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Security audit

Child Happy Moment Capture & Positive Reinforcement | 儿童开心时刻识别与正向激励

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

ClawScan rates this skill suspicious because it reports a mismatch between the advertised child-happiness monitoring purpose and account, identity, and video-analysis capabilities, along with risks involving credentials and unintended video processing.

Consider the verdict suspicious and avoid installing unless you have reviewed and accept the reported data flows. In particular, verify where videos and identity data are sent, how credentials and user records are handled, and whether the export-only option can trigger analysis. Scanner coverage was partial because one local reference was missing, so the assessment does not verify that referenced material.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Output HandlingUnvalidated Output Injection, Cross-Context Output, Unbounded Output
  • Behavioral ASTexec() Call, eval() Call, Dynamic Import
Findings (22)

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The supplied chunk contains no camera ingestion, expression or action recognition, event capture, diary generation, parent notification, or audio playback. Generic file, date, and polling helpers could support the declared system and are not themselves a mismatch. However, the account-provisioning, credential-storage, and platform API behavior introduces materially different resource access and capabilities absent from the description. These operations occur when the relevant methods are called; the chunk does not establish that they run automatically or that the broader skill lacks the advertised camera features.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The supplied chunk's substantive purpose is managing a local user database, not analyzing children's behavior. Database storage could support a larger application, but this code contains no happy-event or diary data model and no connection to the declared camera workflow. Its user-management functionality therefore represents a materially different purpose in the supplied evidence. This finding is limited to this chunk; it does not establish what other application components implement or imply malicious behavior.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The supplied code is an API-backed analysis/reporting wrapper. It contains no visible camera-stream integration, child-specific happiness detection, event-triggered photo or clip capture, parent-app delivery, or sound playback. Its analysis inputs and outputs are generic, including commonAiResponse and healthAiResponse. Although an imported service could implement some detection internally, the supplied chunk does not establish that connection and instead implements a materially different file-submission and report-management workflow. File validation, upload, and polling are supporting implementation details, not independently suspicious behavior.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The supplied implementation does not substantiate the declared purpose: it is generic skill scaffolding with a disabled and broken agent-chat helper. No subprocess execution actually occurs in this chunk. Imported base classes may contain additional behavior, but their implementations are not supplied, so the assessment is limited to the visible code. There is no visible evidence of malicious activity or undeclared camera/data access.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The visible code is a generic video-analysis and history-retrieval CLI, not the described real-time happiness-monitoring system. It contains no camera-monitoring loop, event-specific detection logic, capture handling, notification delivery, or audio playback. Analysis is delegated to an imported skill whose implementation is not supplied, so the underlying analysis capabilities cannot be verified. This finding concerns the visible workflow mismatch and does not establish malicious behavior or rule out additional functionality in unseen dependencies.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

The API secret is repurposed as a user identity and can be sent to an account-registration endpoint.

High
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

API_SECRET_KEY takes precedence as current__user_name and, when tokens are missing, can reach the phoneLogin endpoint as both openId and mobile. This exposes a credential to identity fields, account records, and potentially associated logs; compromise is particularly consequential if the credential permits access to children's media or family data.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Skill declares no tool scope ('permissions' or 'allowed-tools') but code capabilities were detected: env, file_read, file_write, network, shell.

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Without declared permissions the skill's intent is opaque and cannot be validated.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

The --export-env-only option promises not to perform analysis, but execution still invokes video analysis.

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The program parses --export-env-only but never checks it, so providing that option with an input still reaches the analysis workflow. This violates an explicit no-analysis expectation and can cause unintended processing or transmission of sensitive children's footage.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Whitespace Padding

Medium
Category
Prompt Injection
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Large whitespace padding was detected (a block of blank lines or a long run of spaces). This can push injected instructions below or to the right of the visible area so a human reviewer never sees them while the agent still reads them. Manual review of the hidden content is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · skills/smyx_analysis/scripts/skill.py (reported line 28)May include surrounding context.

python
result_json = JsonUtil.parse(result_json_pure_text, result_json_pure_text)

        result_json_common_ai_response = result_json.get("commonAiResponse") if isinstance(result_json,
                                                                                           dict) else result_json
        if result_json_common_ai_response:
            result_json = result_json_common_ai_response

Whitespace Padding

Medium
Category
Prompt Injection
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Large whitespace padding was detected (a block of blank lines or a long run of spaces). This can push injected instructions below or to the right of the visible area so a human reviewer never sees them while the agent still reads them. Manual review of the hidden content is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · skills/smyx_analysis/scripts/skill.py (reported line 33)May include surrounding context.

python
result_json = result_json_common_ai_response

        result_json_health_ai_response = result_json.get("healthAiResponse") if isinstance(result_json,
                                                                                           dict) else result_json
        if result_json_health_ai_response:
            result_json = result_json_health_ai_response

Local video content is submitted to an analysis API without disclosure that it leaves the user's system.

Medium
Category
Output Handling
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The local-file branch reads the complete video into a multipart payload and passes it to the analysis API without an upload-specific notice or consent check in this workflow. Although API use is generally documented, automatic transfer of identifiable children's footage creates a significant privacy risk when local analysis is expected or guardian authorization has not been established.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

The --export-env-only option promises not to perform analysis, but execution still invokes video analysis.

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The --export-env-only flag is accepted but never used to prevent execution, so a supplied video still reaches analyze_video. Users relying on its explicit no-analysis promise can unintentionally submit sensitive footage for processing, particularly concerning in this child-monitoring context.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

The ai_chat docstring claims to invoke an analysis agent, but execution is disabled and the method silently returns no result.

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

L26 explicitly documents invoking the openclaw agent through subprocess, but L61–L66 comment out that invocation. Instead, L68 creates an empty dictionary and L70 accesses its nonexistent stderr attribute, causing an exception that L81–L82 swallow; this method therefore never performs the documented agent analysis or returns its output.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

FileUtil.open silently truncates existing files without explaining its destructive behavior.

Medium
Category
Output Handling
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The generically named open helper always uses write mode, which immediately erases an existing file's contents. There is no confirmation, informational log, docstring, or comment disclosing this behavior; exception tracing only reports failures after the operation is attempted.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

HTTP requests can trigger undisclosed remote registration and transmission of the current user identity.

Medium
Category
Output Handling
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The generic request path can silently invoke phoneLogin with register=1 and transmit the current identity when authentication tokens are absent. This couples ordinary requests to remote account creation without an explicit enrollment step in the shown code, creating a privacy concern in a child-monitoring context; the registration payload itself does not show transmission of images.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

This POST is the transmission sink for the implicit registration and credential-as-identity issues: its payload includes openId and mobile, which can contain API_SECRET_KEY. External HTTP calls are not inherently unsafe, and the destination is not shown to be malicious, but this specific data flow can disclose credentials beyond their intended authentication channel.

Content

Scanner excerpt · skills/smyx_common/scripts/util.py (reported line 561)May include surrounding context.

python
"source": ConstantEnum.DEFAULT__SKILL_HUB_NAME
            }
            try:
                _response = requests.post(_url, json=_data)
                if _response.status_code == 200:
                    _response_json = _response.json()
                    if _response_json and _response_json.get("success"):

Configuration loading silently creates directories and writes files, including during module import.

Low
Category
Output Handling
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

YamlUtil.load creates parent directories and writes a YAML file when the requested configuration is absent, without a prompt, log, docstring, or explanatory comment disclosing this side effect. BaseEnum.init_subclass invokes this loader during class definition (L044–L059), so merely importing the module can modify the filesystem rather than only read configuration.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Dynamic attribute access via getattr()

Low
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Dynamic getattr() with a non-literal attribute name can access arbitrary object attributes, potentially bypassing access controls.

Content

Scanner excerpt · skills/smyx_common/scripts/dao.py (reported line 243)May include surrounding context.

python
username = getattr(model, "username", None)
            if username:
                column_names = self.__model__.__table__.columns.keys()
                update_data = {key: getattr(model, key) for key in column_names if key != "username"}
                return self.update_by_username(username, **update_data)

            return None

Dynamic attribute access via getattr()

Low
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Dynamic getattr() with a non-literal attribute name can access arbitrary object attributes, potentially bypassing access controls.

Content

Scanner excerpt · skills/smyx_common/scripts/dao.py (reported line 353)May include surrounding context.

python
column_names = self.__model__.__table__.columns.keys()

            for key in column_names:
                value = getattr(model, key)
                setattr(instance, key, value)

            session.commit()

Dynamic attribute access via getattr()

Low
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Dynamic getattr() with a non-literal attribute name can access arbitrary object attributes, potentially bypassing access controls.

Content

Scanner excerpt · skills/smyx_common/scripts/dao.py (reported line 326)May include surrounding context.

python
if filters:
                for key, value in filters.items():
                    query = query.filter(getattr(self.__model__, key) == value)

            if offset:
                query = query.offset(offset)

Dynamic attribute access via getattr()

Low
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Dynamic getattr() with a non-literal attribute name can access arbitrary object attributes, potentially bypassing access controls.

Content

Scanner excerpt · skills/smyx_common/scripts/dao.py (reported line 441)May include surrounding context.

python
if filters:
                for key, value in filters.items():
                    query = query.filter(getattr(self.__model__, key) == value)

            return query.scalar()
        finally:

Dynamic attribute access via getattr()

Low
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Dynamic getattr() with a non-literal attribute name can access arbitrary object attributes, potentially bypassing access controls.

Content

Scanner excerpt · skills/smyx_common/scripts/util.py (reported line 30)May include surrounding context.

python
elif isinstance(cur, dict):
                        cur = cur.get(part, default)
                    else:
                        cur = getattr(cur, part)
                return cur
            except Exception:
                return default