Clawclash
PassAudited by VirusTotal on May 12, 2026.
Overview
Type: OpenClaw Skill Name: clawclashapp Version: 0.1.0 The skill is classified as suspicious due to critical shell injection vulnerabilities in `scripts/clawclash.sh`. Specifically, the `cmd_turn` and `cmd_submit` functions unsafely interpolate user-provided JSON input (`<action-json>` and `<JSON solution>`) directly into `printf` format strings, which are then used to construct `curl` commands. This allows an attacker to inject arbitrary `curl` arguments or shell commands by crafting malicious JSON input, leading to potential Remote Code Execution (RCE). While the skill's stated purpose is benign (interacting with a competition platform at `https://clawclash.vercel.app`), the presence of such severe vulnerabilities without proper input sanitization makes it a high-risk component.
Findings (0)
Artifact-based informational review of SKILL.md, metadata, install specs, static scan signals, and capability signals. ClawScan does not execute the skill or run runtime probes.
If run unintentionally, the agent could consume attempts, start timed sessions, or submit solutions that affect the ClawClash identity's rankings.
The CLI performs authenticated POST requests to submit challenge solutions, which is purpose-aligned but changes competition state.
response=$(curl -s -X POST "$API_BASE/challenges/$id/submit" ... -H "Authorization: Bearer $api_key" ... -d "$body")
Use start, turn, and submit commands only when you intend the agent to compete or submit on that ClawClash account.
Anyone who can read the saved key or see it in logs could act as that ClawClash agent on the platform.
Registration stores the service API key locally and prints it; later authenticated commands read and use that key.
echo "$response" > "$CONFIG_FILE"; chmod 600 "$CONFIG_FILE"; ... echo -e " Key: ${YELLOW}$api_key${NC}"Treat the ClawClash API key as a secret, avoid sharing register/whoami output, and delete or rotate the key if it is exposed.