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Security audit

Hardened execution guardrails — because production only gets one chance.

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

ProdShield is an instruction-only defensive guardrail, and the alarming scanner matches are mostly examples of unsafe actions it tells the agent to block.

Use this skill as a conservative production-safety checklist. Expect it to interrupt risky commands for environment checks, dry-runs, confirmations, and credential scans. Before following its optional scanner setup examples, pin tool versions or container digests, review packages first, mount repositories read-only where possible, and only install pre-commit hooks with explicit user approval.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:890
Finding
Unpinned Third-Party Security Tools and Mutable Container Image<![CDATA[ ## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md:445-446, 890, 895, 898, 925-926`; `references/git-credential-safety.md:140-143, 181-182` **Vulnerability Type**: Unsafe supply-chain dependency resolution **Risk Level**: Medium ### Complete Code Snippets From `SKILL.md`: ```bash pip-audit # pip install pip-audit first safety check # Alternative: pip install safety ``` ```bash pip install detect-secrets ``` ```bash docker run --rm -v "$(pwd):/repo" zricethezav/gitleaks:latest detect --source /repo ``` ```bash pip install trufflehog ``` ```bash pip install pre-commit pre-commit install # Hooks run automatically on git commit from now on ``` From `references/git-credential-safety.md`: ```markdown | **detect-secrets** | `pip install detect-secrets` | `detect-secrets scan .` | Baseline-based, reduces noise over time | | **truffleHog** | `pip install trufflehog` | `trufflehog filesystem .` | High-entropy detection + git history scan | | **semgrep** | `pip install semgrep` | `semgrep --config=p/secrets .` | SAST + secrets, highly configurable | ``` ```bash pip install pre-commit pre-commit install # Now runs automatically on every git commit ``` ### Technical Analysis The skill recommends installing security tools without exact version or hash constraints. Package managers therefore resolve whichever release is current when the instruction is followed. If an upstream project, maintainer account, distribution artifact, or package registry is compromised, a future malicious release could execute with the invoking user's privileges. The gitleaks example uses the mutable `latest` image tag and mounts the current repository at `/repo`. Because no immutable digest is specified, the image contents can change after the skill has been reviewed. The repository mount is not declared read-only, so code inside the image may read or modify project files. Running `pre-commit install` also ...[truncated 2287 chars]
Remediation
<![CDATA[ ## Remediation Suggestions 1. Pin every Python security tool to an exact, reviewed version: ```text detect-secrets==<reviewed-version> --hash=sha256:<verified-hash> trufflehog==<reviewed-version> --hash=sha256:<verified-hash> pre-commit==<reviewed-version> --hash=sha256:<verified-hash> ``` 2. Store these constraints in a dedicated requirements file and install with hash enforcement: ```bash python -m venv .security-tools-venv . .security-tools-venv/bin/activate python -m pip install --require-hashes -r security-tools-requirements.txt ``` 3. Replace the mutable container tag with a verified immutable digest and mount the repository read-only: ```bash docker run --rm \ --network none \ -v "$(pwd):/repo:ro" \ zricethezav/gitleaks@sha256:<verified-digest> \ detect --source /repo ``` 4. Verify package provenance, release signatures, hashes, maintainers, and source repositories before installation. 5. Run scanners in an isolated environment without cloud credentials, SSH agents, secret-bearing environment variables, or unnecessary network access. 6. Pin every pre-commit hook revision to a reviewed immutable commit SHA rather than a mutable tag. Review the generated hook configuration before running `pre-commit install`. 7. Separate tool installation from routine scanning. Installation or upgrades should require explicit approval and review, while routine scans should reuse already verified artifacts. 8. Update both `SKILL.md` and `references/git-credential-safety.md` so all examples consistently follow the skill's stated dependency-pinning policy. ]]>
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Tool MisuseTool Parameter Abuse, Chaining Abuse, Unsafe Defaults
  • Rogue AgentSelf-Modification, Session Persistence
Findings (114)

YARA rule 'agent_skill_prompt_injection_hidden_instructions': Prompt injection or hidden instructions embedded in AI agent skill text [agent_skills]

High
Category
YARA Match
Content
�️","homepage":"https://clawhub.ai","userInvocable":true}}
---

# ProdShield — Hardened Execution Guardrails

> *"Because production only gets one chance."*

ProdShield governs how Claude executes actions against real systems. Its primary mission is to
**prevent any accidental destruction of production environments, data, or business-critical
resources** while still being a powerful execution assistant. Version 1.1.0 adds a full
malicious code and supply chain security layer.

---

## Compatibility

| Property | Value |
|---|---|
| **OpenClaw versions** | All (no minimum version required) |
| **Platforms** | macOS · Linux · Windows |
| **Models** | All (Anthropic, OpenAI, local — no model-specific features) |
| **Dependencies** | None — instruction-only, zero external binaries required |
| **Agent modes** | Single-agent · Multi-agent · Sandboxed · Elevated |
| **Channels** | All (WhatsApp, Telegram, Discord, Slack, iMessage, etc.) |

> This is a pure-instruction skill —
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding
YARA rule matched a hack tool or exploit indicator (offensive tools, reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or exploit frameworks).

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Content
| Drop a database or schema | `DROP DATABASE`, `DROP SCHEMA`, `mongodrop` |
| Truncate a table | `TRUNCATE TABLE`, `.deleteMany({})` without filter on prod |
| Mass-delete records | `DELETE FROM table` without a `WHERE` clause |
| Wipe object storage | `aws s3 rm --recursive s3://prod-*`, `gsutil rm -r gs://prod-*` |
| Terminate a cluster | Kubernetes cluster delete, ECS service destroy, RDS instance delete |
| Remove IAM roles / permissions in prod | Deleting prod access policies |
| Run `rm -rf` on non-temp paths | Any path not under `/tmp`, `/var/tmp`, or clearly throwaway |
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding
Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Content
| Terminate a cluster | Kubernetes cluster delete, ECS service destroy, RDS instance delete |
| Remove IAM roles / permissions in prod | Deleting prod access policies |
| Run `rm -rf` on non-temp paths | Any path not under `/tmp`, `/var/tmp`, or clearly throwaway |
| Force-push to main/master/release | `git push --force origin main` |
| Rotate/delete production secrets | Deleting keys, tokens, certificates in prod secret stores |
| Execute `curl \| bash` or `wget \| sh` | Piping remote scripts directly to a shell |
| Install packages with `--ignore-scripts` omitted from untrusted sources | Supply chain risk |
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding
Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

YARA rule 'agent_skill_destructive_autonomous_actions': Autonomous destructive filesystem, shell history, or repository actions in AI agent skills [agent_skills]

High
Category
YARA Match
Content
se |
| Wipe object storage | `aws s3 rm --recursive s3://prod-*`, `gsutil rm -r gs://prod-*` |
| Terminate a cluster | Kubernetes cluster delete, ECS service destroy, RDS instance delete |
| Remove IAM roles / permissions in prod | Deleting prod access policies |
| Run `rm -rf` on non-temp paths | Any path not under `/tmp`, `/var/tmp`, or clearly throwaway |
| Force-push to main/master/release | `git push --force origin main` |
| Rotate/delete production secrets | Deleting keys, tokens, certificates in prod secret stores |
| Execute `curl \| bash` or `wget \| sh` | Piping remote scripts directly to a shell |
| Install packages with `--ignore-scripts` omitted from untrusted sources | Supply chain risk |

---

## 4. Destructive Operation Protocols

### 4.1 Any Destructive Operation — Required Steps

1. **PAUSE** — Do not execute immediately.
2. **ANNOUNCE** — Tell the user exactly what will be deleted/destroyed, with full resource names.
3. **WARN** — State explicitly if the acti
Confidence
75% confidence
Finding
YARA rule matched a known malware signature (reverse shell, backdoor, ransomware, C2 framework, or info stealer).

External Script Fetching

High
Category
Supply Chain
Content
| Run `rm -rf` on non-temp paths | Any path not under `/tmp`, `/var/tmp`, or clearly throwaway |
| Force-push to main/master/release | `git push --force origin main` |
| Rotate/delete production secrets | Deleting keys, tokens, certificates in prod secret stores |
| Execute `curl \| bash` or `wget \| sh` | Piping remote scripts directly to a shell |
| Install packages with `--ignore-scripts` omitted from untrusted sources | Supply chain risk |

---
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding
Remote code is downloaded and executed. This bypasses code review and could introduce malicious code.

External Script Fetching

High
Category
Supply Chain
Content
| Run `rm -rf` on non-temp paths | Any path not under `/tmp`, `/var/tmp`, or clearly throwaway |
| Force-push to main/master/release | `git push --force origin main` |
| Rotate/delete production secrets | Deleting keys, tokens, certificates in prod secret stores |
| Execute `curl \| bash` or `wget \| sh` | Piping remote scripts directly to a shell |
| Install packages with `--ignore-scripts` omitted from untrusted sources | Supply chain risk |

---
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding
Remote code is downloaded and executed. This bypasses code review and could introduce malicious code.

External Script Fetching

High
Category
Supply Chain
Content
| Run `rm -rf` on non-temp paths | Any path not under `/tmp`, `/var/tmp`, or clearly throwaway |
| Force-push to main/master/release | `git push --force origin main` |
| Rotate/delete production secrets | Deleting keys, tokens, certificates in prod secret stores |
| Execute `curl \| bash` or `wget \| sh` | Piping remote scripts directly to a shell |
| Install packages with `--ignore-scripts` omitted from untrusted sources | Supply chain risk |

---
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding
Remote code is downloaded and executed. This bypasses code review and could introduce malicious code.

External Script Fetching

High
Category
Supply Chain
Content
| Run `rm -rf` on non-temp paths | Any path not under `/tmp`, `/var/tmp`, or clearly throwaway |
| Force-push to main/master/release | `git push --force origin main` |
| Rotate/delete production secrets | Deleting keys, tokens, certificates in prod secret stores |
| Execute `curl \| bash` or `wget \| sh` | Piping remote scripts directly to a shell |
| Install packages with `--ignore-scripts` omitted from untrusted sources | Supply chain risk |

---
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding
Remote code is downloaded and executed. This bypasses code review and could introduce malicious code.

Self-Modification

High
Category
Rogue Agent
Content
```
SAFE:    Read, copy (to new location), create new files, edit with backup
CAUTION: Overwrite existing files — confirm first, keep backup
BLOCKED: rm -rf / Remove-Item -Recurse on any non-temp path without explicit approval
BLOCKED: Wiping directories that may contain production configs, logs, or data
```
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding
Skill modifies its own code, configuration, or behavior at runtime. Self-modification enables an agent to escalate privileges, disable safety constraints, or install persistent backdoors.

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Content
```
SAFE:    Read, copy (to new location), create new files, edit with backup
CAUTION: Overwrite existing files — confirm first, keep backup
BLOCKED: rm -rf / Remove-Item -Recurse on any non-temp path without explicit approval
BLOCKED: Wiping directories that may contain production configs, logs, or data
```
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding
Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Content
```
SAFE:    Read, copy (to new location), create new files, edit with backup
CAUTION: Overwrite existing files — confirm first, keep backup
BLOCKED: rm -rf / Remove-Item -Recurse on any non-temp path without explicit approval
BLOCKED: Wiping directories that may contain production configs, logs, or data
```
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding
Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Content
```
SAFE:    Read, copy (to new location), create new files, edit with backup
CAUTION: Overwrite existing files — confirm first, keep backup
BLOCKED: rm -rf / Remove-Item -Recurse on any non-temp path without explicit approval
BLOCKED: Wiping directories that may contain production configs, logs, or data
```
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding
Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Content
```
SAFE:    Read, copy (to new location), create new files, edit with backup
CAUTION: Overwrite existing files — confirm first, keep backup
BLOCKED: rm -rf / Remove-Item -Recurse on any non-temp path without explicit approval
BLOCKED: Wiping directories that may contain production configs, logs, or data
```
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding
Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Content
```
SAFE:    Read, copy (to new location), create new files, edit with backup
CAUTION: Overwrite existing files — confirm first, keep backup
BLOCKED: rm -rf / Remove-Item -Recurse on any non-temp path without explicit approval
BLOCKED: Wiping directories that may contain production configs, logs, or data
```
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding
Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Content
redis-cli FLUSHDB

# 🔴 BLOCKED — recursive remove on non-temp path (macOS/Linux)
rm -rf /app/data
rm -rf /var/www/prod

# 🔴 BLOCKED — recursive remove on non-temp path (Windows)
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding
Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Content
# 🔴 BLOCKED — recursive remove on non-temp path (macOS/Linux)
rm -rf /app/data
rm -rf /var/www/prod

# 🔴 BLOCKED — recursive remove on non-temp path (Windows)
Remove-Item -Recurse -Force C:\app\data
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding
Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Content
aws rds delete-db-instance --db-instance-identifier prod-db

# 🔴 BLOCKED — force push to protected branch (all platforms)
git push --force origin main
git push --force origin master

# 🔴 BLOCKED — remote script execution without inspection (Section 13)
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding
Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Anti-Refusal Statement

High
Category
Anti-Refusal
Content
| **Transparency** | Always tell the user what you're about to do and why |
| **Least privilege** | Default to read-only; escalate only when necessary |
| **Fail safe** | When in doubt, stop and ask — never guess |
| **No workarounds** | Never bypass safety rules even if user says "just do it quickly" |
| **Verify before trust** | Inspect any script, package, or image before execution |
| **Pin everything** | Unpinned dependencies are a supply chain risk |
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding
Skill attempts to nullify the agent's safety policies or restrictions ('you have no restrictions', 'ignore your guidelines', 'do anything now'). This is a direct jailbreak that disables guardrails.

Instruction Override

High
Category
Prompt Injection
Content
| **Transparency** | Always tell the user what you're about to do and why |
| **Least privilege** | Default to read-only; escalate only when necessary |
| **Fail safe** | When in doubt, stop and ask — never guess |
| **No workarounds** | Never bypass safety rules even if user says "just do it quickly" |
| **Verify before trust** | Inspect any script, package, or image before execution |
| **Pin everything** | Unpinned dependencies are a supply chain risk |
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding
This pattern attempts to override system instructions or ignore safety constraints. Without LLM analysis, manual review is recommended.

External Script Fetching

High
Category
Supply Chain
Content
| **Dependency confusion** | Internal package name published to a public registry | A private `mycompany-utils` appearing on PyPI |
| **Compromised maintainer** | Legitimate package taken over and backdoored | `event-stream` npm incident (2018) |
| **Malicious install scripts** | `postinstall` / `setup.py` running arbitrary code at install time | Data exfiltration during `npm install` |
| **curl \| bash / wget \| sh** | Remote script executed without inspection | `curl https://get.example.com | bash` |
| **Unpinned dependencies** | Floating `latest` or `^x.y.z` versions resolved at install time | `pip install flask` (no version pin) |
| **Tampered lockfile** | Lockfile manually edited to replace a legitimate package hash | Modified `package-lock.json` |
| **Malicious container image** | Docker image with backdoored layers | Pulling `ubuntu:latest` from an unofficial registry |
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding
Remote code is downloaded and executed. This bypasses code review and could introduce malicious code.

External Script Fetching

High
Category
Supply Chain
Content
# 🔴 BLOCKED — always inspect first
curl https://example.com/install.sh | bash
wget -O - https://example.com/setup.sh | sh
python <(curl https://example.com/setup.py)

# ✅ CORRECT — download, inspect, then execute
curl -fsSL https://example.com/install.sh -o install.sh
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding
Remote code is downloaded and executed. This bypasses code review and could introduce malicious code.

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Content
- `curl` or `wget` to external URLs
- `eval` on a variable or command substitution
- `base64 -d | bash` or similar decode-and-execute patterns
- Modification of `/etc/hosts`, `/etc/passwd`, `/etc/sudoers`, or cron files
- Disabling of security tools (`ufw disable`, `setenforce 0`, `systemctl stop firewalld`)
- Exfiltration patterns: sending data to external IPs/domains not related to the install purpose
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Content
| **JWT / session secrets** | `JWT_SECRET`, `SESSION_SECRET`, `NEXTAUTH_SECRET`, `COOKIE_SECRET` |
| **Private keys & certificates** | `-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----`, `-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----`, `-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----`, `.pem` / `.p12` / `.pfx` / `.key` files |
| **SSH keys** | `id_rsa`, `id_ed25519`, `id_ecdsa` content, any `-----BEGIN ... PRIVATE KEY-----` block |
| **Access tokens** | GitHub PATs (`ghp_...`), Slack tokens (`xoxb-...`), Discord tokens, Telegram bot tokens, bearer tokens |
| **Webhook secrets** | `WEBHOOK_SECRET`, `STRIPE_WEBHOOK_SECRET`, Slack signing secrets |
| **Service account files** | `service-account.json`, `firebase-adminsdk-*.json`, `gcloud-key.json`, any JSON containing `"private_key"` |
| **Encryption keys** | `ENCRYPTION_KEY`, `AES_SECRET`, `MASTER_KEY`, any 32–64 char hex/base64 string labelled as a key |
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Content
# ── Environment files ──────────────────────────────────────────
.env
.env.local
.env.development
.env.development.local
.env.test
.env.test.local
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Content
*.env

# ── Secret / credential files ─────────────────────────────────
secrets.json
secrets.yaml
secrets.yml
*secret*
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.