T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
SKILL.md:5- Finding
Unpinned Executable Dependency from a Third-Party Homebrew Tap
- Content
View full analysis
Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, line 5
Vulnerability Type: Supply-chain risk from an unpinned third-party executable dependency
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code Snippet:
yaml metadata: {"clawdbot":{"emoji":"🧾","requires":{"bins":["summarize"]},"install":[{"id":"brew","kind":"brew","formula":"steipete/tap/summarize","bins":["summarize"],"label":"Install summarize (brew)"}]}}Technical Analysis
The skill declares installation of the
summarizeexecutable from the third-party Homebrew tapsteipete/tap. The dependency is not constrained to a specific version, source commit, or cryptographic checksum. Consequently, the executable and its installation behavior may change after this skill has been reviewed without requiring any modification to the audited project.Homebrew formula installation can download and execute external build or installation logic. If the tap, formula repository, upstream release infrastructure, or maintainer account is compromised, the dependency could be replaced with malicious code. The resulting binary would later be invoked on URLs and local files according to the documented skill behavior.
The audit found no evidence that the current external package is malicious. The vulnerability is the absence of dependency pinning and integrity verification, which prevents the reviewed project from guaranteeing that future installations resolve to the same audited artifact.
Attack Path
- An attacker compromises the third-party Homebrew tap, its maintainer account, or the upstream artifact distribution channel.
- The attacker modifies the formula or referenced artifact to install a malicious
summarizeexecutable. - A user or agent follows the skill metadata and installs
steipete/tap/summarize. - Homebrew retrieves and installs the attacker-controlled package without a project-level version or integrity constraint.
- The agent invokes
summarizeo ...[truncated 937 chars]
- Remediation
View remediation
Remediation Suggestions
- Pin the dependency to a specific, reviewed release rather than resolving the latest formula dynamically.
- Record and verify a cryptographic checksum for the downloaded artifact.
- Where practical, pin the tap or source repository to an immutable commit and document the corresponding upstream source.
- Prefer a trusted package source with reproducible builds, signed releases, and transparent provenance.
- Verify package signatures or checksums before installation and fail closed if verification does not succeed.
- Run the CLI with least privilege and restrict its access to unrelated local files, credentials, environment variables, and network destinations.
- Periodically review the pinned dependency and its transitive dependencies before upgrading.
