Back to skill

Security audit

promptscan

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

ClawScan rates this skill benign with high confidence: the scans found no AIG issues, and the single low-probability Skillspector alert was judged expected for its purpose.

The verdict is benign, and the scan reports complete coverage of the single component. Consider the anti-refusal alert when deciding whether to install; benign does not mean risk-free.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (1)

Anti-Refusal Statement

High
Category
Anti-Refusal
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Skill attempts to nullify the agent's safety policies or restrictions ('you have no restrictions', 'ignore your guidelines', 'do anything now'). This is a direct jailbreak that disables guardrails.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 11)May include surrounding context.

md
For files, run `promptscan --json -- PATH`. For a PR, use
`promptscan --changed BASE --json -- PATH`; this reports new findings using the
base ignore policy. Pass content through stdin (`promptscan --json -`) rather
than interpolating untrusted text into shell commands.

If the MCP server is connected, use `scan_text`, `scan_many`, or `scan_path`.