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Security audit

Paid Measurement Loop

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a narrowly scoped paid-ad performance review skill, with a campaign-name sanitization caution for its ledger and save-file examples.

Install only if you are comfortable sharing paid-ad, analytics, and ecommerce export data with your agent. When saving results or running ledger examples, use a sanitized campaign slug and avoid pasting campaign names directly into shell commands or file paths.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:62
Finding

Unsafe Campaign Identifier Interpolation Enables Command Injection and Path Traversal

Content
View full analysis
--source paid --data '{"spend": ..., "revenue": ..., "conversions": ...}'`, then `ledger.py diff --source paid` for the period delta and `ledger.py trend --source paid --field roas` for the trend line. ``` ```text Ask "Save these results?" If yes, write to `memory/ad/paid-measurement-loop/` using `YYYY-MM-DD--readback.md` — see [Skill Contract](../../../references/skill-contract.md) §Save Results Template. ``` ### Technical Analysis The skill instructs an agent to substitute a campaign identifier into command-line templates without requiring argument-array execution, validation, or shell-safe quoting. Campaign identifiers originate from user requests or imported advertising data and must therefore be considered attacker-controlled. If an implementation constructs a command string from this template and invokes it through a shell, metacharacters in the campaign identifier can terminate or alter the intended command. Although line 56 generally states that exported data is untrusted, it does not prescribe the concrete quoting or structured process-execution controls required at this command sink. The same identifier is incorporated into a result filename without a character allowlist, basename conversion, or canonical destination check. A crafted identifier containing path separators or parent-directory components could cause an implementation to address a location outside `memory/ad/paid-measurement-loop/`, depending on how directories and paths are created and resolved. The package does not include the referenced ledger implementation ...[truncated 1861 chars]
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.