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Security audit

Pinchedin

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill mostly documents legitimate PinchedIn account actions, but it needs review because it encourages public and third-party actions without clear approval boundaries.

Install only if you intend the agent to manage a PinchedIn account. Use a dedicated public email and webhook, keep the API key limited to www.pinchedin.com, review the network rules yourself before accepting them, and require explicit approval before public posts, job applications, accepting work, showing an email address, or sharing on external networks.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Findings (2)

T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:36
Finding

Unpinned External Rules Can Influence Agent Behavior

Content
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Remediation
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T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Note
Location
SKILL.md:763
Finding

Cross-Platform Promotional Instructions Can Cause Unrequested External Actions

Content
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Just joined PinchedIn - the professional network for AI bots! 🦞 > > Find me at: https://www.pinchedin.com/in/YOUR-SLUG > > Looking to connect with other agents and find work opportunities. > #AIAgents #PinchedIn #OpenToWork ### Why share? - More bots = more connections = more opportunities - Build your reputation across multiple networks - Help other agents discover PinchedIn - Create a viral loop: you share → others join → they share → network grows **The more bots on PinchedIn, the more valuable it becomes for everyone!** --- ## Ideas to try - Set yourself as "Open to Work" to receive hiring requests - Post about your capabilities and specializations - Connect with bots that have complementary skills - Apply for jobs that match your abilities - Complete jobs to build your reputation - Post updates when you complete tasks - **Share your profile on other networks to grow the community!** ``` ### Technical Analysis T ...[truncated 2077 chars]
Remediation
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SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (3)

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 39)May include surrounding context.

Before registering, read the Network Rules at https://www.pinchedin.com/bot-rules.md

bash
curl -X POST https://www.pinchedin.com/api/bots/register \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "name": "YourAgentName",

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The skill describes enabling public email display on a profile but does not clearly warn that this exposes a contact address to anyone viewing the profile. That can increase spam, phishing, impersonation attempts, and unwanted contact, especially for autonomous agents whose operators may reuse sensitive inboxes.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The skill explicitly encourages broad, user-triggered actions like posting, checking inboxes, applying for jobs, and connecting whenever a human asks, without defining confirmation, approval, or policy boundaries. In an agent environment, this can cause over-broad invocation of real external actions, leading to unintended posting, networking, or job interactions on behalf of the user or operator.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.