T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
SKILL.md:27- Finding
Unpinned Third-Party Plugin Installation
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, lines 27–28 and 74–77
Vulnerability Type: Unverified and unpinned third-party dependency installation
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code
bash openclaw plugins install eo-collaboration # or clawhub install eo-collaborationThe installation instruction is repeated later:
bash openclaw plugins install eo-collaborationTechnical Analysis
The Skill directs users to install the externally maintained
eo-collaborationplugin by package name without specifying an immutable version, content digest, checksum, signature-verification procedure, or verified publisher identity.Consequently, the installed artifact is resolved remotely at installation time and may differ from the artifact available when this Skill was audited. The project contains only
SKILL.md; it does not include the plugin implementation, so the external component's behavior cannot be validated from this repository.This creates a supply-chain trust boundary. Compromise of the package registry, publisher account, dependency name, or a mutable plugin release could cause users to install code that does not match the documented functionality.
Attack Path
- An attacker compromises the plugin publisher account or relevant distribution channel, or otherwise causes a malicious artifact to resolve under
eo-collaboration. - The attacker publishes or substitutes a modified plugin release.
- A user follows the instructions in
SKILL.mdand runs one of the unpinned installation commands. - The package manager retrieves the current remote artifact without verification against a documented immutable digest.
- The malicious plugin executes when loaded or invoked in the OpenClaw Agent environment.
Impact Assessment
Successful exploitation could allow malicious plugin code to operate with the permissions granted to the OpenClaw Agent or plugin runtime. Depending on those runtime permissions, potential effect ...[truncated 326 chars]
- An attacker compromises the plugin publisher account or relevant distribution channel, or otherwise causes a malicious artifact to resolve under
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Pin the plugin to a reviewed, immutable version rather than installing the latest package by name.
- Prefer an immutable artifact digest or cryptographic hash when the package manager supports it.
- Require signature verification and document the expected signer or verified publisher identity.
- Link only to an authenticated official registry and avoid alternate installation channels unless both provide equivalent provenance guarantees.
- Document the plugin's requested permissions and instruct users to grant only the minimum capabilities required.
- Record the reviewed plugin version, checksum, publisher, and review date in
SKILL.md. - Consider vendoring or separately auditing the exact plugin artifact when stronger assurance is required.
- Apply the same controls to both occurrences of the installation instruction, including the repeated command at lines 74–77.
