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Security audit

Zerion API

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is mostly a disclosed Zerion wallet-analysis integration, but it under-scopes sensitive third-party financial profiling use cases.

Review before installing if you plan to analyze wallets that are not yours or not clearly authorized. Treat wallet histories and DeFi positions as sensitive financial data, use this only for lawful and approved analysis, keep the Zerion API key protected, and prefer a pinned or otherwise verified installer path.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
README.md:19
Finding
Unpinned Package Execution Through npx<![CDATA[ ## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `README.md`, lines 19–22 **Vulnerability Type**: `T08: Insecure Dependencies` **Risk Level**: Medium ### Vulnerable Code ```markdown Via ClawHub: ```bash npx clawhub install abishekdharshan/zerion-api ``` ``` ### Technical Analysis The documented installation command invokes `clawhub` through `npx` without specifying a reviewed package version or verifying package integrity. If the package is not already available locally, `npx` may retrieve the currently published version from the configured package registry and execute its CLI code. Because the package reference is mutable, the code executed by future users may differ from the version that existed when this skill was reviewed. The project provides no lockfile, checksum, package signature, or other provenance control for this command. A compromise of the `clawhub` package, its publisher account, or the relevant distribution channel could therefore turn the installation step into a supply-chain execution vector. The audited repository itself contains only Markdown documentation; no malicious package behavior or compromise was observed. Exploitation depends on an external package or distribution-path compromise. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises the `clawhub` package, its publisher account, or a package-distribution path used by the victim. 2. The attacker publishes or serves a modified package version containing malicious CLI or lifecycle code. 3. A user follows the documented unpinned `npx clawhub install ...` command. 4. `npx` retrieves the mutable package release without a project-specified version or integrity check. 5. The malicious package code executes under the account and environment used to run the installation command. 6. The payload can access resources available to that user and may tamper with the installed skill or related configuration. ### Impact Assessment Successful exploitation could permit arbitrary code execution wit ...[truncated 599 chars]
Remediation
<![CDATA[ ## Remediation Suggestions 1. Pin `clawhub` to an explicitly reviewed version instead of relying on the current registry release: ```bash npx clawhub@<reviewed-version> install abishekdharshan/zerion-api ``` 2. Prefer installing the dependency through a lockfile-controlled workflow and invoke the verified local binary afterward. 3. Verify package provenance, registry identity, integrity hashes, and signatures where supported before execution. 4. Avoid running installation commands as `root`, with `sudo`, or from an account holding unrelated sensitive credentials. 5. Execute third-party installers in a restricted environment with minimal filesystem, network, and credential access. 6. Document the tested package version and update it only after security review. ]]>
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (3)

Missing User Warnings

High
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding
The example workflows directly encourage customer research, competitor analysis, identifying protocol users, portfolio sizing, and cross-chain activity analysis without any caution about consent, legality, or ethical handling of third-party financial data. This makes the skill materially more dangerous because it operationalizes large-scale deanonymization, profiling, and surveillance use cases rather than merely documenting passive blockchain lookup capabilities.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
87% confidence
Finding
The README instructs users to run `npx clawhub install abishekdharshan/zerion-api` without any version pinning or integrity constraint. This creates a supply-chain risk: if the referenced package, installer behavior, or fetched skill content changes or is compromised, users may install different code than expected, which is especially sensitive here because the skill configures an MCP server and handles API credentials for blockchain-related access.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding
The skill explicitly enables querying wallet portfolios, transaction histories, DeFi positions, NFTs, and protocol usage tied to specific wallet addresses, but it provides no warning that this can profile identifiable financial behavior and expose sensitive activity of third parties. In a security-sensitive agent context, normalizing this analysis without consent or authorization guidance increases the risk of privacy-invasive surveillance and misuse of public blockchain data at scale.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.