T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation
- Location
SKILL.md:217- Finding
Overly Broad Privileged Collection of System-Wide Forensic Data
- Content
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"$CASEDIR/crontab.txt" 2>/dev/null for user in $(cut -d: -f1 /etc/passwd); do crontab -u "$user" -l >> "$CASEDIR/crontab-all.txt" 2>/dev/null done ``` ```bash MEMDUMP="/evidence/mem-$(hostname)-$(date +%s).dump" CASEDIR="$HOME/App/domains/argus/evidence/ir-$(date +%Y%m%d-%H%M%S)" mkdir -p "$CASEDIR" echo "=== Memory Forensics ===" # Capture memory echo "--- Memory Dump ---" if [ -f /dev/fmem ]; then sudo dd if=/dev/fmem of="$MEMDUMP" bs=1M 2>&1 echo "Memory dump: $MEMDUMP" else echo " /dev/fmem not available — install fmem kernel module" echo " Alternative: sudo dd if=/dev/mem of=$MEMDUMP bs=1M" fi ``` ### Technical Analysis The playbook enumerates scheduled tasks for every account in `/etc/passwd` and provides commands for acquiring complete physical memory through `/dev/fmem` or `/dev/mem`. These operations are relevant to incident response, but their default scope exceeds least privilege when the affected users, processes, or systems have not first been identified. System-wide cron collection can expose command arguments, internal paths, service configuration, and embedded credentials. A physical-memory image can contain authentication tokens, private application data, cryptographic material, credentials, and information belonging to unrelated users or workloads. The playbook states that root access is required for forensic acquisition, but it does not enforce an authorization gate, incident scope, affected-user allowlist, or separate privileged acquisition procedure. Suppression of errors during cron enumeration also makes it difficult to review which accounts were accessed successfully. The `crontab` commands only read scheduled tasks; they do not ...[truncated 1627 chars]- Remediation
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