T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation
- Location
README.md:112- Finding
Automatic Enumeration and Storage of Messaging Relationships Without Defined Authorization Boundaries
- Content
View full analysis
Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md:19-27,SKILL.md:43-47,README.md:49-51,README.md:112-125,README.md:145-156
Vulnerability Type: Automatic messaging-environment enumeration and excessive relationship-data collection
Risk Level: MediumRelevant Source Snippet
The documented relationship table includes persistent identifiers, group and channel memberships, and administrator status:
json { "relations": [ { "owner_id": "123456", "bot_username": "@YinxiaBot", "groups": ["-100123", "-100456"], "channels": ["-100789"], "is_admin": true } ] }The configuration also models target bots and the groups in which they have administrator access:
json { "known_bots": { "@example_bot": { "name": "Example Bot", "in_channel": true, "is_admin_in": ["GROUP_ID_1", "GROUP_ID_2"] } } }Technical Analysis
The documentation directs the agent to scan existing Telegram groups and channels automatically, construct a social relationship table, inspect bot membership and administrator status, and use that information to select a communication route.
No explicit authorization workflow, per-chat scope restriction, retention period, access-control policy, or data-minimization requirement is defined. Consequently, installation may cause the agent to enumerate messaging resources beyond the specific chat or target bot needed for the user's immediate request.
The relationship model contains security-sensitive metadata:
- Stable owner identifiers
- Bot usernames
- Group and channel identifiers
- Membership relationships
- Administrator status
This information exposes the topology and privilege structure of the accessible messaging environment. If the main agent, a delegated subagent, or its retained state is influenced by an untrusted instruction, the collected map could facilitate targeted messaging, impersonation, spam, or social engineering against privi ...[truncated 1798 chars]
- Remediation
View remediation
Remediation Suggestions
- Require explicit user consent before performing any group or channel discovery.
- Limit discovery to the user-selected source chat and explicitly named target bot.
- Do not automatically enumerate every group or channel accessible to the agent.
- Collect only the fields required for the current relay request. Avoid retaining owner names, unrelated chat IDs, or privilege metadata.
- Require confirmation before every cross-chat or cross-channel message.
- Apply authorization checks that bind each request to the requesting user, source chat, target chat, and intended message.
- Prevent subagents from reading the complete relationship table unless required for a narrowly scoped operation.
- Encrypt relationship data at rest and restrict access to the main agent component responsible for authorization.
- Define a short retention period and provide a mechanism to inspect and delete collected relationship records.
- Record security-relevant events, including discovery, authorization decisions, message destinations, and delivery attempts, without logging message secrets.
- Clearly document Telegram permission requirements and ensure that administrator privileges are never requested solely to improve convenience.
- Add implementation-level tests proving that an untrusted group participant cannot trigger discovery of unrelated chats or delivery to an unauthorized destination.