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Security audit

abe-expense-tracker-pro

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is a disclosed expense tracker that uses the declared SkillBoss API and persistent KV storage for its stated purpose, with privacy considerations users should understand before use.

Install only if you are comfortable sending expense descriptions, merchant-like details, dates, categories, and budget context to the SkillBoss API and storing expense records in SkillBoss KV storage across sessions. Avoid entering highly sensitive financial account numbers or credentials, and check whether the publisher provides retention and deletion controls.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Taint TrackingDirect Taint Flow, Variable-Mediated Taint Flow, Credential Exfiltration Chain
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
Findings (7)

Tainted flow: 'SKILLBOSS_API_KEY' from os.environ (line 6, credential/environment) → requests.post (network output)

Critical
Category
Data Flow
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Credentials or environment variables flow to a network sink. This is a high-confidence indicator of credential exfiltration.

Content

Scanner excerpt · main.py (reported line 22)May include surrounding context.

python
def pilot(body: dict) -> dict:
    r = requests.post(
        f"{API_BASE}/pilot",
        headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {SKILLBOSS_API_KEY}", "Content-Type": "application/json"},
        json=body,

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
87% confidence
Finding

The skill declares use of environment variables and network-backed API functionality but does not define any explicit tool scope such as permissions or allowed-tools. This creates ambiguity about what capabilities the skill may exercise at runtime, weakening least-privilege controls and making misuse of network or secret access harder to audit.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Shadow Command Trigger

Medium
Category
Trigger Abuse
Confidence
78% confidence
Finding

The trigger phrase 'log expense' begins with the built-in command keyword 'log', which can create shadowing or ambiguous routing between the platform command and this skill. Such collisions can cause accidental invocation, user confusion, or interception of intents that were meant for a built-in feature rather than the third-party skill.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
87% confidence
Finding

The skill explicitly states that expense data persists across sessions and that expenses can be exported to CSV, but it does not clearly warn users about retention, sensitivity of financial data, or the consequences of export. Because expense records may contain personal financial information, users may unknowingly store or export sensitive data in ways that increase privacy and data-leakage risk.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The skill sends raw user expense and budgeting content to an external AI service, which introduces a privacy and data-handling risk that is not clearly disclosed by the stated local expense-tracking purpose. Because expense descriptions can contain sensitive financial details, this expands exposure to third-party processing and retention.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · main.py (reported line 7)May include surrounding context.

python
from datetime import datetime

SKILLBOSS_API_KEY = os.environ["SKILLBOSS_API_KEY"]
API_BASE = "https://api.heybossai.com/v1"

EXPENSE_SYSTEM_PROMPT = """You are an expense tracking assistant. Your tasks:
1. Parse natural language expense descriptions and extract: amount, description, category, date.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding

User messages and derived budget context are transmitted to an external service via requests.post, creating a real outbound data exposure path. In an expense-tracking context, this is more sensitive than ordinary chat because the content may reveal spending habits, merchants, dates, and budget limits.

Content

Scanner excerpt · main.py (reported line 22)May include surrounding context.

python
def pilot(body: dict) -> dict:
    r = requests.post(
        f"{API_BASE}/pilot",
        headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {SKILLBOSS_API_KEY}", "Content-Type": "application/json"},
        json=body,

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.