Security audit

Binance Pro 1.0.0

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This Binance skill is purpose-aligned but needs review because it can run live spot and leveraged trades while using broad activation and weak credential guidance.

Install only if you are comfortable letting an agent help with live Binance account operations. Use a dedicated Binance API key with withdrawals disabled, the narrowest permissions possible, and IP allowlisting if available. Prefer testnet or read-only use first, and require explicit confirmation for every order, leverage change, cancellation, or position close, not only large orders.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns

Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally

Findings (1)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error

Location: SKILL.md:15
Finding: Binance API Credentials Stored in a Predictable Plaintext File
Content: View full analysis
Remediation: View remediation

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns

Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code

Findings (6)

Vague Triggers

High

Category: Not specified by scanner
Confidence: 97% confidence
Finding: The skill description claims it can perform essentially any Binance operation and is marked with always=true, creating an overly broad trigger surface for a capability that can place real trades and alter leveraged positions. In an agent setting, broad invocation increases the chance of accidental activation or misuse for irreversible financial actions.
Content: No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

High

Category: Not specified by scanner
Confidence: 96% confidence
Finding: This section provides direct command sequences for opening spot and futures positions, including leverage, stop-loss, and take-profit operations, but does not present a prominent upfront warning that these actions can immediately and irreversibly move funds or create leveraged exposure. In an agent-driven environment, executable examples for market orders materially raise the risk of accidental or unauthorized trading losses.
Content: No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium

Category: Data Exfiltration
Confidence: 50% confidence
Finding: Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
Content: Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 37)May include surrounding context.
QUERY="timestamp=${TIMESTAMP}" SIGNATURE=$(echo -n "$QUERY" | openssl dgst -sha256 -hmac "$SECRET" | cut -d' ' -f2)

curl -s "https://api.binance.com/api/v3/account?${QUERY}&signature=${SIGNATURE}"
-H "X-MBX-APIKEY: ${API_KEY}" | jq '[.balances[] | select(.free != "0.00000000")]'

text

External Transmission

Medium

Category: Data Exfiltration
Confidence: 50% confidence
Finding: Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
Content: Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 43)May include surrounding context.
QUERY="timestamp=${TIMESTAMP}" SIGNATURE=$(echo -n "$QUERY" | openssl dgst -sha256 -hmac "$SECRET" | cut -d' ' -f2)

curl -s "https://api.binance.com/api/v3/account?${QUERY}&signature=${SIGNATURE}"
-H "X-MBX-APIKEY: ${API_KEY}" | jq '[.balances[] | select(.free != "0.00000000")]'

text

External Transmission

Medium

Category: Data Exfiltration
Confidence: 89% confidence
Finding: This command sends an authenticated POST request to Binance that immediately places a real market buy order. In the context of an agent skill, authenticated external transmission that changes account state and spends funds is dangerous because a prompt, invocation error, or automation mistake can trigger irreversible financial loss.
Content: Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 148)May include surrounding context.
QUERY="symbol=${SYMBOL}&side=BUY&type=MARKET&quantity=${QUANTITY}&timestamp=${TIMESTAMP}" SIGNATURE=$(echo -n "$QUERY" | openssl dgst -sha256 -hmac "$SECRET" | cut -d' ' -f2)

curl -s -X POST "https://api.binance.com/api/v3/order?${QUERY}&signature=${SIGNATURE}"
-H "X-MBX-APIKEY: ${API_KEY}" | jq '.'

text

External Transmission

Medium

Category: Data Exfiltration
Confidence: 89% confidence
Finding: This authenticated external transmission places a real market sell order on Binance, which can liquidate holdings immediately at market price. In a skill that may be invoked automatically or by ambiguous user requests, such state-changing outbound requests create significant risk of unintended asset disposal and monetary harm.
Content: Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 161)May include surrounding context.
QUERY="symbol=${SYMBOL}&side=SELL&type=MARKET&quantity=${QUANTITY}&timestamp=${TIMESTAMP}" SIGNATURE=$(echo -n "$QUERY" | openssl dgst -sha256 -hmac "$SECRET" | cut -d' ' -f2)

curl -s -X POST "https://api.binance.com/api/v3/order?${QUERY}&signature=${SIGNATURE}"
-H "X-MBX-APIKEY: ${API_KEY}" | jq '.'

text

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.