T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking
- Location
SKILL.md:25- Finding
Untrusted Target Skill Content Is Embedded into Executable Sub-Agent Instructions
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
The skill has a legitimate evaluation purpose, but it sends untrusted skill files directly into sub-agent instructions without clear containment or prompt-injection safeguards.
Install only if you are comfortable with a skill that spawns multiple evaluator agents and feeds them complete target-skill text. It should be improved to mark evaluated files as untrusted evidence, restrict sub-agent tools, and validate score summaries strictly before relying on its reports.
SKILL.md:25Untrusted Target Skill Content Is Embedded into Executable Sub-Agent Instructions
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
- `SKILL.md`
The manifest description "帮我评估一下这个 skill。" is extremely broad and overlaps with ordinary user requests, making accidental invocation more likely. In an agent ecosystem, overly generic triggers can cause this skill to activate in unintended contexts and process arbitrary third-party content, increasing the chance of misuse or unsafe delegation.
The skill content is written as if interaction and output are expected in Chinese, including the mandated report structure and evaluator instructions, but it does not offer users a language or locale choice. Under the policy, forcing a specific language without opt-in is a natural-language policy violation unless the locale restriction is explicitly justified.
This markdown file contains a natural-language locale constraint requiring the output keys to use Chinese dimension names exactly. Combined with the fully Chinese protocol, this effectively forces a specific language/locale without any opt-in or alternative, which matches the policy category for language or locale violations.
No suspicious patterns detected.