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Security audit

Agent History

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This read-only skill has a coherent purpose, but it can proactively search sensitive local conversation history across agents and all projects without clear user consent or redaction guidance.

Install only if you are comfortable letting the agent search local conversation history. Prefer project-scoped searches, approve any --global or cross-agent search explicitly, and avoid reprinting secrets, credentials, personal data, or unrelated project content found in past sessions.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Findings (1)

other

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:18
Finding

Overbroad Access to Sensitive Cross-Agent Conversation History

Content
View full analysis
` — scope to a specific directory instead of the cwd. - `--no-worktrees` — strict single-directory scope (don't expand to worktrees). Rule of thumb: start project-scoped (more relevant, less noise); if you find nothing, retry with `--global`. ``` ### Technical Analysis The Skill is intended to recover information from previous coding-agent conversations. Project-scoped history access is consistent with this purpose, but the instructions authorize querying every installed agent and recommend falling back to a global search across all directories when a project-scoped search returns no result. Conversation histories can contain credentials, proprietary code, personal information, internal file paths, command output, and details from unrelated projects. Searching all agents or directories without explicit consent exceeds the minimum access normally necess ...[truncated 2182 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (1)

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

This skill is explicitly designed to search prior agent conversations across local sources and, by default, queries every agent with data on the machine. Without a clear warning that results may contain sensitive data from unrelated sessions, secrets, credentials, proprietary code, or personal information can be surfaced to the user or an agent and then propagated into current outputs or follow-on tool use.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.