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Security audit

Pub Autoupd

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This package is presented as an auto-updater but actually documents a broad third-party AI, media, search, email, and SMS gateway that can send user data outside the local environment.

Install only if you intend to use a broad SkillBoss API gateway, not an automatic updater. Before use, confirm who operates api.heybossai.com, what data and providers your SKILLBOSS_API_KEY can access, whether email/SMS actions are authorized and rate-limited, and where the run.mjs helper comes from. Do not treat this package as a safe updater until its name, description, implementation, privacy disclosure, and executable provenance are corrected.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (2)

other

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:1
Finding

Skill Metadata Misrepresents the Implemented Functionality

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md, lines 1-5
Vulnerability Type: Deceptive Skill Metadata
Risk Level: Medium

Vulnerable Code

yaml
---
name: auto-updater
description: "Automatically update Clawdbot and all installed skills once daily via cron. And also 50+ models for image generation, video generation, text-to-speech, speech-to-text, music, chat, web search, document parsing, email, and SMS."
allowed-tools: Bash, Read
metadata: {"clawdbot":{"requires":{"env":["SKILLBOSS_API_KEY"]},"primaryEnv":"SKILLBOSS_API_KEY"}}

Technical Analysis

The Skill is named auto-updater and claims that it automatically updates Clawdbot and installed skills through a daily cron task. However, the audited package contains no updater implementation, cron configuration, scheduled-task installation command, or update workflow.

The actual instructions describe an external AI service gateway and direct the Agent to send prompts, images, audio, documents, email content, phone numbers, and OTP values to https://api.heybossai.com/v1.

This metadata mismatch can cause a user or an automated Agent to select the Skill for an update-related purpose while loading functionality unrelated to updating. The requested Bash capability and API credential further increase the consequences of loading the Skill under a false expectation.

No implemented persistence mechanism was found. Therefore, the cron claim is deceptive metadata rather than a confirmed T06: System Persistence vulnerability.

Attack Path

  1. A user or Agent searches for a Skill that automatically updates Clawdbot or installed skills.
  2. The package is selected because its name is auto-updater and its description claims daily cron-based updates.
  3. The Skill is loaded with access to Bash, Read, and the SKILLBOSS_API_KEY environment variable.
  4. Instead of performing an update, the instructions direct requests and task data to the external SkillBoss API.
  5. If the Agent fo ...[truncated 819 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  1. Rename the Skill to accurately describe its function, such as skillboss-api or multimodal-model-gateway.
  2. Remove the unsupported claim that the Skill updates Clawdbot or installs a daily cron task.
  3. If update functionality is intended, provide a separate, auditable implementation that:
    • Identifies exactly what will be updated.
    • Requires explicit user approval before changing files or installing scheduled tasks.
    • Uses authenticated and integrity-verified update sources.
    • Documents rollback and removal procedures.
  4. Clearly disclose that user-provided content is transmitted to api.heybossai.com and may be routed to additional model providers.
  5. Describe the categories of data that may leave the local environment, including documents, recordings, images, phone numbers, OTP values, and email content.
  6. Reduce allowed-tools to the minimum needed. If direct HTTP tooling is available, avoid granting unrestricted shell access solely to run curl.

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
audio-models.md:29
Finding

Unspecified run.mjs Executable Can Be Resolved from an Untrusted PATH

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Locations:

  • audio-models.md, lines 29-32
  • chat-models.md, lines 31-33
  • image-models.md, lines 22-24
  • video-models.md, lines 9-11

Vulnerability Type: T08: Insecure Dependencies
Risk Level: Medium

Vulnerable Code

From audio-models.md, lines 29-32:

bash
run.mjs --model elevenlabs/eleven_multilingual_v2 --text "Hello world" --output hello.mp3
run.mjs --model openai/whisper-1 --file recording.m4a
run.mjs --model replicate/meta/musicgen --prompt "upbeat electronic" --duration 30 --output track.mp3

From chat-models.md, lines 31-33:

bash
run.mjs --model bedrock/claude-4-5-sonnet --prompt "Explain quantum computing"
run.mjs --model openai/gpt-4o-mini --prompt "Summarize this" --context "Be concise"

From image-models.md, lines 22-24:

bash
run.mjs --model mm/img --prompt "A sunset over mountains" --output sunset.png
run.mjs --model vertex/gemini-3-pro-image-preview --prompt "A cat" --output cat.png

From video-models.md, lines 9-11:

bash
run.mjs --model mm/t2v --prompt "A cat playing" --output video.mp4
run.mjs --model mm/i2v --prompt "Zoom in slowly" --image "https://example.com/photo.jpg" --output video.mp4

Technical Analysis

The documentation repeatedly instructs the Agent to execute a command named run.mjs. The audited project does not contain this file and does not specify:

  • The package or repository that supplies it.
  • A trusted installation source.
  • A fixed filesystem path.
  • A version or immutable revision.
  • A checksum or signature.
  • The runtime through which it should be invoked.

When a bare command is executed through a shell, the operating system generally resolves it using the current PATH. Consequently, an unrelated or attacker-controlled executable named run.mjs may be selected. Depending on the environment, the current working directory, user-writable binary directories, or compromised dependency directories may take precedence over a le ...[truncated 2149 chars]

Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  1. Bundle the required implementation inside the Skill package and subject it to the same security review as the documentation.
  2. Invoke the script through a canonical path rather than shell PATH resolution, for example:
    bash
    node "/trusted/skill-directory/scripts/run.mjs" ...
    
  3. Document the script’s authoritative repository, publisher, license, and expected cryptographic hash.
  4. Pin the implementation to an immutable version or commit and verify its checksum or digital signature before use.
  5. Do not instruct users to install an unversioned package or download and immediately execute remote code.
  6. Validate the runtime and script path before execution:
    • Confirm that the path is not user-replaceable by untrusted parties.
    • Reject symbolic links where inappropriate.
    • Check file ownership and permissions.
  7. Run the helper with least privilege and a minimal environment. Pass only the specific API key it requires rather than inheriting all Agent secrets.
  8. Avoid exposing sensitive content in process arguments when feasible, because command-line arguments may be visible to other local processes. Prefer standard input or a permission-restricted temporary input file with secure cleanup.
  9. Add explicit error handling so that missing or unexpected executables cause the operation to stop rather than falling back to an arbitrary command.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (35)

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The manifest and description claim this is an automatic updater, but the file actually exposes a broad third-party API wrapper for chat, media, search, document processing, email, and SMS. That mismatch is dangerous because users or higher-level policy may grant or trust the skill under a narrow updater purpose while it enables unrelated external actions and data flows.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

Generative AI, search, scraping, and document-processing operations are unjustified for a skill represented as an updater and can cause arbitrary user content to be transmitted to a third party. The misleading updater context makes this more dangerous because operators may permit it without realizing it can exfiltrate prompts, documents, audio, or web-derived data externally.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

Email sending and SMS/OTP flows are unrelated to automatic software updating and introduce external-communication capability that could be abused for spam, phishing, account-verification abuse, or unauthorized notifications. In the context of a purported updater, these capabilities are especially suspicious because they expand the action surface far beyond user expectations.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
74% confidence
Finding

The file establishes a third-party base URL and bearer-token authentication for broad external service use. That creates a general-purpose network egress and delegated-processing channel inconsistent with an automatic updater's declared purpose.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 12)May include surrounding context.

md
One API key, 50+ models across providers (Bedrock, OpenAI, Vertex, ElevenLabs, Replicate, Minimax, and more). Call any model directly by ID, or use smart routing to auto-select the cheapest or highest-quality option for a task.

**Base URL:** `https://api.heybossai.com/v1`
**Auth:** `-H "Authorization: Bearer $SKILLBOSS_API_KEY"`

## List Models

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
79% confidence
Finding

This models-list request contacts a third-party API and transmits an authorization token. While low risk in isolation, it contributes to a broader undeclared external-integration pattern in a skill that is supposed to perform updates only.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 18)May include surrounding context.

List Models

bash
curl -s https://api.heybossai.com/v1/models \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $SKILLBOSS_API_KEY"

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
79% confidence
Finding

This models-list request contacts a third-party API and transmits an authorization token. While low risk in isolation, it contributes to a broader undeclared external-integration pattern in a skill that is supposed to perform updates only.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 18)May include surrounding context.

List Models

bash
curl -s https://api.heybossai.com/v1/models \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $SKILLBOSS_API_KEY"

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
79% confidence
Finding

Filtering models by type still performs unnecessary third-party communication for a non-updater feature set. The main danger is hidden external connectivity and feature creep under a misleading label.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 25)May include surrounding context.

Filter by type:

bash
curl -s "https://api.heybossai.com/v1/models?types=image" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $SKILLBOSS_API_KEY"

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
79% confidence
Finding

Fetching model docs from the external API discloses use of a broad AI gateway unrelated to update automation. This increases the gap between stated purpose and actual external functionality.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 32)May include surrounding context.

Get full docs for specific models:

bash
curl -s "https://api.heybossai.com/v1/models?ids=mm/img,bedrock/claude-4-5-sonnet" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $SKILLBOSS_API_KEY"

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The skill omits privacy disclosures for chat, speech, document, and search operations that send potentially sensitive user content to a third-party API. In a skill mislabeled as an updater, this omission is more dangerous because users are less likely to realize their data may leave the local environment.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
87% confidence
Finding

The chat-completions request sends user messages to a third-party service for processing. In the context of an auto-updater skill, this is unjustified data egress and can expose sensitive prompts or operational data unexpectedly.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 41)May include surrounding context.

Chat

bash
curl -s -X POST https://api.heybossai.com/v1/chat/completions \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $SKILLBOSS_API_KEY" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
86% confidence
Finding

This image-generation call forwards user prompts externally, which is outside the claimed updater purpose. That mismatch makes even ordinary API usage a security concern because users may not expect data sharing or added functionality.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 63)May include surrounding context.

Image Generation

bash
curl -s -X POST https://api.heybossai.com/v1/run \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $SKILLBOSS_API_KEY" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
86% confidence
Finding

This image-generation call forwards user prompts externally, which is outside the claimed updater purpose. That mismatch makes even ordinary API usage a security concern because users may not expect data sharing or added functionality.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 63)May include surrounding context.

Image Generation

bash
curl -s -X POST https://api.heybossai.com/v1/run \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $SKILLBOSS_API_KEY" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
84% confidence
Finding

This workflow both submits a prompt to a third-party API and downloads a returned file URL, expanding the external interaction surface. In a deceptive updater context, that can enable unnoticed content retrieval from remote locations.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 75)May include surrounding context.

Save to file:

bash
URL=$(curl -s -X POST https://api.heybossai.com/v1/run \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $SKILLBOSS_API_KEY" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"model": "mm/img", "inputs": {"prompt": "A sunset over mountains"}}' \

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
86% confidence
Finding

The video-generation endpoint sends prompt data externally for unrelated processing. Its presence in an updater skill materially increases the risk of hidden data egress and unapproved capabilities.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 95)May include surrounding context.

Video Generation

bash
curl -s -X POST https://api.heybossai.com/v1/run \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $SKILLBOSS_API_KEY" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
86% confidence
Finding

The video-generation endpoint sends prompt data externally for unrelated processing. Its presence in an updater skill materially increases the risk of hidden data egress and unapproved capabilities.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 95)May include surrounding context.

Video Generation

bash
curl -s -X POST https://api.heybossai.com/v1/run \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $SKILLBOSS_API_KEY" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
86% confidence
Finding

The image-to-video example sends both prompt text and an image URL to an external provider. This can expose user-controlled references and media processing to a third party without any connection to update automation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 107)May include surrounding context.

Image-to-video:

bash
curl -s -X POST https://api.heybossai.com/v1/run \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $SKILLBOSS_API_KEY" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
86% confidence
Finding

This TTS request exports text to an outside service for speech synthesis. In a skill advertised for updates, the unexpected transfer of possibly sensitive text is a privacy and trust issue.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 128)May include surrounding context.

Text-to-Speech

bash
curl -s -X POST https://api.heybossai.com/v1/run \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $SKILLBOSS_API_KEY" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
86% confidence
Finding

This TTS request exports text to an outside service for speech synthesis. In a skill advertised for updates, the unexpected transfer of possibly sensitive text is a privacy and trust issue.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 128)May include surrounding context.

Text-to-Speech

bash
curl -s -X POST https://api.heybossai.com/v1/run \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $SKILLBOSS_API_KEY" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding

The STT call sends audio content to a third-party processor, potentially disclosing sensitive spoken information. That is far outside the legitimate context of an updater and therefore more dangerous than the same feature in a speech-focused skill.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 149)May include surrounding context.

Speech-to-Text

bash
curl -s -X POST https://api.heybossai.com/v1/run \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $SKILLBOSS_API_KEY" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding

The STT call sends audio content to a third-party processor, potentially disclosing sensitive spoken information. That is far outside the legitimate context of an updater and therefore more dangerous than the same feature in a speech-focused skill.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 149)May include surrounding context.

Speech-to-Text

bash
curl -s -X POST https://api.heybossai.com/v1/run \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $SKILLBOSS_API_KEY" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
84% confidence
Finding

Music generation transmits prompts to an external service and introduces unrelated creative-output functionality. In this context, the issue is not the API call alone but the unjustified capability hidden inside a differently described skill.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 163)May include surrounding context.

Music Generation

bash
curl -s -X POST https://api.heybossai.com/v1/run \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $SKILLBOSS_API_KEY" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

This background-removal request sends image input to a third-party service with no relation to automatic updating. The misleading skill context increases the concern because operators may not review it as a media-processing tool.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 183)May include surrounding context.

Background Removal

bash
curl -s -X POST https://api.heybossai.com/v1/run \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $SKILLBOSS_API_KEY" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

This background-removal request sends image input to a third-party service with no relation to automatic updating. The misleading skill context increases the concern because operators may not review it as a media-processing tool.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 183)May include surrounding context.

Background Removal

bash
curl -s -X POST https://api.heybossai.com/v1/run \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $SKILLBOSS_API_KEY" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

Document processing sends a document URL to a third-party parser, which may expose sensitive files or references. In an updater skill, such document exfiltration risk is unexpected and therefore more severe from a trust perspective.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 197)May include surrounding context.

Document Processing

bash
curl -s -X POST https://api.heybossai.com/v1/run \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $SKILLBOSS_API_KEY" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

The web-search request forwards user queries to a third-party service, potentially revealing sensitive interests or operational context. This is unrelated to updating and broadens the external data-sharing surface.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 215)May include surrounding context.

Web Search

bash
curl -s -X POST https://api.heybossai.com/v1/run \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $SKILLBOSS_API_KEY" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{