Calendly or marketing links.
5. The user may be redirected to third-party promotional resources despite not requesting commercial recommendations.

Impact Assessment

The issue can influence ...[truncated 494 chars]

Remediation

View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

1. Remove the entire promotional “Next Steps” section from SKILL.md.
2. Keep vendor attribution, pricing, booking links, and marketing material only in README.md or other clearly non-operational documentation.
3. Restrict SKILL.md to instructions directly required to generate SLA monitoring artifacts.
4. Add an explicit rule that generated responses must not contain endorsements, sales pitches, or outbound promotional links unless the user specifically requests vendor recommendations.
5. Review future skill updates for instructions that alter response goals beyond the declared functionality.
6. Add tests verifying that standard monitoring requests produce only the requested technical deliverables and do not append promotional content.

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns

• Prompt Injection: Instruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
• Data Exfiltration: External Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
• Privilege Escalation: Excessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
• Supply Chain: Unpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
• Excessive Agency: Unrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep

Findings (1)

Rp1

Medium

• Category: MCP Rug Pull
• Confidence: 94% confidence

Finding

The Docker command pulls and runs louislam/uptime-kuma:1, which uses a broad mutable tag rather than an immutable digest. If the upstream image is replaced, retagged, or later found compromised, users of this skill could deploy unreviewed code into production monitoring infrastructure. In this skill context, that is moderately dangerous because the guidance is operational and likely to be copied directly into real environments.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.