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Security audit

aeon

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is mostly disclosed Aeon-management guidance, but it includes broad local chat-history mining and high-impact credential/tool patterns that are not tightly scoped.

Review this skill before installing if you use private repos, shared chat channels, connected MCP tools, or local coding-agent transcripts. Prefer narrow GitHub tokens over GH_GLOBAL, set Slack/Discord allowed-user variables for inbound commands, connect only MCP servers you are comfortable exposing to all Aeon skills, and run history mining only after choosing the scope you want analyzed.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
Findings (5)

T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation

Error
Location
scripts/mine-history.mjs:42
Finding

Local Transcript Reconnaissance Includes Undocumented Subagent Sidechains

Content
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fs.existsSync(d)); ``` ```javascript if (t === 'user') { const c = d.message?.content; if (typeof c === 'string') { if (c.startsWith('/') || c.startsWith('')) { const name = (c.match(/([^<]+)/) || c.match(/^\/([\w:-]+)/) || [])[1]; if (name) localSlash.push(name.replace(/^\//, '').trim()); } else if (!c.includes('') && c.trim().length > 3) { prompts.push(c); } } } ``` ```javascript const text = (title + ' ' + prompts.join(' ')).toLowerCase(); const words = new Set(); for (const w of text.split(/[^a-z0-9.+-]+/)) { if (w.length < 4 || w.length > 24 || STOP.has(w)) continue; if (/^\d+$/.test(w) || /^https?/.test(w)) continue; words.add(w); } ``` ```javascript function listFiles() { const files = []; const walk = (dir) => { let entries; try { entries = fs.readdirSync(dir, { withFileTypes: true }); } catch { return; } for (const ent of entries) { const fp = path.join(dir, ent.name); if (ent.isDirectory()) { walk(fp); continue; } if (!ent.name.endsWith('.jsonl')) continue; let fst; try { fst = fs.statSync(fp); } catch { continue; } if (fst.mtimeMs < CUTOFF_MS) continue; files.push(fp); } }; for (const root of ROOTS) walk(root); return files; } ``` The associated documentation at `references/history-mining.md:17-19` states: ```markdown It only scans **top-level sessions** — files under a `subagents/` path are sidechains (agent fan-out) and would double-count the parent's work, so they're skipped. ``` ### Tech ...[truncated 2690 chars]
Remediation
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T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation

Error
Location
references/mcp.md:79
Finding

Configured MCP Servers Are Globally Available to Every Skill

Content
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Remediation
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T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation

Error
Location
references/secrets.md:66
Finding

Broad Classic GitHub PAT Is Automatically Promoted Into Skill Runs

Content
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**Tokens (classic)** -> scopes **`repo`** + **`workflow`** -> add as `GH_GLOBAL`. One token covers everything cross-repo (`github-monitor`, `pr-review`, `feature`, `changelog` push-to), private reads, repository security advisories / PVR (disclosure skills), and secrets writeback. Auto-promoted to the run's `GITHUB_TOKEN` | | `GH_READ_PAT` | *Legacy / optional.* Folded into `GH_GLOBAL`. Keep a separate read-only PAT only to give `bd-radar`'s private cross-repo enrichment a read token without granting the run write | | `GH_SECRETS_PAT` | *Optional.* Folds into `GH_GLOBAL` (its `repo` scope already writes secrets). Set a dedicated PAT only to isolate secrets-write from the main token: github.com/settings/personal-access-tokens -> add this repo under Repository access (a PAT without it 404s) -> Repository permissions -> Secrets: Read and write. Used by OAuth-connected MCP servers or the Grok X-account harness | `GH_SECRETS_PAT` gotcha: providers rotate the refresh token every run, and the runner needs this PAT to save each rotation back. Without it, auth breaks exactly one run after you connect. After adding it, re-connect any already-connected server once. **Scope summary (one classic PAT as `GH_GLOBAL`):** `repo` = cross-repo + private read/write, security advisories / PVR, and secrets writeback; `workflow` = pushing `.github/workflows/` changes (`aeon-update`, `spawn-instance`, `auto-workflow`). ``` ### Technical Analysis The recommended `GH_GLOBAL` credential is a classic personal access token carrying both `repo` and `workflow` scopes. It combines priv ...[truncated 2002 chars]
Remediation
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T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
references/skill-anatomy.md:18
Finding

Missing or Invalid Skill Mode Fails Open to Write Access

Content
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--var` overrides at run time | | `requires:` | 28 | API keys to inject. **This is an allowlist** — see the trap below | | `mode:` | 17 | `read-only` (10) or `write` (7). **Absent = `write`** | ``` ```markdown ### Trap 2 — a typo'd `mode:` silently grants write `scripts/skill_mode.sh` maps an unknown value to `write` ("never silently over-restrict"). `mode: readonly` or `mode: read_only` does **not** get you `read-only` — it gets you full access. The exact string is `read-only`. ``` ### Technical Analysis The skill authorization model defaults to write access when `mode` is absent and also maps unknown values to write access. This is a fail-open design: malformed, misspelled, or missing security metadata grants the more privileged execution tier. For example, an author may reasonably use `mode: readonly` or `mode: read_only`, believing that the skill is restricted. Instead, the runtime silently gives it write access. Because skills are primarily natural-language prompts and can be installed from community sources, metadata mistakes are likely and may not be obvious during review. Secure authorization parsers should reject unknown values and default to the least privileged mode. The stated rationale of avoiding silent over-restriction prioritizes functionality over containment and turns configuration errors into privilege escalation. ### Attack Path 1. A skill author omits `mode` or writes a plausible but unsupported value such as `readonly`. 2. The skill passes installation or is enabled without a hard validation failure. 3. `scripts/skill_mode.sh` interprets the missing or unkno ...[truncated 921 chars]
Remediation
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T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Error
Location
references/secrets.md:51
Finding

Shared Slack and Discord Channels Permit Unrestricted Agent Commands by Default

Content
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Remediation
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Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
Findings (27)

MCP Config Access

High
Category
Agent Snooping
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Skill accesses MCP server configuration files (mcp.json). MCP configs contain server URLs, authentication tokens, and tool definitions — reading them allows the skill to discover and potentially abuse other tool integrations.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 183)May include surrounding context.

md
If the delete 403s, they never had write access — nothing was ever written, and the earlier command failed while only *looking* fine.
- **Missing secret.** Skills declare keys in `requires:`. Check them against `./aeon secrets ls --set`. A missing optional key (`KEY?`) means it degrades quietly, not that it breaks.
- **"No MCP tools available."** On the Claude harness a single unresolved `${VAR}` in `.mcp.json` disables **every** MCP server for that run, not just the broken one (`::warning::.mcp.json references secret(s) not set:` … `Skipping MCP this run.`). Grok degrades per-server instead. If an OAuth server broke a run *after* working, suspect a rotated refresh token that couldn't be saved — `references/mcp.md`.
- **It ran but sent nothing.** That's usually correct. Aeon's convention is silence on no signal — a clean run sends nothing rather than an empty report.

Note: GitHub only delivers ~10% of `*/5` cron ticks, so the scheduler catches up missed slots for up to 12 hours. A skill firing 40 minutes late is normal.

MCP Config Access

High
Category
Agent Snooping
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Skill accesses MCP server configuration files (mcp.json). MCP configs contain server URLs, authentication tokens, and tool definitions — reading them allows the skill to discover and potentially abuse other tool integrations.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 206)May include surrounding context.

md
- **Stay silent on nothing.** Add an explicit "if there's nothing worth reporting, log and exit without notifying." Otherwise it gets muted in a week.
   - **Don't repeat yesterday.** Add "check the last 3 days of `memory/logs/` and skip anything already reported."

3. **Check it can actually run there.** No local filesystem, no logged-in tools. If the session read their home directory or used a local MCP server, say so plainly — that part won't work unattended unless it's wired as a repo secret / `.mcp.json`. Wiring an MCP server for unattended use (dashboard Connect, OAuth refresh, the rotating-token PAT): `references/mcp.md`.

4. **Add the `aeon.yml` entry yourself.** A new skill on disk has no entry, and `./aeon skills enable|schedule` **will not create one** — they only flip entries that already exist, and report `no change — already in that state`, which is false. Add it by hand, disabled, before the fallback `heartbeat:` line:

MCP Config Access

High
Category
Agent Snooping
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Skill accesses MCP server configuration files (mcp.json). MCP configs contain server URLs, authentication tokens, and tool definitions — reading them allows the skill to discover and potentially abuse other tool integrations.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 206)May include surrounding context.

md
- **Stay silent on nothing.** Add an explicit "if there's nothing worth reporting, log and exit without notifying." Otherwise it gets muted in a week.
   - **Don't repeat yesterday.** Add "check the last 3 days of `memory/logs/` and skip anything already reported."

3. **Check it can actually run there.** No local filesystem, no logged-in tools. If the session read their home directory or used a local MCP server, say so plainly — that part won't work unattended unless it's wired as a repo secret / `.mcp.json`. Wiring an MCP server for unattended use (dashboard Connect, OAuth refresh, the rotating-token PAT): `references/mcp.md`.

4. **Add the `aeon.yml` entry yourself.** A new skill on disk has no entry, and `./aeon skills enable|schedule` **will not create one** — they only flip entries that already exist, and report `no change — already in that state`, which is false. Add it by hand, disabled, before the fallback `heartbeat:` line:

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 271)May include surrounding context.

md
- **`${today}` / `${var}` are not templated.** Nothing rewrites `SKILL.md`; the workflow puts the date and var in the surrounding prompt and the model resolves

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 274)May include surrounding context.

md
- **`${today}` / `${var}` are not templated.** Nothing rewrites `SKILL.md`; the workflow puts the date and var in the surrounding prompt and the model resolves

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 450)May include surrounding context.

md
- **`${today}` / `${var}` are not templated.** Nothing rewrites `SKILL.md`; the workflow puts the date and var in the surrounding prompt and the model resolves

Agent Config Directory Access

High
Category
Agent Snooping
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The skill explicitly directs access to agent configuration/history directories in the user's home folder, which are outside the normal repo-scoped Aeon management task and may contain highly sensitive transcripts, context, or tokens. Accessing these directories violates least privilege and broadens the blast radius from repo automation into local user data.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 376)May include surrounding context.

md
## Mode 8 — Mine history for skills to automate

"What am I doing by hand over and over that Aeon could just do?" Mode 4 turns *this* chat into a skill; Mode 8 mines *past* chats to find which chat is worth turning into one. It reads the operator's local coding-agent transcripts (`~/.claude/projects` or `~/.codex/sessions`), so it only works on their own machine — never inside an Aeon run.

1. **Scan.** Run the miner from the instance repo root:

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 384)May include surrounding context.

md
there's no history. Deeper reading of the tables and the candidate rubric: `references/history-mining.md`.

MCP Config Access

High
Category
Agent Snooping
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Skill accesses MCP server configuration files (mcp.json). MCP configs contain server URLs, authentication tokens, and tool definitions — reading them allows the skill to discover and potentially abuse other tool integrations.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/mcp.md (reported line 44)May include surrounding context.

ts
{
  slug: 'myserver',                    // also the .mcp.json key and MCP_<SLUG>_* secret stem
  name: 'My Server',
  url: 'https://myserver.com/mcp',
  logo: 'https://…',

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

The document describes storing MCP access tokens and OAuth refresh material as ordinary repo secrets and refreshing them for runs. In the context of this system, where all configured MCP servers are available to every skill, centralizing reusable credentials increases the blast radius: a malicious or compromised skill may be able to invoke high-privilege external MCP services using shared instance credentials.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/mcp.md (reported line 110)May include surrounding context.

md
1. **Connect** (dashboard) — discovery (RFC 9728 → RFC 8414/OIDC), dynamic client registration (RFC 7591), Authorization Code + PKCE. Tokens never reach the browser.
2. **Store** — two repo secrets:
   - `MCP_<SLUG>_TOKEN` — short-lived access token, referenced by the header
   - `MCP_<SLUG>_OAUTH` — JSON refresh material (`token_endpoint`, `client_id`, optional `client_secret`, `refresh_token`, `scope`)
3. **Refresh** — every run sources `scripts/mcp-oauth-refresh.sh` *before* the `${VAR}` resolution loop, mints a fresh access token, and exports `MCP_<SLUG>_TOKEN`. The loop keeps anything already in the environment, so the live token wins over the stored, stale one.

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
87% confidence
Finding

Refreshing and exporting live access tokens into the run environment increases the chance that any skill with broad MCP availability can indirectly benefit from those credentials during execution. Even if tokens are masked in logs, the architectural issue is that refreshed credentials become part of a shared execution context rather than being narrowly delegated to only authorized skills.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/mcp.md (reported line 112)May include surrounding context.

md
2. **Store** — two repo secrets:
   - `MCP_<SLUG>_TOKEN` — short-lived access token, referenced by the header
   - `MCP_<SLUG>_OAUTH` — JSON refresh material (`token_endpoint`, `client_id`, optional `client_secret`, `refresh_token`, `scope`)
3. **Refresh** — every run sources `scripts/mcp-oauth-refresh.sh` *before* the `${VAR}` resolution loop, mints a fresh access token, and exports `MCP_<SLUG>_TOKEN`. The loop keeps anything already in the environment, so the live token wins over the stored, stale one.

The script is **sourced, never executed**: it can't abort the run, guards every command, and masks tokens with `::add-mask::`. A server whose refresh fails is simply left without a token.

MCP Config Access

High
Category
Agent Snooping
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Skill accesses MCP server configuration files (mcp.json). MCP configs contain server URLs, authentication tokens, and tool definitions — reading them allows the skill to discover and potentially abuse other tool integrations.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/mcp.md (reported line 137)May include surrounding context.

md
| `MCP OAuth: persisted rotated refresh token for …` | rotation saved — durable refresh active |
| `::warning::… uses a ROTATING refresh token but no secrets-write credential` | next run's auth **will** fail — add the PAT |
| `::warning::… refresh failed … (invalid_grant)` | already broken; re-connect in the dashboard |
| `::warning::.mcp.json references secret(s) not set: …` | see below |

### The harnesses differ on a missing secret

Env Variable Harvesting

High
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Code enumerates, copies, or searches environment variables for secrets. Bulk environment access can collect credentials unrelated to the skill's stated purpose.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/secrets.md (reported line 23)May include surrounding context.

gh variable list

text

Getting the two mixed up is the most common setup mistake. A credential in variables is exposed; a toggle in secrets works but you can't read it back to check what it's set to.

Three things worth knowing:

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Without declared permissions the skill's intent is opaque and cannot be validated.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The manifest description says to use this skill when the user asks to schedule, enable, edit, or debug an agent that runs on a cron, or asks what repeated work could be automated. Those triggers are expansive and overlap with ordinary assistant requests, and the file does not provide exclusion conditions or negative examples to constrain invocation.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

Mode 8 instructs the agent to read local transcript directories under ~/.claude/projects or ~/.codex/sessions, which can contain sensitive conversation history, credentials, internal code paths, or business context unrelated to the immediate user request. Even though the text says this is local-only and to surface aggregates, it still expands access into high-sensitivity personal data stores and creates a real privacy and data-minimization risk.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Ssd 3

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

Mining historical coding-agent transcripts risks exposing sensitive prompts, proprietary code discussions, secrets mentioned in chats, internal URLs, and other personal or enterprise data through derived summaries and skill proposals. Because the workflow normalizes and ranks activity across many sessions, it can reveal patterns of work and sensitive project focus even without reproducing full transcript text.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The doc presents mcp: as the way to specify MCP usage, then clarifies that it does not gate access at runtime. This is dangerous because developers and operators may incorrectly assume a per-skill boundary exists, leading them to enable sensitive MCP servers under a false sense of isolation.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The documentation explicitly states that the per-skill mcp: declaration is only metadata and does not restrict runtime access, while every server present in .mcp.json is callable by every skill. That creates a broken least-privilege model: any compromised, buggy, or overbroad skill can access all configured MCP servers regardless of declared need.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 434)May include surrounding context.

md
| Variable | Effect |
|---|---|
| `ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL` | Point `ANTHROPIC_API_KEY` at any Anthropic-compatible endpoint, e.g. `https://api.deepseek.com/anthropic` |
| `GATEWAY_ORDER` | Space-separated provider names — override the failover priority |
| `GROK_MODEL` | Model for the Grok gateway path |
| `STATE_BACKEND` | `file` (default) · `dual` · `issues` — where run state lives |

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/secrets.md (reported line 114)May include surrounding context.

md
| Variable | Effect |
|---|---|
| `ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL` | Point `ANTHROPIC_API_KEY` at any Anthropic-compatible endpoint, e.g. `https://api.deepseek.com/anthropic` |
| `GATEWAY_ORDER` | Space-separated provider names — override the failover priority |
| `GROK_MODEL` | Model for the Grok gateway path |
| `STATE_BACKEND` | `file` (default) · `dual` · `issues` — where run state lives |

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/skill-anatomy.md (reported line 104)May include surrounding context.

Claude Code's Bash permission analyzer blocks any command containing a secret expansion ($XAI_API_KEY, ${XAI_API_KEY}) because it can't statically prove safety. ./secretcurl takes curl's arguments and substitutes {ENV_NAME} tokens inside the script, so the secret never reaches the agent's command line:

bash
./secretcurl -s -X POST https://api.x.ai/v1/responses \
  -H 'Authorization: Bearer {XAI_API_KEY}' -d "$PAYLOAD"

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/skill-anatomy.md (reported line 104)May include surrounding context.

Claude Code's Bash permission analyzer blocks any command containing a secret expansion ($XAI_API_KEY, ${XAI_API_KEY}) because it can't statically prove safety. ./secretcurl takes curl's arguments and substitutes {ENV_NAME} tokens inside the script, so the secret never reaches the agent's command line:

bash
./secretcurl -s -X POST https://api.x.ai/v1/responses \
  -H 'Authorization: Bearer {XAI_API_KEY}' -d "$PAYLOAD"

Ssd 3

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The file's stated purpose is to mine local coding-agent conversation history and summarize recurring work from transcripts, including user prompts and session titles. This is a genuine privacy/security issue because those transcripts may contain secrets, internal URLs, customer data, incident details, or other confidential context, and the script derives and outputs summaries from them without access controls or sanitization.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.