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Security audit

DevOps Engine

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a DevOps guidance skill with templates and checklists, not an executable or hidden automation package.

Installers should treat this as a broad DevOps reference skill. Review any generated CI, Docker, Terraform, Kubernetes, secret-management, or deployment changes before committing or applying them, especially for production environments.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Tool MisuseTool Parameter Abuse, Chaining Abuse, Unsafe Defaults
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (4)

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Content
- [ ] Multi-stage builds (build deps not in final image)
- [ ] `.dockerignore` excludes: `.git`, `node_modules`, `*.md`, tests, docs
- [ ] Combine RUN commands (fewer layers)
- [ ] Clean package manager cache in same RUN (`rm -rf /var/cache/apk/*`)
- [ ] No dev dependencies in production stage
- [ ] Pin base image SHA: `FROM node:20-alpine@sha256:abc123...`
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding
Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Content
- [ ] Multi-stage builds (build deps not in final image)
- [ ] `.dockerignore` excludes: `.git`, `node_modules`, `*.md`, tests, docs
- [ ] Combine RUN commands (fewer layers)
- [ ] Clean package manager cache in same RUN (`rm -rf /var/cache/apk/*`)
- [ ] No dev dependencies in production stage
- [ ] Pin base image SHA: `FROM node:20-alpine@sha256:abc123...`
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding
Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Content
- [ ] Multi-stage builds (build deps not in final image)
- [ ] `.dockerignore` excludes: `.git`, `node_modules`, `*.md`, tests, docs
- [ ] Combine RUN commands (fewer layers)
- [ ] Clean package manager cache in same RUN (`rm -rf /var/cache/apk/*`)
- [ ] No dev dependencies in production stage
- [ ] Pin base image SHA: `FROM node:20-alpine@sha256:abc123...`
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding
Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Vague Triggers

Medium
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding
The skill exposes very broad natural-language trigger phrases such as 'Set up CI/CD for my Node.js project' and 'Create a Dockerfile for my Python API' without requiring confirmation, repository scoping, or a read-only planning mode. In a DevOps skill, these prompts can plausibly cause high-impact actions across source code, CI pipelines, infrastructure, and deployment configs, increasing the risk of unsafe or overbroad modifications from ambiguous user input.