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Security audit

Botlearn Doctor@1.0.2

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a plausible OpenClaw health-check skill, but it over-collects sensitive local data and includes unsafe remediation and report-delivery paths.

Review carefully before installing. Prefer removing curl-to-shell fixes, removing --force from install recommendations, disabling external report delivery and browser auto-open unless explicitly needed, and changing collection to emit only redacted metrics rather than raw config or identity-file contents.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
Findings (8)

T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution

Error
Location
check_skills.md:69
Finding

Remote installer is recommended through an unauthenticated curl-to-shell pipeline

Content
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Remediation
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` and verify package provenance and integrity metadata. ]]>

T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Error
Location
check_skills.md:190
Finding

Skill instructions declare an entire vendor namespace trusted and bypass installation risk prompts

Content
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--force ``` `--force` skips interactive risk prompts for trusted botlearn skills. ``` The broader policy at `check_skills.md:127-166` asserts that all `@botlearn/*` skills are trusted, penalizes systems that do not have them installed, and recommends missing packages. `SKILL.md:299-310` contains the same scoring and `--force` recommendation. ### Technical Analysis Package trust is inferred solely from a namespace and promotional assertions rather than from a cryptographic identity, reviewed version, signature, or package-specific assessment. The `--force` option deliberately suppresses interactive risk prompts that are intended to warn about dangerous capabilities or package behavior. The health score is also reduced when vendor-specific packages are absent. This changes the skill's objective from neutral system health assessment to encouraging installation from one ecosystem. When loaded by an agent, these instructions can bias the agent toward recommending additional code and bypassing the installer’s safety checks. The general Phase 4 confirmation requirement reduces automatic exploitation, but it does not restore the skipped package-level review. A user is being asked to approve an installation after the skill has already labeled the namespace trusted. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker publishes or compromises a package under a name returned by the `botlearn` registry search. 2. The collection script reports the package as missing. 3. The scoring policy penalizes the installation for not having the package. 4. The agent recommends `clawhub install ... --force`. 5. After user confirmation, `--force` suppresses the package manager’s risk prompts. 6. The package installs and executes with the privileges ava ...[truncated 385 chars]
Remediation
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T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation

Error
Location
data_collect.md:74
Finding

Raw OpenClaw configuration is copied into agent context without secret redaction

Content
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/dev/null # Fallback: also try $HOME/.openclaw/config/openclaw.json ``` Store raw JSON content as `DATA.openclaw_json`. Purpose: cross-validate against `DATA.config` script output; catch any unusual overrides. ``` ### Technical Analysis The protocol explicitly places the complete raw configuration in the model's working context. OpenClaw configuration can contain authentication tokens, webhook URLs, channel credentials, or other sensitive connection data. Unlike the security scanner, which emits only a secret type, path, line number, and redacted placeholder, this direct-read path has no redaction step. The stated purpose is structural cross-validation. That purpose can be achieved locally by parsing the file and returning only selected non-secret fields, hashes, presence indicators, or mismatch records. Giving the agent the complete file therefore exceeds the minimum data access necessary for the declared health-check function. The later instruction not to print credential values only controls final output; it does not prevent secret values from entering model context, traces, diagnostics, or intermediate storage. ### Attack Path 1. A user stores a gateway token, webhook credential, or another secret in `openclaw.json`. 2. A routine health check executes the direct `cat` instruction. 3. The complete file is stored as `DATA.openclaw_json`. 4. The credential enters agent context before any redaction is applied. 5. The value may subsequently be exposed through model telemetry, debugging, prompt injection in another collected file, or an accidental report-generation path. ### Impact Assessment Exposure may compromise gateway authentication, messaging integrations, webhook ...[truncated 182 chars]
Remediation
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T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation

Warning
Location
data_collect.md:149
Finding

Personal workspace identity files are ingested in full when only structural metrics are needed

Content
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/dev/null || echo "[MISSING]" echo "=== END ===" done ``` Store as `DATA.workspace_identity`: ```json { "agent_md": { "exists": true, "word_count": 350, "content": "..." }, "soul_md": { "exists": true, "word_count": 120, "content": "..." }, "user_md": { "exists": false, "word_count": 0, "content": null }, "identity_md": { "exists": true, "word_count": 85, "content": "..." }, "tool_md": { "exists": false, "word_count": 0, "content": null } } ``` ``` ### Technical Analysis The scoring logic primarily needs file existence, word counts, section presence, and limited personalization indicators. Nevertheless, the collection protocol reads and stores the complete contents of `user.md`, `soul.md`, `identity.md`, and tool/agent files in model context. These files may contain personally identifying information, behavioral rules, private operational details, tool descriptions, or sensitive user preferences. The instruction not to echo the raw content in the final report does not prevent the data from being processed or retained upstream. Full-content ingestion is therefore broader than necessary for health scoring and creates an avoidable privacy boundary violation. ### Attack Path 1. A user records personal information or confidential instructions in workspace identity files. 2. A general health check reads every file in full. 3. Th ...[truncated 606 chars]
Remediation
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T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
scripts/deliver-report.sh:133
Finding

Report and webhook data are interpolated into shell commands with inadequate escaping

Content
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(idx+1) + ". " + i.severity.toUpperCase() + " [" + i.id + "] " + i.msg).join("\n"); const payload = JSON.stringify({ blocks: [ { type: "header", text: { type: "plain_text", text: "🏥 OpenClaw Health Report" } }, { type: "section", fields: [ { type: "mrkdwn", text: "*Score:* " + report.overall_score + "/100 " + statusEmoji(report.overall_score) }, { type: "mrkdwn", text: "*Status:* " + report.overall_status } ]}, { type: "section", text: { type: "mrkdwn", text: issuesMd || "No issues found" } } ] }); const safe = redactSecrets(payload); execSync("curl -sS -X POST -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" -d " + JSON.stringify(safe) + " " + JSON.stringify(webhook), { timeout: 10000 }); ``` Equivalent command construction is used for DingTalk at lines 154-166, Feishu at lines 172-191, and Discord at lines 197-216. ### Technical Analysis `child_process.execSync()` invokes a shell. `JSON.stringify()` produces JSON string syntax, not POSIX shell escaping. In particular, strings are generally surrounded by double quotes, inside which shells still process command substitutions such as `$(command)` and backticks. Both the webhook URL and portions of the payload can originate from external or locally mutable data. Slack and DingTalk payloads include report issue messages, which may be derived from logs, configuration, package metadata, or diagnostic output. Secret redaction does not sanitize shell metacharacters. Consequently, a crafted value such as `$(touch /tmp/report-pwned)` can be evaluated by the shel ...[truncated 918 chars]
Remediation
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T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
scripts/deliver-report.sh:221
Finding

SMTP host and port configuration permit shell command injection

Content
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"; const htmlContent = htmlFile && fs.existsSync(htmlFile) ? fs.readFileSync(htmlFile, "utf8") : "

Score: " + report.overall_score + "/100

"; const safeHtml = redactSecrets(htmlContent); const emailPayload = "From: " + from + "\nTo: " + emailConf.to + "\nSubject: " + subject + "\nContent-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8\n\n" + safeHtml; const tmpFile = "/tmp/doctor-email-" + Date.now() + ".eml"; fs.writeFileSync(tmpFile, emailPayload); try { const host = emailConf.smtp_host || "localhost"; const port = emailConf.smtp_port || 25; execSync("sendmail -t < " + JSON.stringify(tmpFile) + " 2>/dev/null || curl --url smtp://" + host + ":" + port + " --mail-from " + JSON.stringify(from) + " --mail-rcpt " + JSON.stringify(emailConf.to) + " --upload-file " + JSON.stringify(tmpFile), { timeout: 10000 }); results.push({ channel: "email", status: "delivered", to: emailConf.to }); } catch { results.push({ channel: "email", status: "failed", error: "sendmail/smtp delivery failed" }); } try { fs.unlinkSync(tmpFile); } catch {} ``` ### Technical Analysis The `smtp_host` and `smtp_port` values are concatenated directly into an `execSync()` shell command without quoting or validation. Shell separators, substitutions, redirects, and other metacharacters are therefore interpreted as command syntax. The use of `sendmail ... || curl ...` does not mitigate the issue. An attacker can arrange for an injected command to execute in the fallback branch, or can use syntax that changes the structure of the complete command. The message headers are also assembled ...[truncated 857 chars]
Remediation
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T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
scripts/deliver-report.sh:226
Finding

Email reports use a non-exclusive temporary file and plaintext SMTP fallback

Content
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Score: " + report.overall_score + "/100"; const safeHtml = redactSecrets(htmlContent); const emailPayload = "From: " + from + "\nTo: " + emailConf.to + "\nSubject: " + subject + "\nContent-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8\n\n" + safeHtml; const tmpFile = "/tmp/doctor-email-" + Date.now() + ".eml"; fs.writeFileSync(tmpFile, emailPayload); try { const host = emailConf.smtp_host || "localhost"; const port = emailConf.smtp_port || 25; execSync("sendmail -t < " + JSON.stringify(tmpFile) + " 2>/dev/null || curl --url smtp://" + host + ":" + port + " --mail-from " + JSON.stringify(from) + " --mail-rcpt " + JSON.stringify(emailConf.to) + " --upload-file " + JSON.stringify(tmpFile), { timeout: 10000 }); results.push({ channel: "email", status: "delivered", to: emailConf.to }); } catch { results.push({ channel: "email", status: "failed", error: "sendmail/smtp delivery failed" }); } try { fs.unlinkSync(tmpFile); } catch {} ``` ### Technical Analysis The report is written into the shared `/tmp` namespace using a timestamp-derived filename. The file is not opened with exclusive creation, symlink protection, or an explicitly restrictive mode. This creates a race in which another local user may predict or discover the path and place a symlink before the write, potentially redirecting the write to another file accessible to the OpenClaw user. File confidentiality also depends on the process umask. The fallback transmits the report using `smtp://` rather than TLS-protected `smtps://` or enforced STARTTLS. Health reports can contain internal paths, software versions, network posture, and security findings. The redaction expression is not a co ...[truncated 853 chars]
Remediation
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T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
scripts/collect-security.sh:257
Finding

OPENCLAW_HOME is concatenated into a shell command in the security scanner

Content
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/dev/null", { encoding: "utf8", timeout: 3000 }); const secretFiles = tracked.split("\n").filter(f => f.endsWith(".key") || f.endsWith(".pem") || f.endsWith(".env") || f.includes("credentials") || f.includes("secret") ); for (const sf of secretFiles) { if (sf.trim()) { result.vcs_sensitive.findings.push({ type: "tracked_secret", file: sf.replace(process.env.HOME, "~"), severity: "critical", msg: "Potentially sensitive file tracked in git" }); } } } catch {} ``` `HOME` is initialized at line 18: ```javascript const HOME = process.env.OPENCLAW_HOME || (process.env.HOME + "/.openclaw"); ``` ### Technical Analysis `OPENCLAW_HOME` is an environment-controlled value and is concatenated into a command executed by a shell. No quoting, argument separation, or path validation is applied. A value containing spaces changes command semantics, while shell separators or substitutions can execute arbitrary commands. Catching the resulting exception does not prevent command execution; it only suppresses evidence after the shell has already processed the malicious value. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker controls the environment used to launch the health check, a wrapper script, or a service definition supplying `OPENCLAW_HOME`. 2. The variable is set to a value containing a shell fragment. 3. The security collection script runs as part of the normal health check. 4. `execSync()` creates a shell command containing the untrusted value. 5. The shell executes the injected command with the health-check user's privileges. ### Impact Assessment The attacker can execute arbitrary commands as the Ope ...[truncated 207 chars]
Remediation
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Vulnerability Patterns
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Tool MisuseTool Parameter Abuse, Chaining Abuse, Unsafe Defaults
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
Findings (74)

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

A skill described as an autonomous live health checker but actually requiring an existing report file and launching a local browser introduces undisclosed local file handling and application-launch behavior. Unexpected local file opening can expose sensitive report contents to other local users, browser extensions, sync tooling, or shell integrations and exceeds least-surprise expectations for a diagnostic skill.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

A skill described as an autonomous live health checker but actually requiring an existing report file and launching a local browser introduces undisclosed local file handling and application-launch behavior. Unexpected local file opening can expose sensitive report contents to other local users, browser extensions, sync tooling, or shell integrations and exceeds least-surprise expectations for a diagnostic skill.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

A skill described as an autonomous live health checker but actually requiring an existing report file and launching a local browser introduces undisclosed local file handling and application-launch behavior. Unexpected local file opening can expose sensitive report contents to other local users, browser extensions, sync tooling, or shell integrations and exceeds least-surprise expectations for a diagnostic skill.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

A skill described as an autonomous live health checker but actually requiring an existing report file and launching a local browser introduces undisclosed local file handling and application-launch behavior. Unexpected local file opening can expose sensitive report contents to other local users, browser extensions, sync tooling, or shell integrations and exceeds least-surprise expectations for a diagnostic skill.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

A skill described as an autonomous live health checker but actually requiring an existing report file and launching a local browser introduces undisclosed local file handling and application-launch behavior. Unexpected local file opening can expose sensitive report contents to other local users, browser extensions, sync tooling, or shell integrations and exceeds least-surprise expectations for a diagnostic skill.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

A skill described as an autonomous live health checker but actually requiring an existing report file and launching a local browser introduces undisclosed local file handling and application-launch behavior. Unexpected local file opening can expose sensitive report contents to other local users, browser extensions, sync tooling, or shell integrations and exceeds least-surprise expectations for a diagnostic skill.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

A skill described as an autonomous live health checker but actually requiring an existing report file and launching a local browser introduces undisclosed local file handling and application-launch behavior. Unexpected local file opening can expose sensitive report contents to other local users, browser extensions, sync tooling, or shell integrations and exceeds least-surprise expectations for a diagnostic skill.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

A skill described as an autonomous live health checker but actually requiring an existing report file and launching a local browser introduces undisclosed local file handling and application-launch behavior. Unexpected local file opening can expose sensitive report contents to other local users, browser extensions, sync tooling, or shell integrations and exceeds least-surprise expectations for a diagnostic skill.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

A skill described as an autonomous live health checker but actually requiring an existing report file and launching a local browser introduces undisclosed local file handling and application-launch behavior. Unexpected local file opening can expose sensitive report contents to other local users, browser extensions, sync tooling, or shell integrations and exceeds least-surprise expectations for a diagnostic skill.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding

A skill described as an autonomous live health checker but actually requiring an existing report file and launching a local browser introduces undisclosed local file handling and application-launch behavior. Unexpected local file opening can expose sensitive report contents to other local users, browser extensions, sync tooling, or shell integrations and exceeds least-surprise expectations for a diagnostic skill.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

A skill described as an autonomous live health checker but actually requiring an existing report file and launching a local browser introduces undisclosed local file handling and application-launch behavior. Unexpected local file opening can expose sensitive report contents to other local users, browser extensions, sync tooling, or shell integrations and exceeds least-surprise expectations for a diagnostic skill.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

A skill described as an autonomous live health checker but actually requiring an existing report file and launching a local browser introduces undisclosed local file handling and application-launch behavior. Unexpected local file opening can expose sensitive report contents to other local users, browser extensions, sync tooling, or shell integrations and exceeds least-surprise expectations for a diagnostic skill.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

A skill described as an autonomous live health checker but actually requiring an existing report file and launching a local browser introduces undisclosed local file handling and application-launch behavior. Unexpected local file opening can expose sensitive report contents to other local users, browser extensions, sync tooling, or shell integrations and exceeds least-surprise expectations for a diagnostic skill.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

A skill described as an autonomous live health checker but actually requiring an existing report file and launching a local browser introduces undisclosed local file handling and application-launch behavior. Unexpected local file opening can expose sensitive report contents to other local users, browser extensions, sync tooling, or shell integrations and exceeds least-surprise expectations for a diagnostic skill.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

A skill described as an autonomous live health checker but actually requiring an existing report file and launching a local browser introduces undisclosed local file handling and application-launch behavior. Unexpected local file opening can expose sensitive report contents to other local users, browser extensions, sync tooling, or shell integrations and exceeds least-surprise expectations for a diagnostic skill.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

A skill described as an autonomous live health checker but actually requiring an existing report file and launching a local browser introduces undisclosed local file handling and application-launch behavior. Unexpected local file opening can expose sensitive report contents to other local users, browser extensions, sync tooling, or shell integrations and exceeds least-surprise expectations for a diagnostic skill.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

Broad triggers like "diagnose," "doctor," "what's wrong," and "fix my setup" can unintentionally invoke a skill that performs extensive host inspection, file reads, and shell-based data collection. Because the skill has powerful diagnostic behavior and no declared tool scoping, accidental activation materially raises exposure of sensitive environment, config, and log data.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The skill explicitly directs scanning configs, logs, workspace files, gateway error logs, identity directories, and VCS state for credentials and secret exposure. Even with a stated privacy rule, this is high-risk because a diagnostic skill is being authorized to access secret-bearing locations across the host, and any redaction failure, logging mistake, report export, or browser/display feature could disclose credentials.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 233)May include surrounding context.

md
| Control UI exposed | `controlUI` on non-loopback | false | — | true | ❌ -25 |
| Critical CVEs | `vulnerabilities` CVSS ≥9 | 0 | — | any | -15 each (max -45) |
| High CVEs | `vulnerabilities` CVSS 7–8.9 | 0 | any | — | -5 each (max -20) |
| Secrets tracked in VCS | `vcs` | clean | .env without .gitignore | tracked in git | -10 / -25 |

**Risk classification** (add after scoring):
- Critical: any ❌ from credential exposure or unauthenticated LAN bind → fix immediately

Chaining Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The shell pipeline chains remote content retrieval directly into privileged execution, reducing opportunities for inspection and making accidental or malicious execution far more likely. In a health-check skill that provides actionable fixes, users may copy-paste the command verbatim, amplifying the danger.

Content

Scanner excerpt · check_hardware.md (reported line 73)May include surrounding context.

md
| < 16 | ❌ | -40 | Unsupported — OpenClaw will not run |

**Fix (darwin):** `brew install node` or `nvm install --lts`
**Fix (linux):** `curl -fsSL https://deb.nodesource.com/setup_lts.x | sudo bash -`

---

External Script Fetching

High
Category
Supply Chain
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The guidance includes curl -fsSL https://clawhub.io/install | bash, which downloads and executes remote code directly in the shell without verification. This is a classic high-risk pattern: if the host, transport, DNS, CDN, or upstream script is compromised, it enables immediate arbitrary code execution on the target system.

Content

Scanner excerpt · check_skills.md (reported line 69)May include surrounding context.

md
| `clawhub_available = true`, `registry_reachable = false` | ⚠️ | -10 — clawhub present but offline |
| `can_install = true` | ✅ | 0 — self-improvement is fully enabled |

**Fix (clawhub missing):** `npm install -g clawhub` or `curl -fsSL https://clawhub.io/install | bash`
**Fix (registry unreachable):** Check internet connectivity; try `clawhub ping`

---

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
81% confidence
Finding

The script reads configuration files and scans them for secrets, which necessarily gives it access to credential material present in those files. Even though values are redacted in output, the broad recursive scan including all file types under the config directory increases exposure risk if the skill is run in environments containing unrelated sensitive files or symlinks.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/collect-security.sh (reported line 84)May include surrounding context.

sh
}

const scanTargets = [
  ...scanDir(HOME + "/config", [".json", ".yaml", ".yml", ".toml", ".env", "*"]),
  ...scanDir(LOG_DIR, [".log", ".txt"]).slice(0, 5) // limit log scan
];

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
84% confidence
Finding

Explicitly targeting the .env file gives the script access to one of the most common locations for plaintext secrets. Although the intent is defensive and output is redacted, reading credential-bearing files is still sensitive and can become dangerous if the skill is reused, modified, or its results are logged elsewhere.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/collect-security.sh (reported line 88)May include surrounding context.

sh
...scanDir(LOG_DIR, [".log", ".txt"]).slice(0, 5) // limit log scan
];

// Also scan .env files in OPENCLAW_HOME
const envFile = HOME + "/.env";
if (fs.existsSync(envFile)) scanTargets.push(envFile);

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/collect-security.sh (reported line 89)May include surrounding context.

sh
];

// Also scan .env files in OPENCLAW_HOME
const envFile = HOME + "/.env";
if (fs.existsSync(envFile)) scanTargets.push(envFile);

result.credential_exposure.scanned_files = scanTargets.length;

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/collect-security.sh (reported line 103)May include surrounding context.

sh
];

// Also scan .env files in OPENCLAW_HOME
const envFile = HOME + "/.env";
if (fs.existsSync(envFile)) scanTargets.push(envFile);

result.credential_exposure.scanned_files = scanTargets.length;

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/collect-security.sh (reported line 239)May include surrounding context.

sh
];

// Also scan .env files in OPENCLAW_HOME
const envFile = HOME + "/.env";
if (fs.existsSync(envFile)) scanTargets.push(envFile);

result.credential_exposure.scanned_files = scanTargets.length;