Bloomberg Headlines

• Outcome: Review
• Latest audit: Sep 16, 2026 · 3:41 AM UTC
• Version: 1.0.0

Overview

This skill does what it says, but it installs and runs a mutable third-party Go executable, so users should review that dependency before installing.

Install only if you are comfortable trusting the upstream bbgwire Go module. Prefer a version pinned to a reviewed commit or release, and run it with limited local file and credential exposure.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns

• Insecure Dependencies: Introduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
• Skill Instruction Hijacking: Alters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
• Agent Memory Poisoning: Writes attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
• Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution: Fetches external code whose behavior can change after review
• Embedded Malicious Code: Ships malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally

Findings (1)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Error

• Location: SKILL.md:10

Finding

Unpinned Third-Party Executable Dependency

Content

View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md, lines 10-18
Vulnerability Type: T08: Insecure Dependencies
Risk Level: High

Vulnerable Code

yaml

"requires": { "bins": ["bbgwire"] },
"install":
  [
    {
      "id": "go",
      "kind": "go",
      "module": "github.com/8treenet/bbgwire@latest",
      "bins": ["bbgwire"],
      "label": "Install bbgwire (go)",

Technical Analysis

The skill installs and executes the external bbgwire Go binary from github.com/8treenet/bbgwire@latest. The @latest selector is mutable and does not identify an audited, immutable release or commit. The project also provides no checksum, signature, vendored source, or provenance verification for this dependency.

Consequently, the executable installed in the future may differ from the version reviewed during the audit. Because the audited project contains only SKILL.md, the actual behavior of the external binary cannot be verified from the project artifact. A compromised upstream repository, maintainer account, or later malicious release could therefore introduce arbitrary executable behavior.

Attack Path

1. An attacker compromises the upstream repository, its maintainer account, or the dependency publication process.
2. The attacker publishes a modified version that becomes the version resolved by @latest.
3. A user or agent installs the skill dependency according to the declared installation configuration.
4. The Go toolchain downloads, compiles, and installs the attacker-controlled source as bbgwire.
5. The skill invokes bbgwire, executing the modified payload with the privileges of the user or agent process.
6. The payload may access files, environment variables, credentials, and network resources available to that process.

Impact Assessment

Successful exploitation permits arbitrary code execution under the account that installs or invokes the dependency. The accessible ...[truncated 378 chars]

Remediation

View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

• Replace github.com/8treenet/bbgwire@latest with an audited, immutable version or commit reference.
• Record and verify cryptographic checksums for the approved dependency artifact.
• Verify release signatures and build provenance where the upstream project supports them.
• Vendor the reviewed source or binary when practical so that installation does not silently change after the skill is audited.
• Review the dependency source and transitive dependencies before approval.
• Restrict execution using least privilege, filesystem isolation, limited environment variables, and network allowlisting.
• Document the exact remote endpoints and local permissions required by bbgwire.
• Add automated dependency monitoring and require a new security review before updating the pinned version.

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns

• Prompt Injection: Instruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
• Data Exfiltration: External Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
• Privilege Escalation: Excessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
• Supply Chain: Unpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
• Excessive Agency: Unrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep

Findings (1)

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low

• Category: Not specified by scanner
• Confidence: 90% confidence

Finding

The skill description and output specification consistently state that Bloomberg headlines and titles are presented in Chinese, including '新闻标题（中文）' and '新闻内容为中文翻译版本'. This imposes a language choice without indicating that users can opt into another language, which matches the language/locale policy violation criterion.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.