T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
SKILL.md:33- Finding
Unpinned Global Installation of an Unreviewed npm Package
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Locations:
SKILL.md:33-35andREADME.md:21-23
Vulnerability Type: Supply-chain exposure through an unpinned third-party dependency
Risk Level: MediumComplete vulnerable code snippet (
SKILL.md:33-35):bash npm install -g 1688alphaclawDuplicate installation instruction (
README.md:21-23):bash npm install -g 1688alphaclawTechnical Analysis
The project directs users to install the remotely hosted
1688alphaclawnpm package globally without pinning a reviewed version or providing an integrity digest. The package implementation, source provenance, dependency lockfile, and lifecycle scripts are not included in the audited project, which consists only ofSKILL.mdandREADME.md.An npm installation can execute package lifecycle scripts with the permissions of the invoking user. Because the command resolves a mutable package release, the effective code installed in the future may differ from the code that existed when this documentation was reviewed. Global installation also increases exposure because the resulting executable is placed in the user's global command environment.
The documented CLI handles AK/SK credentials, reads and writes local configuration, downloads skills, and packages local directories for upload. These behaviors cannot be independently verified without the package source. This finding does not establish that the current npm package is malicious; it identifies the unsafe and unverifiable dependency installation mechanism.
Attack Path
- An attacker compromises the npm publisher account, package supply chain, or a transitive dependency used by
1688alphaclaw. - The attacker publishes a malicious release under the same package name.
- A user follows the documented unpinned command, causing npm to resolve the attacker-controlled release.
- Malicious package code executes during an npm lifecycle hook or when the glob ...[truncated 1000 chars]
- An attacker compromises the npm publisher account, package supply chain, or a transitive dependency used by
- Remediation
View remediation
Remediation Suggestions
- Pin the installation command to a specific, reviewed package version, such as
npm install -g 1688alphaclaw@1.0.2. - Publish or reference the exact source revision corresponding to the package release so its implementation and dependencies can be audited.
- Provide package provenance information and verify npm registry signatures or build attestations where supported.
- Record and verify an expected package integrity digest through a controlled installation process.
- Audit all direct and transitive dependencies and commit an appropriate lockfile in the CLI source repository.
- Avoid lifecycle scripts unless strictly necessary. Where operationally possible, install with lifecycle scripts disabled and explicitly perform reviewed setup steps.
- Prefer a project-local installation or isolated execution environment over global installation to reduce command-path and filesystem exposure.
- Document that users must not run the installation with
sudoor another elevated account. - Ensure
~/.alphaclaw/auth.jsonis created with owner-only permissions, avoids retaining the Secret Key when unnecessary, and never exposes credentials in debug logs. - Update both
SKILL.mdandREADME.mdso they provide the same pinned and verifiable installation procedure.
- Pin the installation command to a specific, reviewed package version, such as
