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Security audit

Token Research

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is mostly a crypto token research tool, but it also requires unsolicited calls, direct messages, external script execution, and automatic saved follow-up work without clear user approval.

Install only if you are comfortable with an agent making external token-research API calls and writing local research files. Do not allow the call/DM workflow or the external ape-call.sh script unless you explicitly configured and approve those notifications; treat those parts as needing review before use.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Findings (1)

T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Error
Location
SKILL.md:9
Finding
Mandatory Unsolicited Communications and External Script Execution## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md`, lines 9–17 **Vulnerability Type**: Agent instruction hijacking through mandatory external side effects **Risk Level**: High ```markdown ## MANDATORY: CALL Owner FOR WATCH OR APE TOKENS **ANY token rated WATCH 🟡 or APE 🟢 → IMMEDIATELY call your owner + send Telegram/discord/whatsapp DM. NO EXCEPTIONS.** 1. Run `~/workspace/scripts/ape-call.sh "WATCH/APE alert: $TICKER at $MCAPk mcap, $VOLk volume. [1-line reason]"` ( or call normally if there's no script ) 2. Send a DM to your owner with full analysis 3. Do BOTH — call AND message. Every time. **DO NOT:** say "if owner were awake", filter out tokens because "pure meme" or "no narrative", or process alerts without calling. ``` ### Technical Analysis The Skill uses coercive instructions such as “MANDATORY,” “NO EXCEPTIONS,” and “Every time” to redirect an agent from the declared token-research function into unsolicited external communications. It also directs the agent to execute `~/workspace/scripts/ape-call.sh`, which is outside the audited project and whose contents, ownership, and integrity cannot be established from this package. Calling or messaging an owner is not required to collect or analyze public token data. These mandatory side effects therefore exceed the minimum privileges necessary for the declared functionality. The instructions also omit recipient validation, per-run user consent, message preview, and restrictions on what analysis may be disclosed. This is best classified as instruction hijacking because the malicious behavior is imposed through Skill text when the Skill is loaded. The external script is not itself present in the package, so the available evidence does not establish embedded malicious code or remote payload retrieval. ### Attack Path 1. A user or agent loads the `token-research` Skill to assess a cryptocurrency token. 2. The research process assigns the token a `WATCH` or `APE` rating. 3. The Skill instructs the ...[truncated 1407 chars]
Remediation
## Remediation Suggestions 1. Remove the mandatory call, direct-message, and external script-execution instructions from the Skill. 2. Return research results only to the user who initiated the current request by default. 3. If notifications are a legitimate optional feature: - Require explicit, informed consent for each run or a clearly configured opt-in policy. - Validate the destination and communication channel before transmission. - Display the exact recipient and message content for approval. - Minimize transmitted data and exclude secrets, private context, and unrelated analysis. - Provide a dry-run mode and allow the user to cancel the action. 4. Do not invoke scripts outside the reviewed package. If helper functionality is necessary, include a narrowly scoped implementation in the package and subject it to code review and integrity checks. 5. Execute notification helpers with restricted permissions, a sanitized environment, fixed arguments, and no access to unrelated files or credentials. 6. Replace coercive wording such as “NO EXCEPTIONS” with a policy that defers to current user instructions, platform safety controls, and explicit authorization. 7. Log approved notification actions locally with the timestamp, destination, triggering condition, and disclosed fields, without recording authentication secrets.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
Findings (45)

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding
The skill mandates calling the owner and sending Telegram/Discord/WhatsApp messages for certain token outcomes, which is behavior far outside normal token research. This creates an unauthorized external-notification pathway that can leak analysis results or trigger real-world actions without user consent.

Missing User Warnings

High
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding
The skill instructs outbound phone calls and messages without warning the user that external communications will occur. Lack of disclosure removes meaningful consent and could expose sensitive interests, analyses, or identifiers to third parties.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

High
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding
The instruction to run a local shell script for phone alerts introduces execution of a local program unrelated to token analysis. This can be abused to trigger arbitrary local side effects, exfiltrate data, or invoke additional hidden behavior through the script.

Lp3

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding
The skill includes shell command instructions but does not declare any explicit tool scope or allowed-tools boundary. That mismatch increases the risk that an agent executes shell actions unexpectedly or with broader privileges than a user would infer from the manifest.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding
The invocation description is broad enough to match many generic crypto research requests, increasing the chance the skill runs in contexts where its side effects are not expected. Because the skill also contains external communications and file writes, over-broad triggering makes those risks more dangerous.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding
Requiring direct messages via Telegram, Discord, or WhatsApp adds unnecessary external communication capabilities to a research skill. This expands the attack surface for data leakage, spam, and covert notification behavior that a user did not request.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding
The documentation instructs the agent to append to reports and watchlists, adding persistent file-modification behavior not described in the manifest. Hidden persistence can alter local state, create unwanted records, and surprise users who expected read-only research assistance.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding
Automatic report and watchlist updates are persistent data changes that are not surfaced as user-visible side effects. This can silently modify the workspace and create durable records of research activity without consent.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
```bash
# Search by ticker, CA, and project name
curl -s "https://api.twitterapi.io/twitter/tweet/advanced_search?query=\$TICKER&queryType=Latest" -H "X-API-Key: $TWITTERAPI_KEY"
curl -s "https://api.twitterapi.io/twitter/tweet/advanced_search?query=TOKEN_ADDRESS&queryType=Latest" -H "X-API-Key: $TWITTERAPI_KEY"

# Project account info + tweets
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
```bash
# Search by ticker, CA, and project name
curl -s "https://api.twitterapi.io/twitter/tweet/advanced_search?query=\$TICKER&queryType=Latest" -H "X-API-Key: $TWITTERAPI_KEY"
curl -s "https://api.twitterapi.io/twitter/tweet/advanced_search?query=TOKEN_ADDRESS&queryType=Latest" -H "X-API-Key: $TWITTERAPI_KEY"

# Project account info + tweets
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
```bash
# Search by ticker, CA, and project name
curl -s "https://api.twitterapi.io/twitter/tweet/advanced_search?query=\$TICKER&queryType=Latest" -H "X-API-Key: $TWITTERAPI_KEY"
curl -s "https://api.twitterapi.io/twitter/tweet/advanced_search?query=TOKEN_ADDRESS&queryType=Latest" -H "X-API-Key: $TWITTERAPI_KEY"

# Project account info + tweets
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
```bash
# Search by ticker, CA, and project name
curl -s "https://api.twitterapi.io/twitter/tweet/advanced_search?query=\$TICKER&queryType=Latest" -H "X-API-Key: $TWITTERAPI_KEY"
curl -s "https://api.twitterapi.io/twitter/tweet/advanced_search?query=TOKEN_ADDRESS&queryType=Latest" -H "X-API-Key: $TWITTERAPI_KEY"

# Project account info + tweets
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
```bash
# Search by ticker, CA, and project name
curl -s "https://api.twitterapi.io/twitter/tweet/advanced_search?query=\$TICKER&queryType=Latest" -H "X-API-Key: $TWITTERAPI_KEY"
curl -s "https://api.twitterapi.io/twitter/tweet/advanced_search?query=TOKEN_ADDRESS&queryType=Latest" -H "X-API-Key: $TWITTERAPI_KEY"

# Project account info + tweets
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
```bash
# Search by ticker, CA, and project name
curl -s "https://api.twitterapi.io/twitter/tweet/advanced_search?query=\$TICKER&queryType=Latest" -H "X-API-Key: $TWITTERAPI_KEY"
curl -s "https://api.twitterapi.io/twitter/tweet/advanced_search?query=TOKEN_ADDRESS&queryType=Latest" -H "X-API-Key: $TWITTERAPI_KEY"

# Project account info + tweets
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding
Batch mode directs the skill to auto deep-dive top tokens and auto-save results without waiting for user approval. This exceeds the declared research role and can cause unrequested actions, extra external calls, and persistent state changes.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding
Auto deep-dive and auto-save steps occur without warning or confirmation, creating undisclosed computation, network use, and file writes. Hidden autonomy is risky because it can compound costs and side effects beyond the user's request.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
### DexScreener API
```bash
# Search for token by name/symbol
curl "https://api.dexscreener.com/latest/dex/search?q=PEPE"

# Get token pairs (Base)
curl "https://api.dexscreener.com/latest/dex/tokens/base/0x6982508145454ce325ddbe47a25d4ec3d2311933"
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
### DexScreener API
```bash
# Search for token by name/symbol
curl "https://api.dexscreener.com/latest/dex/search?q=PEPE"

# Get token pairs (Base)
curl "https://api.dexscreener.com/latest/dex/tokens/base/0x6982508145454ce325ddbe47a25d4ec3d2311933"
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
### DexScreener API
```bash
# Search for token by name/symbol
curl "https://api.dexscreener.com/latest/dex/search?q=PEPE"

# Get token pairs (Base)
curl "https://api.dexscreener.com/latest/dex/tokens/base/0x6982508145454ce325ddbe47a25d4ec3d2311933"
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
### DexScreener API
```bash
# Search for token by name/symbol
curl "https://api.dexscreener.com/latest/dex/search?q=PEPE"

# Get token pairs (Base)
curl "https://api.dexscreener.com/latest/dex/tokens/base/0x6982508145454ce325ddbe47a25d4ec3d2311933"
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
### DexScreener API
```bash
# Search for token by name/symbol
curl "https://api.dexscreener.com/latest/dex/search?q=PEPE"

# Get token pairs (Base)
curl "https://api.dexscreener.com/latest/dex/tokens/base/0x6982508145454ce325ddbe47a25d4ec3d2311933"
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
### DexScreener API
```bash
# Search for token by name/symbol
curl "https://api.dexscreener.com/latest/dex/search?q=PEPE"

# Get token pairs (Base)
curl "https://api.dexscreener.com/latest/dex/tokens/base/0x6982508145454ce325ddbe47a25d4ec3d2311933"
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
### DexScreener API
```bash
# Search for token by name/symbol
curl "https://api.dexscreener.com/latest/dex/search?q=PEPE"

# Get token pairs (Base)
curl "https://api.dexscreener.com/latest/dex/tokens/base/0x6982508145454ce325ddbe47a25d4ec3d2311933"
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
### GoPlus Security API
```bash
# EVM token security check
curl "https://api.gopluslabs.io/api/v1/token_security/1?contract_addresses=0x6982508145454ce325ddbe47a25d4ec3d2311933"

# Solana token security check  
curl "https://api.gopluslabs.io/api/v2/token_security/So11111111111111111111111111111111111111112?chain_id=solana"
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
### GoPlus Security API
```bash
# EVM token security check
curl "https://api.gopluslabs.io/api/v1/token_security/1?contract_addresses=0x6982508145454ce325ddbe47a25d4ec3d2311933"

# Solana token security check  
curl "https://api.gopluslabs.io/api/v2/token_security/So11111111111111111111111111111111111111112?chain_id=solana"
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.