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Security audit

意图分类器

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a markdown-only intent-classification and routing guide with broad matching examples, but it does not install code, request permissions, persist data, or execute actions itself.

Installers should understand that this skill may classify common Chinese phrases like polite requests as task intent. Use its output as advisory routing only, and require explicit user confirmation before invoking any downstream skill that can edit files, run commands, search private data, or store memories.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (5)

Vague Triggers

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The activation phrases "识别意图 / 分类任务 / 智能路由" are broad, generic terms that can naturally appear in ordinary conversation or user requests. In an agent environment, this can cause unintended invocation of the skill and accidental routing into downstream skills, expanding the chance of unauthorized actions or prompt/flow hijacking through misclassification.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The task-intent keywords include very common words like "帮我", "请", and "做", which are ubiquitous in normal user speech. This makes the classifier over-match benign conversation as actionable task intent, increasing the risk that the agent routes users into execution-oriented workflows without sufficiently clear intent.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The keyword-based classifier relies on substring matches for extremely broad tokens, including common Chinese function words and basic action verbs. Because these checks lack contextual guards, boundary checks, or disambiguation, they can misclassify routine text and trigger incorrect routing, especially to skills associated with code generation, learning, or task automation.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The regex pattern ^帮我.* matches any input starting with a very common phrase, so ordinary polite requests will be treated as task-routing triggers. In context, this is more dangerous because the skill is explicitly designed as a dispatcher to other skills, meaning broad matching can fan out into unintended downstream capabilities.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The skill metadata and body are written as Chinese-only user-facing instructions and examples, with no indication that users may interact in other languages or opt into Chinese. This can violate language/locale policy when a skill imposes a language without user choice.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.