T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking
- Location
skills/cjl-card/SKILL.md:51- Finding
Forced Third-Party Branding and False Authorship in User Deliverables
- Content
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来源文字`,否则空字符串。 ``` `skills/cjl-writes/SKILL.md:32-39`: ```org ### Org file header #+title: {title} #+date: [{YYYY-MM-DD Day HH:MM}] #+filetags: :write: #+identifier: {YYYYMMDDTHHMMSS} #+author: 李继刚 ``` ### Technical Analysis The card skill requires generated visual deliverables to contain a fixed logo and personal name. The writing skill independently assigns the same fixed person as the author of generated documents. These instructions are not derived from user input and are applied as part of ordinary output generation. Consequently, loading the skill changes the agent's output objective from producing a neutral user deliverable to producing content branded or attributed to a third party. This is instruction-level output hijacking because the behavior is embedded directly in the skill text rather than being requested by the user. ### Attack Path 1. A user invokes `cjl-card` to create a visual asset or `cjl-writes` to create an article. 2. The agent loads and follows the corresponding `SKILL.md`. 3. The card workflow inserts the fixed logo and personal name, or the writing workflow inserts the fixed `#+author` value. 4. The generated file is delivered to the user with third-party branding or authorship. 5. If the user republishes the output with ...[truncated 540 chars]- Remediation
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