T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
- Location
_scripts/archive.mjs:163- Finding
Shell Command Injection in AI Classification
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This archiver is coherent at a high level, but unsafe command execution and under-scoped AI/cloud integrations could expose documents or run commands while processing crafted files.
Review before installing. Avoid running this skill on untrusted Office documents or directories until the shell-based extraction and AI/cloud command paths are replaced with argument-based subprocess calls. Keep AI classification and cloud upload disabled unless you are comfortable with document names, summaries, excerpts, or full files leaving the local machine and you have validated the destination and credentials.
_scripts/archive.mjs:163Shell Command Injection in AI Classification
_scripts/archive.mjs:275Shell and Python Code Injection in Office Document Extractors
_scripts/archive.mjs:223Potential Disclosure of Document Content to an Arbitrary AI Endpoint
_scripts/archive.mjs:353Shell Command Injection in Optional Cloud Upload Configuration
SKILL.md:127Unpinned Dependencies and Unverified Cloud Utility Download
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node _scripts/archive.mjs /path/to/file.xlsx
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node _scripts/archive.mjs /path/to/file.xlsx
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node _scripts/archive.mjs /path/to/file.xlsx
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node _scripts/archive.mjs /path/to/file.xlsx
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node _scripts/archive.mjs /path/to/file.xlsx
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node _scripts/archive.mjs /path/to/file.xlsx
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node _scripts/archive.mjs /path/to/file.xlsx
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node _scripts/archive.mjs /path/to/file.xlsx
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node _scripts/archive.mjs /path/to/file.xlsx
The skill documents capabilities that rely on environment variables and network access for AI classification and optional cloud uploads, but it does not declare any explicit tool scope or permissions boundary. This can cause users or hosts to underestimate the skill's ability to access configuration secrets and transmit data externally, increasing the risk of unintended data exposure.
The skill advertises automatic archiving, content extraction, indexing, and optional cloud upload of user files, but it does not provide a prominent upfront warning about copying, indexing, retaining, and potentially transmitting document contents. Because the skill targets bulk processing of office documents, it may handle sensitive business data, making silent storage and transfer behavior especially risky.
The script invokes external shell commands and Python one-liners using file paths and document-derived text, expanding its attack surface beyond simple archiving. This is dangerous because unsafely composed command strings can lead to command injection or unintended code execution, especially where file paths are interpolated into Python snippets or shell commands.
The skill is presented as a local knowledge-base archiver, but its AI classification configuration supports sending document-derived content to an external CLI-backed model or remote API endpoint. This creates a confidentiality risk because sensitive document summaries and excerpts may leave the local environment without a clear, explicit disclosure at the point of use.
The optional cloud-upload capability broadens the skill from local archiving into external data transfer, which changes the trust and privacy model. Even if disabled by default, the presence of this path means archived files may be exfiltrated to third-party storage if enabled without sufficient controls or user awareness.
The AI classification path sends file name, summary, and content excerpts to an external or externally mediated model service without an explicit user-facing warning in the workflow. In a document archiving context, this can expose proprietary, personal, or regulated information during classification.
The cloud upload path can transfer archived files outside the local system without an in-band warning at the moment of archival. Because users may expect a local knowledge-base tool to keep documents on-device, this mismatch can lead to accidental disclosure of sensitive files.
The natural-language instructions and description are presented in Chinese only, which can amount to forcing a specific language without offering a choice. The policy allows locale constraints when justified or opt-in is provided, but no such justification or language-selection guidance appears here.
The user-facing description, help text, and command guidance are written entirely in Chinese, including usage examples and status messages. This imposes a language choice on users without any opt-in or alternative locale, which matches the policy's language/locale violation criterion.