T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation
- Location
references/active_finger.json:2730- Finding
Fleet-Wide SaltStack Command Dispatched by an Active Fingerprint Probe
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This is a legitimate dual-use security-scanning skill, but some default rules can actively touch sensitive services and record secrets more broadly than users may expect.
Install only for authorized security assessments with written scope. Review or disable active probes before use, especially SaltStack and Redis checks, and run passive-only mode when broad active probing is not approved. Treat reports as restricted evidence because they can contain credentials, personal data, and internal service details; prefer redaction or encryption before sharing.
references/active_finger.json:2730Fleet-Wide SaltStack Command Dispatched by an Active Fingerprint Probe
references/Rules.yml:87Credential Extraction Rules Retain Plaintext Values Without Sensitive Classification
YARA rule matched cryptocurrency mining indicators (stratum protocol, mining pools, miner binaries, or cryptojacking scripts).
],
"location": "header",
"method": "keyword"
},
{
"cms": "Solodev",
"keyword": [
"Solodev"
],
"location": "header",
"method": "keyword"
},
{
"cms": "Amazon Cloudfront",
"keyword": [
"Amazon Cloudfront"
],
"location": "header",
"method": "keyword"
},
{
"cms": "JSEcoin",
"keyword": [
"JSEcoin"
],
"location": "header",
"method": "keyword"
},
{
"cms": "LiveJournal",
"keyword": [
"LiveJournal"
],
"location": "header",
"method": "keyword"
},
{
"cms": "Mustache",
"keyword": [
"Mustache"
],
"location": "header",
"method": "keyword"
},
{
"cms": "IBM WebSphere Portal",
"keyword": [
"IBM WebSphere Portal"
],
"location": "header",
"method": "keyword"
},
{
Skill contains instructions that could directly expose system prompts, internal rules, or hidden instructions to users or external parties.
### 1. Active Fingerprinting (-A to disable)
Sends protocol-specific probes to identify services with high confidence.
- 300+ active fingerprint rules
- Covers SSH, RDP, web servers, databases
- Protocol-specific probes
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
- Fingerprint Databases: See references/finger.json, active_finger.json
This rule performs an active POST to SaltStack's /run endpoint with a functional payload invoking test.ping against tgt="*", which goes beyond passive identification and attempts to trigger server-side behavior. Even if intended for fingerprinting, it can interact with exposed orchestration infrastructure, create audit noise, and in misconfigured environments confirm or exercise dangerous control-plane access.
This rule sends an INFO command payload to detect unauthenticated Redis access, which is an active unauthorized command probe rather than simple fingerprinting. Probing administrative/data-store protocols in this way can validate exploitable misconfiguration, may affect monitoring or logging, and is especially risky in a red-team reconnaissance skill because it normalizes checks against exposed services.
YARA rule matched a hack tool or exploit indicator (offensive tools, reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or exploit frameworks).
ch-routers",
"keyword": [
"cgi-bin/cgibox.cgi",
"./img/logo.jpg"
],
"location": "body",
"method": "keyword"
},
{
"cms": "Eudemon8000E-X8",
"keyword": [
"huawei eudemon8000e-x8"
],
"location": "header",
"method": "keyword"
},
{
"cms": "EUESOFT-HR",
"keyword": [
"link.description = \"亿华软件\""
],
"location": "body",
"method": "keyword"
},
{
"cms": "euseStudy",
"keyword": [
"userinfo/userfp.aspx"
],
"location": "body",
"method": "keyword"
},
{
"cms": "evercookie",
"keyword": [
"evercookie.js",
"var ec = new evercookie(;"
],
"location": "body",
"method": "keyword"
},
{
"cms": "EverFocus-CCTV",
"keyword": [
"server: http server/everfocus",
"realm=\"everfocus"
],
"
YARA rule matched a hack tool or exploit indicator (offensive tools, reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or exploit frameworks).
"location": "body",
"method": "keyword"
},
{
"cms": "BugScan",
"keyword": [
"<title>bugscan memos</title>"
],
"location": "body",
"method": "keyword"
},
{
"cms": "BugScan",
"keyword": [
"powered by bugscan"
],
"location": "body",
"method": "keyword"
},
{
"cms": "BurpSuite",
"keyword": [
"<title>Burp Suite Professional</title>"
],
"location": "body",
"method": "keyword"
},
{
"cms": "Business-System",
"keyword": [
"onsubmit=\"return checksubmit"
],
"location": "body",
"method": "keyword"
},
{
"cms": "Business-System",
"keyword": [
"function hiddenpasse"
],
"location": "body",
"method": "keyword"
},
{
"cms": "Business-System",
"keyword": [
"function omiga_windowurl"
],
The reference explicitly highlights discovery of sensitive configuration paths such as /.env, which commonly expose credentials, API keys, and database secrets when misconfigured. In the context of a fingerprinting/recon tool, documenting these paths as scan targets facilitates credential harvesting and post-compromise escalation if used against unauthorized systems.
/.env
/config.php
/web.config
/settings.py
The document includes workflow integrations with offensive security tools such as Nmap, Nuclei, and Metasploit, which increases operational capability for reconnaissance and follow-on exploitation. In this skill context, chaining fingerprinting output directly into CVE scanning or attack tooling makes the content more dangerous because it streamlines an end-to-end offensive pipeline.
mory Usage
-t 10 and batch scanning# Port scan first, then fingerprint
nmap -p- target.com -oG - | awk '/Up$/ {print $2}' > targets.txt
muki-fingerprint -l targets.txt
# Use MUKI to find targets, Nuclei for CVEs
muki-fingerprint -l targets.txt -o muki.json
cat muki.json | jq -r '.fingerprints[] | select(.service == "WordPress") | .target' | nuclei -t cves/
# Import services to Metasploit
muki-fingerprint -l targets.txt -o muki.json
cat muki.json | jq -r '.fingerprints[] | "\(.target) \(.service) \(.version)"' >> msf_targets.txt
This YAML file defines rule groups and rule names entirely in Chinese, such as "疑似漏洞", "指纹信息", and multiple Chinese field labels. Because the file provides no indication that the skill is region-specific or that users can opt into this locale, it creates a language/locale policy concern for users expecting language choice.
Tool defaults are unsafe or overly permissive (e.g. disabled TLS verification, no authentication, world-writable permissions). Unsafe defaults widen the attack surface.
{
"cms": "DolphinScheduler",
"keyword": [
"let node_env = 'true'",
"<title>dolphinscheduler</title>"
],
"location": "body",
The quick reference provides concrete instructions for active scanning, directory probing, sensitive path discovery, and sensitive information extraction/export, but it does not repeat or foreground authorization, ownership, or privacy constraints in the operational examples. In a red-team reconnaissance tool, omission of these guardrails materially lowers friction for misuse and normalizes collection of potentially sensitive data from third-party systems.
The README is primarily in English, but the Rules.yml section switches to Chinese labels such as '疑似漏洞' and '敏感信息' without explaining that the skill is intended for Chinese-speaking users or providing an alternative. This can violate language/locale policy expectations when a skill implicitly forces part of the workflow into a specific language without user opt-in.
This JSON file contains multiple natural-language match strings in Chinese such as "管理登录" and similar localized terms, but the file provides no indication that locale-specific matching is optional or limited to Chinese-language targets. That can create a language/locale policy concern because the skill behavior implicitly bakes in a specific language without user choice or documented regional justification.
This JSON contains multiple natural-language values in Chinese such as "监控面板", "任务调度", "监控系统", and "控制台" embedded as matching keywords and labels. Because the file does not indicate that it is intentionally China/Chinese-locale specific or provide an alternative locale option, it may violate the language/locale policy for skills that should not force a specific language implicitly.
Several headings and labels are forced into Chinese while the rest of the quick reference is in English, which can create a language/locale policy issue if users are not given an explicit choice. The file does not explain that this is a region-specific document or provide an opt-in for Chinese terminology.
Detected: suspicious.install_untrusted_source