T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking
- Location
SKILL.md:57- Finding
Automatic routing can upload biometric media without explicit facial-analysis consent
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This skill needs review because it can upload facial videos to a remote health service, silently link a user identity, store tokens locally, and retrieve cloud health-style reports.
Install only if you are comfortable sending facial videos or video URLs to lifeemergence.com services and having reports associated with an automatically managed identity. Avoid using third-party videos without consent, assume cloud history may be retrievable through this skill, and review local workspace data for stored service tokens if you uninstall or share the workspace.
SKILL.md:57Automatic routing can upload biometric media without explicit facial-analysis consent
skills/smyx_common/scripts/util.py:548Platform identity and reusable authentication tokens are silently collected and stored in plaintext
scripts/skill.py:102Unrestricted URLs are delegated to a privileged backend fetch operation
skills/smyx_common/scripts/util.py:568Shared HTTP helper attaches authentication credentials to arbitrary absolute URLs
requirements.txt:1Dependency manifest uses an ambiguous YAML package name and lacks a fully reproducible request dependency
This finding indicates the skill reads local workspace files for identity, manipulates workspace directories, creates or reuses local user identities, performs automatic phone login/registration to external health APIs, manages tokens, and injects auth headers for arbitrary requests. In a health-oriented facial-analysis context, this is highly dangerous because it combines sensitive biometric/medical data handling with undisclosed identity brokerage, credential management, local data access, and broad outbound request capability.
This finding indicates the skill reads local workspace files for identity, manipulates workspace directories, creates or reuses local user identities, performs automatic phone login/registration to external health APIs, manages tokens, and injects auth headers for arbitrary requests. In a health-oriented facial-analysis context, this is highly dangerous because it combines sensitive biometric/medical data handling with undisclosed identity brokerage, credential management, local data access, and broad outbound request capability.
This finding indicates the skill reads local workspace files for identity, manipulates workspace directories, creates or reuses local user identities, performs automatic phone login/registration to external health APIs, manages tokens, and injects auth headers for arbitrary requests. In a health-oriented facial-analysis context, this is highly dangerous because it combines sensitive biometric/medical data handling with undisclosed identity brokerage, credential management, local data access, and broad outbound request capability.
This finding indicates the skill reads local workspace files for identity, manipulates workspace directories, creates or reuses local user identities, performs automatic phone login/registration to external health APIs, manages tokens, and injects auth headers for arbitrary requests. In a health-oriented facial-analysis context, this is highly dangerous because it combines sensitive biometric/medical data handling with undisclosed identity brokerage, credential management, local data access, and broad outbound request capability.
This finding indicates the skill reads local workspace files for identity, manipulates workspace directories, creates or reuses local user identities, performs automatic phone login/registration to external health APIs, manages tokens, and injects auth headers for arbitrary requests. In a health-oriented facial-analysis context, this is highly dangerous because it combines sensitive biometric/medical data handling with undisclosed identity brokerage, credential management, local data access, and broad outbound request capability.
This finding indicates the skill reads local workspace files for identity, manipulates workspace directories, creates or reuses local user identities, performs automatic phone login/registration to external health APIs, manages tokens, and injects auth headers for arbitrary requests. In a health-oriented facial-analysis context, this is highly dangerous because it combines sensitive biometric/medical data handling with undisclosed identity brokerage, credential management, local data access, and broad outbound request capability.
This finding indicates the skill reads local workspace files for identity, manipulates workspace directories, creates or reuses local user identities, performs automatic phone login/registration to external health APIs, manages tokens, and injects auth headers for arbitrary requests. In a health-oriented facial-analysis context, this is highly dangerous because it combines sensitive biometric/medical data handling with undisclosed identity brokerage, credential management, local data access, and broad outbound request capability.
This finding indicates the skill reads local workspace files for identity, manipulates workspace directories, creates or reuses local user identities, performs automatic phone login/registration to external health APIs, manages tokens, and injects auth headers for arbitrary requests. In a health-oriented facial-analysis context, this is highly dangerous because it combines sensitive biometric/medical data handling with undisclosed identity brokerage, credential management, local data access, and broad outbound request capability.
This finding indicates the skill reads local workspace files for identity, manipulates workspace directories, creates or reuses local user identities, performs automatic phone login/registration to external health APIs, manages tokens, and injects auth headers for arbitrary requests. In a health-oriented facial-analysis context, this is highly dangerous because it combines sensitive biometric/medical data handling with undisclosed identity brokerage, credential management, local data access, and broad outbound request capability.
This finding indicates the skill reads local workspace files for identity, manipulates workspace directories, creates or reuses local user identities, performs automatic phone login/registration to external health APIs, manages tokens, and injects auth headers for arbitrary requests. In a health-oriented facial-analysis context, this is highly dangerous because it combines sensitive biometric/medical data handling with undisclosed identity brokerage, credential management, local data access, and broad outbound request capability.
YARA rule matched a hack tool or exploit indicator (offensive tools, reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or exploit frameworks).
---
name: "face-analysis"
description: "Supports uploading local MP4 videos or network video URLs to call the server-side API for facial diagnosis. It returns structured TCM facial diagnosis results. | 支持通过上传本地 MP4 视频或网络视频 URL,调用服务端 API 进行面部诊断,返回结构化的中医面诊结果"
version: "1.0.6"
license: "MIT-0"
---
# 🧑⚕️ TCM Facial Diagnosis Analysis Tool | 中医面诊分析工具
> **智能分析中枢** · 图片/视频智能分析 · 结构化报告 · 历史报告云端查询
---
## 🧭 技能概览 | Overview
| 模块 | 内容 |
|---|---|
|
The skill description says users can upload facial videos or provide URLs to a server-side API but does not prominently warn about the privacy implications of transmitting biometric and potentially health-related data off-device. For a medical-adjacent facial-analysis tool, omission of this disclosure meaningfully increases consent and data-protection risk.
This utility layer silently performs identity resolution, account lookup/creation, login, and token persistence, which is materially broader than the declared face-analysis purpose. That creates hidden authentication side effects and enables the skill to operate under a local or derived identity without explicit user consent, increasing the risk of unauthorized account use, privacy violations, and unexpected backend actions.
The skill requests or implies capabilities including shell, network, file read/write, and environment access, but the manifest does not declare any tool scope restrictions. In an agent setting this weakens least-privilege controls, making it easier for a misleading or overbroad skill to access resources beyond what users would reasonably expect.
The default trigger activates on generic video-analysis requests unless users mention several exclusions. Such broad triggering can cause the skill to process or upload facial videos when the user intended a different analysis path, which is especially sensitive given biometric and health-related data.
The history-report trigger relies on broad everyday phrases like viewing reports or lists, which may inadvertently fetch cloud-hosted historical medical reports. In this context, accidental disclosure of prior facial-health reports is a meaningful privacy risk.
The documentation describes transmitting MP4 videos or public video URLs for facial analysis, which involves highly sensitive biometric data, but it provides no privacy warning, consent guidance, retention notice, or data-handling expectations. In the context of a face-analysis skill tied to health-style diagnosis, this omission increases the risk that users or integrators send sensitive personal data without understanding exposure, storage, or compliance implications.
The inline documentation at L02 says this is a '宠物健康诊断分析工具配置文件' (pet health diagnosis analysis tool configuration file), while the surrounding skill manifest describes facial diagnosis from MP4 videos or video URLs. The code then sets generic health-analysis endpoints rather than anything clearly tied to facial diagnosis, so the documentation actively points to a different tool/domain than the declared skill intent.
The skill includes a history-listing capability via show_analyze_list() that is not described in the manifest, which only mentions uploading a video or URL for diagnosis and returning results. Hidden functionality that retrieves prior facial-analysis records expands access to sensitive health-related data and can violate user expectations and least-privilege design.
The code initializes and relies on an internal open_id identity mechanism even though identity binding is not necessary for the stated purpose of one-off video analysis. Introducing hidden identity linkage for a biometric/health-adjacent workflow increases privacy risk, enables silent account correlation, and broadens what backend data may be accessed under the hood.
OpenIdUtil.resolve_current_open_id(...) performs internal identity resolution without clear user disclosure or an obvious opt-in path. In a facial diagnosis skill, silently attaching a persistent identifier to requests raises privacy concerns because sensitive biometric/medical inferences may be tied to a user account without informed consent.
The tool sends either a local video path or remote video URL to a server-side analysis function without a clear user-facing disclosure that data will be transmitted off-host. Because facial videos are highly sensitive personal data, lack of explicit transmission notice meaningfully increases privacy and consent risk even if network use is functionally expected.
The skill returns natural-language strings such as '面诊分析结构化结果' and other Chinese-only messages throughout the file. This imposes a fixed locale on all users with no opt-in, fallback, or language-selection mechanism, which matches the language/locale policy violation criteria.
This code reads arbitrary local file contents and uploads them to a server-side analysis API, but the code path contains no user-facing confirmation, disclosure, or consent checkpoint before exfiltrating data. In a skill that processes local media, this is more dangerous because users may provide sensitive videos containing faces, surroundings, or metadata, and the skill directly transfers that content off-device.
The method is named SMYX_HYDROPONIC_NUTRIENT_ASSESSMENT_ANALYSIS, which denotes hydroponic nutrient assessment, but its docstring and implementation clearly retrieve face-diagnosis report lists. This is not merely incomplete documentation; the identifier actively points to a different skill intent than the code actually serves.
Detected: suspicious.install_untrusted_source