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Security audit

Tavily Search V2

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a straightforward Tavily web-search wrapper that sends the user's search query to Tavily using the disclosed API key.

Install this only if you are comfortable sending your search queries and selected filters to Tavily and providing a Tavily API key. Keep the key scoped and rotated according to Tavily account practices; no additional local persistence or broad data access was evident in the artifact.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (3)

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
84% confidence
Finding

The skill documents use of an API key and a networked Node script but does not declare an explicit tool scope such as permissions or allowed-tools. This creates a trust-boundary problem: a host may not be able to enforce or review that the skill reads environment secrets and makes outbound network requests, increasing the risk of unintended secret exposure or over-broad execution.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/search.mjs (reported line 100)May include surrounding context.

js
if (includeDomains.length > 0) body.include_domains = includeDomains;
if (excludeDomains.length > 0) body.exclude_domains = excludeDomains;

const resp = await fetch("https://api.tavily.com/search", {
  method: "POST",
  headers: {
    "Content-Type": "application/json",

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/search.mjs (reported line 100)May include surrounding context.

js
if (includeDomains.length > 0) body.include_domains = includeDomains;
if (excludeDomains.length > 0) body.exclude_domains = excludeDomains;

const resp = await fetch("https://api.tavily.com/search", {
  method: "POST",
  headers: {
    "Content-Type": "application/json",