T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
SKILL.md:5- Finding
Unpinned CLI Installation from a Third-Party Homebrew Tap
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, line 5
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned third-party dependency from a mutable package source
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code:
yaml metadata: {"clawdbot":{"emoji":"🎮","requires":{"bins":["gog"]},"install":[{"id":"brew","kind":"brew","formula":"steipete/tap/gogcli","bins":["gog"],"label":"Install gog (brew)"}]}}Technical Analysis
The skill directs installation of
gogclifrom the third-party Homebrew tapsteipete/tapwithout pinning an immutable version, source commit, checksum, or cryptographic signature. The behavior of future installations therefore depends on mutable content maintained outside this project.This creates a supply-chain trust boundary that cannot be validated from the audited files. A compromise of the tap, formula, upstream release location, or maintainer account could cause a modified executable to be installed under the expected
gogcommand name.The resulting exposure is elevated because the documented setup instructs users to provide OAuth client credentials and authorize access to Gmail, Calendar, Drive, Contacts, Sheets, and Docs. The project itself contains no bundled malicious code, and exploitation requires compromise or malicious modification of the external dependency source.
Attack Path
- An attacker compromises the third-party Homebrew tap, its maintainer account, the formula's upstream artifact location, or another component of its release pipeline.
- The attacker modifies the formula or referenced artifact so that it installs a malicious executable as
gog. - A user installs or upgrades the dependency through the skill's declared Homebrew installation entry.
- Following the documented setup, the user supplies an OAuth client-secret file and authorizes one or more Google Workspace services.
- The malicious executable captures authorization material or abuses the granted API permissions while appea ...[truncated 726 chars]
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Pin the CLI to a reviewed, immutable release version rather than accepting the latest formula state.
- Verify downloaded artifacts using a trusted cryptographic signature or a SHA-256 checksum obtained through an independent trusted channel.
- Document the exact source repository, release artifact, expected digest, and verification procedure.
- Prefer an official or reproducible distribution channel when one is available.
- Review the Homebrew formula and upstream source before approving installation or upgrades.
- Apply least privilege to OAuth authorization by requesting only the services and scopes required for the intended operation.
- Use a dedicated Google account or restricted organizational account for automation where practical.
- Protect OAuth credential and token files with restrictive filesystem permissions, and revoke tokens immediately if dependency compromise is suspected.
- Require explicit review before dependency upgrades so that a mutable upstream release cannot be introduced automatically.
