Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This skill documents a real Celaut/Nodo workflow, but it asks agents to install and run mutable network-sourced code with high host privileges.
Install only on a dedicated Linux host or VM you are willing to administer closely. Pin source commits and verify checksums or signatures before running installers, do not let an agent run sudo automatically, and never configure wallet mnemonics or initiate Ergo spending without explicit review and consent.
SKILL.md:102Mutable Remote Installers Are Executed Directly With Root Privileges
INSTALL.md:67Downloaded yq Executable Is Installed Without Integrity Verification
INSTALL.md:281Cloud Hypervisor Binary Is Installed Without Integrity Verification
SKILL.md:122Mutable Nodo Source Checkout Is Passed to a Privileged Installer
SKILL.md:328Mutable MCP Server Checkout Installs and Runs Unreviewed npm Code
INSTALL.md:49Manual Installation Uses Mutable Source and Unverified Python Dependency Resolution
Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).
ln -sfn "$PY_CURRENT_BIN" "$PY_RUNTIME_BIN" fi
rm -rf "$TMP_PY_DIR" /tmp/nodo-python.tar.gz /tmp/nodo-python.SHA256SUMS
## 7) Install local portable Java runtime (Temurin JRE 21)
Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).
ln -sfn "$JRE_INSTALL_DIR" "$JAVA_HOME_PATH" fi
rm -rf "$TMP_JRE_DIR" /tmp/nodo-jre.tar.gz /tmp/nodo-jre.sha256.txt
## 8) Create local Python venv and install Python deps
Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).
fi
done
[ -n "$CH_OK" ] || { echo "Unable to download cloud-hypervisor"; exit 1; }
rm -f /tmp/cloud-hypervisor.bin
KERNEL_SOURCE="$(readlink -f /boot/vmlinuz 2>/dev/null || true)"
if [ -z "$KERNEL_SOURCE" ] || [ ! -f "$KERNEL_SOURCE" ]; then
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
"tests/", "*.pyc", "pycache", ".env" ] }
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
"tests/", "*.pyc", "pycache", ".env" ] }
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
"tests/", "*.pyc", "pycache", ".env" ] }
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
"tests/", "*.pyc", "pycache", ".env" ] }
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
"tests/", "*.pyc", "pycache", ".env" ] }
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
"tests/", "*.pyc", "pycache", ".env" ] }
Tool calls are chained to bypass individual safety checks or escalate capabilities beyond what any single tool call would allow.
COPY ./start.sh /var/www/start.sh
RUN chmod +x /var/www/start.sh
&& chown -R www-data:www-data /var/www/storage
&& chown -R www-data:www-data /var/www/bootstrap/cache
Tool calls are chained to bypass individual safety checks or escalate capabilities beyond what any single tool call would allow.
COPY ./start.sh /var/www/start.sh
RUN chmod +x /var/www/start.sh
&& chown -R www-data:www-data /var/www/storage
&& chown -R www-data:www-data /var/www/bootstrap/cache
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
[`../PACKING.md`](./PACKING.md).
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
[`../PACKING.md`](./PACKING.md).
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
[`../PACKING.md`](./PACKING.md).
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
[`../PACKING.md`](./PACKING.md).
This is a classic chained-abuse pattern: remote download immediately piped into a privileged shell. It collapses all trust boundaries—network, source control, and privilege escalation—into one step, enabling full host takeover if any upstream component is compromised.
routing (iptables) and the virtualization runtime:
curl --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 -sSf https://raw.githubusercontent.com/celaut-project/nodo/stable/install.sh | sudo bash
Verify-first alternative (sanctioned). If piping a remote script into `sudo
This repeats the same chaining-abuse pattern against a mutable dev branch, making the trust boundary even weaker. A malicious or accidental change upstream would be executed as root immediately, giving an attacker total control of the system.
To install from a specific branch (e.g. dev):
curl --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 -sSf https://raw.githubusercontent.com/celaut-project/nodo/dev/install.sh | sudo bash -s -- --branch dev
For manual bootstrapping without install.sh (no-sudo path, exact package and
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
Full key reference: [`../CONFIG.md`](./CONFIG.md).
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
Full key reference: [`../CONFIG.md`](./CONFIG.md).
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
Full key reference: [`../CONFIG.md`](./CONFIG.md).
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
structure of *this* bridge skill file (`SKILL.md`), **Unstoppable Skills** (Celaut
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
> that [`../USAGE.md`](./USAGE.md) does not document these either; consult
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
> that [`../USAGE.md`](./USAGE.md) does not document these either; consult
Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).
sudo systemctl daemon-reload sudo rm -f "$WRAPPER_SCRIPT"
sudo rm -f /etc/bash_completion.d/nodo /usr/local/share/zsh/site-functions/_nodo
### 2.5 Remove installation directory
Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.
CH_INITRAMFS_TARGET="$TARGET_DIR/cloud_hypervisor/initramfs/${CH_ARCH_TAG}/initramfs"
mkdir -p "$(dirname "$CH_KERNEL_TARGET")" "$(dirname "$CH_INITRAMFS_TARGET")"
cp -f "$KERNEL_SOURCE" "$CH_KERNEL_TARGET"
chmod 0644 "$CH_KERNEL_TARGET"
bash "$TARGET_DIR/bash/build_ch_initramfs.sh" "$TARGET_DIR" "$CH_ARCH_TAG" "$CH_INITRAMFS_TARGET"
No suspicious patterns detected.