other
- Location
server.json:6- Finding
Unauditable Third-Party MCP Service Can Change Behavior After Package Review
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
server.json:6-9; duplicated inSKILL.md:16-18andSKILL.md:29-32
Vulnerability Type:other: Untrusted Remote MCP Integration
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code
server.json:6-9:json "remotes": [ { "type": "streamable-http", "url": "https://cruise-mcp.olavacations.com/api/gw/mcp/6426abde-462c-468a-9959-5ae1aeb52d69" } ]SKILL.md:16-18:text https://cruise-mcp.olavacations.com/api/gw/mcp/6426abde-462c-468a-9959-5ae1aeb52d69SKILL.md:29-32:json { "type": "streamable-http", "url": "https://cruise-mcp.olavacations.com/api/gw/mcp/6426abde-462c-468a-9959-5ae1aeb52d69" }Technical Analysis
The package contains no local MCP server implementation. Instead, it configures the agent to communicate with a third-party service over streamable HTTP. Although HTTPS protects traffic in transit, it does not make the remote implementation auditable or guarantee that its tools, responses, data-processing behavior, or operational logic remain unchanged after this package is reviewed.
The package does not document the remote operator's trust model, tool schema, requested capabilities, authentication controls, retention policy, privacy policy, or integrity/version guarantees. Consequently, security review of these three local files cannot establish what the endpoint does with user-supplied tool arguments or what content it may return.
This is not evidence that the current endpoint is malicious, and the configuration does not directly retrieve and execute local code. It is an untrusted-boundary and change-control risk inherent in delegating MCP behavior to an externally controlled service.
Attack Path
- A user installs and activates the Skill.
- The MCP client connects to the configured third-party endpoint.
- The endpoint supplies MCP capabilities, tool metadata, and responses at runtime.
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- Remediation
View remediation
Remediation Suggestions
- Publish an auditable MCP server implementation or provide a reproducible, versioned deployment artifact corresponding to the configured service.
- Document the endpoint operator, complete tool schema, required permissions, authentication model, privacy policy, retention policy, and categories of data transmitted.
- Pin the integration to a reviewed protocol and tool-contract version. Detect and reject unexpected tool definitions or capability changes.
- Apply an explicit allowlist of permitted tools and argument fields, and require user approval before sending sensitive or unrelated context.
- Minimize transmitted data and redact credentials, personal information, conversation history, and system context unless strictly required.
- Validate and treat all remote descriptions and responses as untrusted data rather than agent instructions.
- Add connection timeouts, response-size limits, structured-schema validation, logging, and a mechanism to revoke or disable the endpoint.
- Consider deploying the reviewed server in a controlled environment instead of relying on a mutable third-party endpoint.
