Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This skill does what it says, but it can publish live posts from the user's X/Twitter account without documented confirmation safeguards.
Install only if you are comfortable giving the skill credentials that can post from your X/Twitter account. Treat every tweet, reply, thread, and media command as a live public publish action, and require your agent to preview content and get explicit approval before posting.
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
npm install
# 3. Configure
cp .env.example .env
# Edit .env with your X API credentials
# 4. Use
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
# 3. Configure
cp .env.example .env
# Edit .env with your X API credentials
# 4. Use
node scripts/xpost.mjs verify
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
- Node.js 18+
- X/Twitter developer account with Free tier (or higher)
- API keys (Bearer Token, Consumer Key/Secret, Access Token/Secret)
## Commands
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
.env in {baseDir}):Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
// ── Path validation (LFI protection) ────────────────────────────────────────
const BLOCKED_SEGMENTS = [
'/.ssh/', '/.gnupg/', '/.env', '/.git/config', '/.netrc',
'/etc/', '/proc/', '/sys/', '/dev/',
];
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
// ── Path validation (LFI protection) ────────────────────────────────────────
const BLOCKED_SEGMENTS = [
'/.ssh/', '/.gnupg/', '/.env', '/.git/config', '/.netrc',
'/etc/', '/proc/', '/sys/', '/dev/',
];
The skill description says it can post tweets, threads, and media, but it does not prominently warn that these actions publish directly to a real X/Twitter account. In an agent marketplace or skill catalog, missing this warning can mislead users about the real-world side effects and increase the chance of accidental public posting.
The README shows broad natural-language examples such as 'Tweet:' and 'Post this thread...' without clear confirmation or trigger constraints, which can cause an agent to treat ordinary conversational text as an instruction to publish to a live social-media account. In an agent-integrated context, this increases the risk of unintended or prompt-injected posting on behalf of the user.
The skill requests and uses sensitive environment variables and performs network actions, but the manifest does not declare any explicit tool scope such as permissions or allowed-tools. This weakens transparency and policy enforcement because users and orchestrators cannot easily constrain or review the skill's operational capabilities before use.
The documentation encourages tweet, reply, thread, and media posting without clearly warning that these actions are public, immediately attributable to the user's account, and may be hard to fully undo. In an agent context, missing disclosure increases the risk of accidental reputational harm, unintended publication of sensitive information, or irreversible automated posting.
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
// ── API helpers ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
const API_BASE = 'https://api.x.com/2';
const UPLOAD_BASE = 'https://upload.twitter.com/1.1';
async function apiRequest(method, url, body = null) {
Dependencies lack version pinning, allowing potential malicious package updates. Consider pinning versions.
"url": "https://github.com/ALT-F1-OpenClaw/openclaw-skill-x-twitter.git"
},
"dependencies": {
"commander": "^12.0.0",
"dotenv": "^16.0.0"
},
"engines": {
Dependencies lack version pinning, allowing potential malicious package updates. Consider pinning versions.
},
"dependencies": {
"commander": "^12.0.0",
"dotenv": "^16.0.0"
},
"engines": {
"node": ">=18.0.0"
No suspicious patterns detected.