T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation
Warning
- Location
scripts/virtual_fence_intrusion_warning_analysis.py:40- Finding
Unverified Open ID permits cloud account impersonation
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
scripts/virtual_fence_intrusion_warning_analysis.py:40-60;skills/smyx_common/scripts/util.py:458-471, 545-561, 578-612
Vulnerability Type: Improper authentication and caller-controlled identity impersonation
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code
scripts/virtual_fence_intrusion_warning_analysis.py:40-60python parser.add_argument("--open-id", required=False, help=argparse.SUPPRESS) parser.add_argument("--list", action='store_true', help="显示虚拟围栏越界预警分析列表清单") parser.add_argument("--api-url", help="服务端API地址") parser.add_argument("--api-key", help=argparse.SUPPRESS) parser.add_argument("--output", help="结果输出文件路径") parser.add_argument("--detail", choices=["basic", "standard", "json"], default=ConstantEnum.DEFAULT__OUTPUT_LEVEL, help="输出详细程度") parser.add_argument("--export-env-only", action='store_true', help="仅输出 export 命令设置环境变量，不执行分析") args = parser.parse_args() try: # 初始化内部用户身份；不要求用户输入，也不在帮助信息中展示。 OpenIdUtil.resolve_current_open_id(args.open_id, use_current=bool(args.open_id)) # 检查必需参数 if args.list: open_id = ConstantEnum.CURRENT__OPEN_ID result = show_analyze_list(open_id)skills/smyx_common/scripts/util.py:458-471python @classmethod def resolve_current_open_id(cls, open_id=None, use_current=True): """解析并初始化当前 open-id，返回最终使用值。""" resolved_open_id = (open_id or "").strip() if isinstance(open_id, str) else open_id if not resolved_open_id and use_current: resolved_open_id = ConstantEnum.CURRENT__OPEN_ID or ConstantEnum.CURRENT__USER_NAME if not resolved_open_id: resolved_open_id = cls.get_api_key_file_open_id() if not resolved_open_id: resolved_open_id = cls.get_or_create_default_open_id() ConstantEnum.CURRENT__OPEN_ID = resolved_open_id if not ConstantEnum.CURRENT__USER ...[truncated 5002 chars]- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Remove
--open-idfrom the public command-line entry point. An internal identity parameter must not be accepted from ordinary Skill callers. - Derive identity only from a trusted, authenticated runtime channel. For Agent integrations, require a signed assertion containing the user identity, audience, issuer, expiration time, and nonce.
- Change the backend authentication flow so that possession of an Open ID or mobile string is insufficient to receive access tokens. Require a normal authentication challenge or a cryptographically verified platform assertion.
- Validate that any supplied identity exactly matches the authenticated caller before issuing or selecting credentials. Reject mismatches rather than silently switching accounts.
- Separate registration from login. Do not combine silent login and automatic registration for arbitrary caller-provided identifiers.
- Bind cached tokens to the authenticated principal, workspace, issuer, and tenant. Do not look up credentials solely by an unverified username.
- Store tokens in a protected credential store with restrictive permissions, and invalidate credentials created through the vulnerable flow.
- Add tests confirming that caller-supplied identity overrides are rejected and that one authenticated user cannot list or create reports under another user's Open ID.
- Remove