T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution
- Location
README.md:20- Finding
Unpinned Remote Dependencies Are Retrieved and Executed
- Content
View full analysis
- Remediation
View remediation
Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
The skill is a coherent MegaETH developer guide, but it gives high-impact mainnet wallet, swap, approval, bridge, and deployment instructions with insufficient guardrails for irreversible financial actions.
Review this skill before installing and treat it as high-risk operational guidance. Do not let an agent automatically send, swap, approve, bridge, or deploy on mainnet from these examples. Pin installation sources, use testnet or small amounts first, avoid unlimited approvals, verify chain IDs, addresses, calldata, slippage, gas, and value, and require explicit confirmation before every funds-moving or contract-broadcast step.
README.md:20Unpinned Remote Dependencies Are Retrieved and Executed
wallet-operations.md:187Unvalidated Aggregator Calldata Combined with Unlimited Token Approval
smart-contracts.md:103Mainnet Broadcast Guidance Disables Preflight Simulation
smart-contracts.md:327ERC-6909 Example Permits Unrestricted Public Minting
The README instructs users to run npx skills add ... without pinning a specific package version or commit, which can cause installation of whatever package version is current at execution time. If the upstream package or resolution path is compromised, users may execute unreviewed code during install, creating a supply-chain risk.
The skill explicitly encourages wallet setup, transfers, swaps, and bridging, but the examples do not warn that these actions can move real user funds and should require explicit user confirmation and review of addresses, amounts, and networks. In an AI-agent skill context, this increases the chance that an agent will autonomously prepare or initiate high-risk financial operations without adequate safeguards.
This skill directly covers high-risk financial actions such as wallet management, transaction submission, token swaps, and bridging, but it does not prominently warn about irreversible on-chain actions, mainnet asset loss, or the need for explicit user confirmation before moving funds. In an agent context, that omission increases the chance that users or downstream automations will treat operational guidance as safe-by-default and execute destructive or costly actions without adequate friction.
The quick-reference section includes live transaction and deployment commands (cast send and forge script ... --broadcast --skip-simulation) against a mainnet RPC without any warning that they perform irreversible on-chain actions. In a developer skill, users may copy-paste these commands directly, which increases the risk of unintended fund transfers, accidental mainnet deployment, or bypassing simulation safeguards.
This markdown includes concrete examples for eth_sendRawTransactionSync and realtime_sendRawTransaction against the mainnet RPC, which would broadcast a signed transaction if copied literally. The document explains mechanics and performance but does not warn that these examples can spend funds or have irreversible on-chain effects.
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
# Both work identically:
curl -X POST https://mainnet.megaeth.com/rpc \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
"jsonrpc": "2.0",
The latency section encourages pre-signing and nonce pipelining for speed, but omits guardrails around stale nonces, accidental replay of queued transactions, and unintended fund movement if pre-signed payloads are reused or sent under changed conditions. In a wallet/developer skill focused on transaction handling, this can lead users to adopt unsafe operational patterns that cause real financial loss or transaction-ordering mistakes.
The example presents a Solana-style blockhash freshness/retry flow inside a MegaETH/EVM security guide, which can mislead developers into implementing incorrect transaction handling assumptions. In a development playbook, contradictory chain semantics are security-relevant because they may cause failed submissions, broken retry logic, or unsafe signing/broadcast workflows based on the wrong threat model.
Referring to 'CPI targets' in an EVM/MegaETH audit checklist imports Solana terminology that does not match the surrounding platform model, increasing the chance that reviewers misunderstand what should actually be checked. While not an exploit primitive by itself, this kind of cross-ecosystem confusion in security guidance can cause audits to miss real risks around arbitrary external calls and call target validation.
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
# Detailed timing breakdown
curl -i -X POST https://mainnet.megaeth.com/rpc \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"eth_blockNumber","params":[]}' \
-w "dns: %{time_namelookup} | connect: %{time_connect} | total: %{time_total}\n"
Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.
# Generate wallet (one-time)
node src/setup.js --json
# Stores key at ~/.evm-wallet.json (chmod 600)
The example approves maxUint256 without warning about the risks of unlimited ERC20 allowances. If the spender contract is compromised, upgraded maliciously, or incorrectly specified, it can drain all approved tokens from the wallet, and a wallet-operations guide makes this pattern especially likely to be copied directly into production scripts.
Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.
## Security Notes
1. **Never expose private keys** — store at `~/.evm-wallet.json` with chmod 600
2. **Confirm before sending** — always show recipient, amount, gas before execution
3. **Use hardware wallets** for large amounts
4. **Verify contract addresses** — check explorer before interacting
No suspicious patterns detected.