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Security audit

vue3-ant-design-vue-component-skill

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a Vue 3 and Ant Design Vue component-template guide with no hidden execution, external access, persistence, or credential handling.

Install only if you want Chinese-language Vue 3 + Ant Design Vue component templates. Review generated UI labels for your target locale and domain, especially sample edit/delete actions, but the skill itself does not show high-risk behavior.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (4)

Tp2

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

Mixing characters from multiple Unicode scripts in a single identifier is a common technique to create visually ambiguous tool names.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Hidden Instructions

High
Category
Prompt Injection
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 157)May include surrounding context.

md
>
          <a-form-item :label="field.label" :name="field.prop" :rules="field.rules">
            
            <!-- input -->
            <a-input
              v-if="field.type === 'input'"
              v-model:value="formData[field.prop]"

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The description says the skill should be called 'when the user needs to encapsulate reusable business components,' which is broad and does not define specific trigger phrases, scope boundaries, or exclusion conditions. This could overlap with many ordinary frontend development requests and make it unclear when this skill should activate versus a more general Vue/UI coding skill.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The skill description and all instructional content are written exclusively in Chinese, and the examples hard-code Chinese UI labels such as '取消', '确定', '提交', and '删除'. There is no indication that users can choose another language or that the Chinese-only constraint is documented as a justified region-specific requirement.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.