Security audit

Hivebrite By Altf1be

Security checks across malware telemetry and agentic risk

Overview

This is a disclosed Hivebrite admin CLI, but it can make real changes to users, payments, memberships, content, and email campaigns when given admin credentials.

Install only if you intend to let an agent operate a real Hivebrite admin account. Prefer a least-privileged token or dedicated admin user, keep .env and cached OAuth tokens out of version control, and require human review before send/notify, approval, admin, payment, donation, membership, or other state-changing commands.

SkillSpector

By NVIDIA

Vulnerability Patterns

Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep

Findings (6)

Missing User Warnings

Medium

Confidence: 94% confidence
Finding: The skill advertises broad live admin capabilities across users, payments, memberships, emailings, events, and deletions, but does not prominently warn that these commands act on production administrative APIs and can irreversibly modify real tenant data. In an agent setting, this increases the chance of unsafe execution from ambiguous prompts or operator misunderstanding, leading to destructive or compliance-impacting changes.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

Confidence: 97% confidence
Finding: The documentation instructs users to supply Hivebrite admin email and password for the OAuth password grant without warning that these are highly sensitive privileged credentials. In practice, this encourages storing reusable admin secrets in environment files or agent-accessible config, increasing the risk of credential theft, replay, and full administrative compromise.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

Confidence: 93% confidence
Finding: The skill includes user-facing notification and campaign send operations but provides no warning that these actions can contact real users at scale. In an autonomous or semi-autonomous agent workflow, this creates risk of spam, phishing-like accidental messages, reputation damage, and privacy/compliance issues.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

Confidence: 92% confidence
Finding: The skill documents manual order, donation, membership, receipt, and related financial record operations without emphasizing their accounting and record-integrity consequences. Misuse could create unauthorized charges, alter payment status, corrupt audit trails, or damage financial reporting and member entitlements.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

Confidence: 88% confidence
Finding: The CLI persists OAuth access and refresh tokens to a predictable file under the user's home directory without setting restrictive file permissions or clearly warning the user that long-lived credentials are being stored locally. If the host is shared, backed up, or compromised, those tokens could be recovered and used to access the Hivebrite admin API with the user's privileges.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

Confidence: 93% confidence
Finding: The command sends an email campaign immediately with no confirmation gate, dry-run mode, or explicit warning, even though sending is an irreversible high-impact admin action. A mistaken invocation, script misuse, or prompt-driven agent action could trigger bulk email to real recipients, causing privacy, reputational, and operational harm.

VirusTotal

64/64 vendors flagged this skill as clean.

View on VirusTotal

Static analysis

Detected: suspicious.env_credential_access, suspicious.potential_exfiltration

Environment variable access combined with network send.

Critical

Code: suspicious.env_credential_access
Location: scripts/hivebrite.mjs:35

Sensitive-looking file read is paired with a network send.

Warn

Code: suspicious.potential_exfiltration
Location: scripts/hivebrite.mjs:67