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Security audit

vwu.ai doubao Models

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a simple vwu.ai chat API wrapper, but it can send your API key and prompt to an arbitrary endpoint if the environment sets a custom base URL.

Use this only if you are comfortable sending prompts to vwu.ai. Keep VWU_BASE_URL unset unless you intentionally trust the alternate HTTPS endpoint, avoid putting secrets in prompts, and rotate the API key if the script may have run with an untrusted base URL. Expect problems with quotes or multiline prompts until the script uses proper JSON serialization.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (2)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
vwu-chat.sh:7
Finding

Configurable API Endpoint Can Disclose Bearer Credentials and Prompt Data

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Note
Location
vwu-chat.sh:31
Finding

Unescaped Input Allows JSON Request-Body Injection

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (3)

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The file’s instructional content and examples are presented only in Chinese, which effectively forces a specific language for users without any opt-in or alternative. Under the stated policy, language constraints should either be optional for users or clearly documented as justified for a region-specific skill.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The script's comments and all user-facing output are written in Chinese, including error and usage messages. This imposes a specific language on users without offering a language choice or documenting that the tool is intentionally region-specific, which matches the language/locale policy violation criteria.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

The script sends user-supplied prompt data and an API bearer token to an external service endpoint via curl. External transmission is expected for an API client, but it still creates real security risk because prompts may contain sensitive data and the destination URL is overridable through VWU_BASE_URL, which could exfiltrate both prompts and the API key to an unintended host if misconfigured or manipulated.

Content

Scanner excerpt · vwu-chat.sh (reported line 32)May include surrounding context.

sh
fi

# 调用 API
response=$(curl -s "$VWU_BASE_URL/v1/chat/completions" \
    -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
    -H "Authorization: Bearer $VWU_API_KEY" \
    -d "{

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.