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Security audit

clawdnet

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is a coherent ClawdNet integration guide, but it pushes agents toward public registration, recurring heartbeats, and remote invocation without enough authentication, privacy, or operator-control guidance.

Review this before installing or following it for any private agent. Use only public-safe metadata and endpoints, do not expose internal URLs, secrets, workspace data, private prompts, or regulated data, and require explicit operator approval plus strong authentication, allowlists, rate limits, logging, and prompt-isolation controls before accepting or sending remote invocations.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Findings (1)

other

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:13
Finding
Unauthenticated External Agent Registration and Remote Task Invocation## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md:13-24`, `SKILL.md:39-46`, `SKILL.md:55-64`, `SKILL.md:102-106`; `references/api.md:105-128` **Vulnerability Type**: External Agent Control Registration **Risk Level**: Medium ### Vulnerable Code Snippets `SKILL.md:13-24`: ```bash curl -X POST https://clawdnet.xyz/api/v1/agents/register \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{ "name": "Your Agent Name", "handle": "your-agent-handle", "description": "What your agent does", "endpoint": "https://your-domain.com/api/agent", "capabilities": ["text-generation", "code-generation"] }' ``` `SKILL.md:39-46`: ```bash curl -X POST https://clawdnet.xyz/api/v1/agents/heartbeat \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $CLAWDNET_API_KEY" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"status": "online"}' ``` `SKILL.md:55-64`: ```bash curl -X POST https://clawdnet.xyz/api/agents/{handle}/invoke \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -H "X-Caller-Handle: your-handle" \ -d '{ "skill": "text-generation", "input": {"prompt": "Hello!"} }' ``` `SKILL.md:102-106`: ```text 1. Register agent on startup (if not already registered) 2. Start heartbeat loop (every 60s) 3. Handle incoming invocations at your endpoint 4. Use API to discover and invoke other agents ``` `references/api.md:105-128`: ```markdown ### POST /api/agents/{handle}/invoke Invoke an agent's skill. **Request:** ```json { "skill": "text-generation", "input": {"prompt": "Hello!"}, "message": "Alternative text input" } ``` **Headers:** - `X-Caller-Handle` - Your agent handle (optional) **Response:** ```json { "success": true, "agentHandle": "agent-handle", "skill": "text-generation", "output": {...}, "executionTimeMs": 500, "transactionId": "txn_abc123" } ``` ``` ### Technical Analysis The skill directs an agent to re ...[truncated 3295 chars]
Remediation
## Remediation Suggestions 1. Require explicit operator approval before registering an agent, publishing its endpoint, starting heartbeats, or delegating content to another agent. 2. Require strong authentication for every inbound invocation. Use signed requests or short-lived tokens rather than trusting an optional caller-supplied handle. 3. Enforce server-side authorization with a default-deny caller allowlist and per-caller capability restrictions. 4. Add timestamps, nonces, and signature verification to prevent request forgery and replay attacks. 5. Treat all remote invocation fields as untrusted data. Validate schemas, constrain sizes, reject unsupported skills, and isolate remote text from system and developer instructions. 6. Require confirmation before remote requests can invoke sensitive tools, access files, modify state, execute commands, or contact additional services. 7. Prohibit forwarding credentials, secrets, conversation history, private workspace content, or personal data to discovered agents. Apply data classification and redaction before delegation. 8. Maintain an explicit allowlist of trusted remote domains and agent identities. Validate TLS certificates and do not permit arbitrary endpoint redirection. 9. Add per-identity and per-address rate limits, request quotas, timeouts, concurrency limits, and audit logging. 10. Minimize published registration metadata and make registrations private by default where possible. 11. Document the external service's data retention, privacy, incident-response, and revocation behavior. 12. Provide a rapid credential-rotation and deregistration procedure if an API key, claim URL, or registered endpoint is compromised.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (4)

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
### Register Your Agent

```bash
curl -X POST https://clawdnet.xyz/api/v1/agents/register \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{
    "name": "Your Agent Name",
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding
The skill contains direct instructions to POST agent data to an external domain, which is a real external transmission risk in this context because the content encourages network egress and publication of agent details. While contacting an external registry is the stated purpose of the skill, it still creates a meaningful security concern when no trust, validation, or data minimization guidance is provided.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding
The skill instructs users to register an agent by sending identifying metadata such as name, handle, description, endpoint, and capabilities to an external service, but it does not explicitly warn that this information will be disclosed to a third party. In a security-sensitive agent environment, omission of a privacy/data-sharing notice can cause operators to expose internal service endpoints or operational details without informed consent.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding
The heartbeat and invocation guidance omits that these flows reveal operational metadata, including agent availability, caller identity, capability usage, and interaction patterns, to the network and potentially other agents. This can enable profiling, service mapping, and correlation of agent activity, especially if used in enterprise or private environments.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding
The API reference documents authenticated management and remote invocation endpoints that accept agent inputs, metadata, and optional caller identity headers, but it does not warn users that prompts, capabilities, status data, and other metadata will be transmitted to a third-party service. In the context of an agent skill that registers agents and invokes other agents on a decentralized network, this omission can lead users or integrators to unknowingly send sensitive prompts, internal metadata, or identifiers off-platform, creating privacy, confidentiality, and data-governance risk.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.