other
- Location
SKILL.md:22- Finding
Execution Delegated to Unbundled and Unverifiable External Components
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, lines 22-45
Vulnerability Type: Unverifiable external capability execution
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code
markdown ## Implementation Calls `open_browser_and_search_side_hustle()` from `capabilities_clawhub.py` ## Usage ```python from capability_executor import execute_capability execute_capability("side hustle")Dependencies
- capabilities_clawhub.py in D:\coze-local\db
- capability_executor.py (registration + dispatch)
Linkage
- Reports failures to skill_evolver (MetaClaw) and seal_coevolution (SEAL)
- Confidence tracked via capability_executor
text ### Technical Analysis The Skill does not include its capability implementation or dispatcher. Instead, it delegates behavior to `open_browser_and_search_side_hustle()` in an external `capabilities_clawhub.py` file and invokes it through the external `capability_executor` dispatcher. Because neither component is included in the audited package, their implementation, integrity, permissions, network destinations, and data-handling behavior cannot be verified. The Skill also declares that failures are reported to `skill_evolver` and `seal_coevolution`, but it does not document what information is transmitted, where it is stored, or whether user consent is required. This creates an external trust boundary: the reviewed Skill text does not fully define the behavior that will occur when the trigger is invoked. An attacker or compromised local component able to modify the external Python modules could cause the legitimate-looking Skill invocation to execute behavior not represented in the reviewed package. ### Attack Path 1. A user activates the Skill using the configured side-hustle trigger. 2. The runtime calls `execute_capability("side hustle")` through the external `capability_executor` module. 3. The dispatcher resolves the trigger to `open_browser_and_search_side_hustle( ...[truncated 1362 chars]- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Include
capabilities_clawhub.py,capability_executor.py, and all relevant registration code in the reviewed package so the complete execution path can be audited. - Pin trusted versions or cryptographic hashes for external components and verify their integrity before capability registration or execution.
- Restrict the capability to the minimum required browser and network permissions, using an explicit allowlist of permitted destinations.
- Document every network request, telemetry destination, transmitted field, retention policy, and failure-reporting condition.
- Require explicit user consent before sending failure information or execution metadata to
skill_evolver,seal_coevolution, or any other external subsystem. - Remove evolution-system reporting if it is not essential to the advertised side-hustle search functionality.
- Validate capability registration so the trigger can resolve only to the expected, integrity-checked function.
- Execute the external capability in a sandbox with restricted filesystem, process, credential, and network access.
- Include
