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Security audit

Report Sql

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a documentation-only SQL reporting skill with a real SQL-safety caveat but no hidden execution, persistence, or data-access behavior in the artifact.

Before installing, confirm this skill is intended for your report-service environment and verify the underlying template engine safely escapes or binds all substituted SQL values, especially LIKE, IN, loop, and `${...}` fragment cases.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (2)

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The skill documents a templating system that injects user-controlled values directly into SQL fragments, including quoted string interpolation for LIKE patterns and block-level SQL assembly. Claims such as '天然防 SQL 注入' are unsupported by the document, while the examples show raw substitution semantics ('%#@...#%', '#@item#', and full SQL fragments in ${...}), which creates a substantial risk of SQL injection or unsafe query construction if escaping is incomplete or inconsistent.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
84% confidence
Finding

The entire skill documentation is written in Chinese and does not indicate that users may choose another language or that the skill is intentionally limited to a Chinese-language or region-specific audience. Under the stated policy, forcing a specific language without user opt-in is a natural-language policy concern.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.