T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
- Location
SKILL.md:13- Finding
Unprotected Persistent Storage of Clipboard Contents
- Content
View full analysis
Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, lines 13–17
Vulnerability Type: Plaintext storage of potentially sensitive clipboard data
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code Snippet
markdown ## Usage - Automatically saves every copied item (latest 50 entries) - Supports viewing, searching, and restoring history - Data is stored locally and is not transmitted over the network ## Data File `D:\coze-local\data\clipboard_history.json`The snippet above is an English rendering of the behavior documented in the original file.
Technical Analysis
The Skill declares that it automatically records the latest 50 clipboard entries in a predictable local JSON file. Clipboard contents may include passwords, authentication tokens, private messages, personal information, recovery codes, and confidential business data.
The specification does not describe encryption at rest, restrictive file permissions, sensitive-content filtering, explicit capture consent, configurable expiration, or secure deletion. Consequently, sensitive values may remain recoverable after they are no longer present on the active clipboard. Although the document says that data is not transmitted over the network, local-only storage does not prevent disclosure to another local user or process with read access to the file.
The repository contains only
SKILL.md; therefore, the audit could not verify the actual storage format or runtime access controls. This finding is based on the explicitly documented automatic persistence behavior.Attack Path
- The user enables or invokes the clipboard-history Skill.
- The user copies sensitive content, such as a password, token, recovery code, or confidential text.
- The Skill automatically adds that content to its retained history.
- The entry is stored at the predictable path
D:\coze-local\data\clipboard_history.json. - A local user, malware process, backup utility, or other application with access to that file reads ...[truncated 765 chars]
- Remediation
View remediation
Remediation Suggestions
- Require explicit, informed opt-in before monitoring or retaining clipboard contents.
- Clearly warn users that copied secrets may be persisted beyond the lifetime of the active clipboard.
- Encrypt clipboard history at rest using a key protected by the operating system's credential store.
- Create the data file with permissions restricted to the current user and reject insecure permission configurations.
- Filter or avoid retaining likely secrets, including passwords, authentication tokens, private keys, recovery codes, and payment information.
- Integrate with platform APIs that identify password or sensitive clipboard content where available.
- Provide configurable retention limits, short expiration periods, per-entry deletion, and a one-action history purge.
- Implement secure deletion where supported and document the limitations introduced by backups, journaling, and solid-state storage.
- Avoid a globally predictable or shared storage location; use an application-specific directory scoped to the current user.
- Add automated tests verifying encryption, access permissions, expiration, exclusion rules, and deletion behavior.
- Document the exact data format, threat model, access controls, and lifecycle before distributing the Skill.
