Dangerous exec
- Finding
- Shell command execution detected (child_process).
Security checks across static analysis, malware telemetry, and agentic risk
This skill is an AI task orchestrator, but it includes a Code Mode component that can run generated Node.js/PowerShell code and read or write local files with the user's privileges.
Install only if you specifically need an orchestration library that can execute generated code. Run it in a disposable or tightly scoped workspace, avoid loading sensitive environment variables, require manual approval for file writes and code execution, and review the generated code before allowing Code Mode to run.
VirusTotal findings are pending for this skill version.
Artifact-based informational review of SKILL.md, metadata, install specs, static scan signals, and capability signals. ClawScan does not execute the skill or run runtime probes.
If the agent or a user runs Code Mode on unsafe generated code, it could execute local commands, access files, or use network-capable Node/PowerShell libraries with the user's permissions.
The Code Mode component writes generated code to a temporary file and executes it through Node.js or PowerShell, including PowerShell ExecutionPolicy Bypass. This is high-impact generated-code execution rather than a contained tool call.
const child = spawn('node', [tmpFile], { ... env: { ...process.env }, timeout, }); ... spawn('powershell.exe', ['-NoProfile', '-ExecutionPolicy', 'Bypass', '-File', tmpFile])Use this only in a trusted, isolated workspace; review generated code before execution; disable PowerShell support if unnecessary; and add a real sandbox or explicit approval gate before any code execution.
A mistaken or adversarial tool call could read sensitive local files or overwrite files outside the intended project directory.
Built-in file-read and file-write templates resolve and operate on caller-provided paths without an allowlist, workspace boundary, or mandatory approval in the converter itself.
const filePath = path.resolve(${this._toJson(params.path)}); const content = fs.readFileSync(filePath, 'utf8'); ... fs.writeFileSync(filePath, ${this._toJson(params.content)});Restrict file operations to a configured workspace, deny protected paths by default, require user confirmation for writes, and log exactly which files will be read or changed.
Environment variables such as API keys, cloud credentials, or session tokens available to the parent process could be read by generated code.
The generated-code child process inherits the full environment, not just the specific provider key needed for a tool.
env: { ...process.env }Pass a minimal allowlisted environment to child processes, avoid running with sensitive credentials loaded, and require explicit user approval before any code can access provider credentials.
Users may believe generated code is safely isolated when it can still affect local files and access inherited secrets.
The documentation describes the execution as sandboxed, but the provided implementation shows ordinary child processes with inherited environment and broad filesystem access, which may overstate the safety boundary.
沙箱执行(子进程隔离)
Describe this as child-process execution rather than a sandbox unless real isolation is added, and clearly warn users about local file, credential, and command-execution risks.
Dependency resolution could install a newer compatible package version than the author tested, and users have limited source provenance information.
The package uses a version range rather than a pinned dependency, and the registry metadata lists the source as unknown. This is not malicious by itself, but it increases provenance review importance for a skill that can execute code.
"dependencies": { "zod": "^3.24.0" }Verify the publisher/source, prefer a lockfile or pinned dependency versions, and install in an isolated environment before granting access to sensitive projects.